QASSIM DAOUD ON POSSIBLE ALLIANCE TO END ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000363

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: QASSIM DAOUD ON POSSIBLE ALLIANCE TO END ALL
ALLIANCES (AND MALIKI'S POLITICAL CAREER)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Shia Independent CoR member Qassim Daoud told
us February 5 that he has had several meetings in recent days
with senior ISCI leaders about the formation of a "National
Front" CoR grouping that would alter Iraq's current political
landscape and end the government of Prime Minister al-Maliki.
Describing the new alliance as a "beautiful basket of
parties" that bridges ethno-sectarian divides, Qassim said it
would contain ISCI, the two main Kurdish parties, the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP),Iraqiyyah, Qassim's "Solidarity Bloc" of
ten Shia independents, and possibly Saleh al-Mutlaq's
National Dialogue Front. ISCI, Iraqqiyah, and IIP sources
either confirmed ongoing talks regarding formation of a new
grouping or were sufficiently cagey to suggest that such
talks are indeed underway. In the same breath, however,
Qassim said his "Solidarity Bloc" had rejected ISCI overtures
of a provincial electoral partnership because the Iraqi
public is turning away from Islamist politics. Concerned
about Sadrist control of the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC),Qassim is preparing a lawsuit against IHEC
that will ask a court to order dissolution of the current
IHEC leadership team. End Summary.

Beautiful Basket Means Farewell to Nuri?
--------------


2. (C) Qassim confided that he has had four meetings in the
past week with ISCI's Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Adel Abdel Mehdi,
and other senior officials about formation of a "National
Front" that would include ISCI, Qassim's Solidarity Bloc, the
two major Kurdish parties, Iraqiyyah, IIP, and possibly Saleh
al-Mutlaq's National Dialogue Front. Fielding a line-up of
approximately 157 CoR members, the "National Front" (a
"beautiful basket of parties," Qassim gushed) would be able
to establish a quorum and simple majority on any issue before
the CoR. Qassim emphasized that the Dawa Party would not be
welcome to join the "National Front," and he predicted with
clearly evident glee that an early item of "Front" business
would be removal of Maliki through a no-confidence vote, with
current Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi as replacement Prime
Minister.


3. (C) Senior Hakim aide Haitham al-Husseini confirmed that
Hakim has been shopping ideas about a new political order in
recent meetings with Ayad Allawi, Tareq al-Hashimi and other
heavyweights, but Haitham was guardedly cagey when asked
about specifics of a new alliance. Iraqiyyah contacts also
acknowledged preliminary rumblings regarding a new alliance.
IIP contacts have been across-the-board reluctant to engage
in any in-depth discussion over the purported alliance.
Nevertheless, reading between the lines and listening to
reports from more talkative contacts, there is clearly a
great deal of positioning going on behind the scenes amongst
the groups. One contact posited that ISCI, the Kurds, and
IIP essentially agreed to work together to ensure the legal
formation of three distinct regions - Shia, Kurdish, and
Sunni - with Hashimi leading the latter. The MOU signed
between the IIP and the two main Kurdish parties last
December was ample evidence to critics that the two groups
had yet again sold out Iraqi national interests in lieu of
their own private agendas. Hashimi continues in his recent
public statements to downplay that agreement and conduct
damage control among his Sunni compatriots. Hashimi,s
recent public engagements with Shia leaders, Grand Ayatollah
Sistani last Autumn and the Hakims more recently, also feed
rampant rumors of behind the scenes positioning.


4. (C) Declaring that "we'll leave Maliki and Jaffri behind,
along with Adnan Dulaymi, Khalaf al-Alayan, the Sadrists and
the other troublemakers," Qassim predicted a likely Dawa
counterpunch that would jettison Maliki and replace him with
former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaffri, who would rely on
the Sadrist Trend as his chief base of political and popular
support and thus be obliged to make concessions to the
Sadrists. As is his wont, Qassim was withering in his
criticism of the Maliki government, characterizing the Prime
Minister as "an idiot" and his cabinet ministers as "wild
animals," and repeatedly implored the USG to abandon support
for Maliki. Maliki's hostile relations with his neighbor
Qassim make the famously tense Maliki-Hashimi relationship
look like a lovefest by comparison, and it has degenerated to
the point that Maliki blocked road access to Qassim's house
by installing a t-wall that forces Qassim to transit a
parking lot controlled by the PM's security detail in order
to reach his own home. We noticed that the obstructing
t-wall has been painted with a garish mural since our last
visit, a sure sign that it is there to stay.

Provincial Elections, Sadrists Mock IHEC Lawsuit
-------------- ---

BAGHDAD 00000363 002 OF 002




5. (C) While Qassim maintained that he and his independent
bloc would be pleased to join the "National Front" under
ISCI's leadership, he said he flatly rejected ISCI overtures
to enter into a provincial election partnership because he
thinks the Iraqi electorate is disgusted with all Islamist
political parties, particularly Shia religious parties like
ISCI and Dawa, and is eager for a non-sectarian alternative.
He continued that Grand Ayatollah Sistani is similarly
disenchanted with Shia religious parties, and has already
sent word to ISCI's Hakim and others that they may not use
his name or photo in election campaigns, as they did in 2005
polling. Qassim claimed that the religious parties -
including the Sadrists - are well aware of their diminished
popularity in south-central Iraq and will turn their militias
loose during the campaign and polling in order to preserve
their dominance through threats, intimidation, and violence.
Qassim confided that he may have trouble recruiting
independent candidates to contest elections for fear of
assassination by thugs affiliated with rival contestants.
Concerned about Sadrist control of the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC),Qassim is preparing a lawsuit
against IHEC that will ask a court to order dissolution of
the current IHEC leadership team. When he warned several
Sadrist CoR members about the impending lawsuit, he related,
they burst out laughing in reply.
BUTENIS