Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3589
2008-11-12 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
UNAMI'S DE MISTURA CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE PRT
VZCZCXRO8933 RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3589 3171340 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 121340Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0347 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003589
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI'S DE MISTURA CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE PRT
DRAW-DOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003589
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI'S DE MISTURA CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE PRT
DRAW-DOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) In a brief meeting with the visiting Joint Campaign
Plan Assessment Team (JCPAT) on October 20, UNAMI SRSG
Staffan de Mistura expressed considerable concern over the
negative impact of possible military/PRT drawdowns on UNAMI
operations in the provinces. He pointed out that UNAMI's
expanded mandate requires more personnel on the ground and
greater visibility. UNAMI is in the process of co-locating
at five PRTs (Basrah, Najaf, Anbar, Ninewa and Kirkuk) and
depends on MNF-I for off-FOB movements. He reminded the
group the 2003 Canal Hotel bombing still colors the UN's
security stance, and that without MNF-I support, especially
at the PRTs, it would be difficult for UNAMI to fulfill its
expanded mandate. Except in Erbil and Najaf, UNAMI has been
unable to identify Iraqi security forces able to protect its
personnel out in the provinces.
2. (C) De Mistura is particularly concerned about the PRT
in Kirkuk. The military drawdown there will greatly harm
UNAMI's ability to oversee a disputed internal boundary (DIB)
resolution, the cornerstone of its mandate. UNAMI may also
be called upon to assist in implementing Article 24 of the
Provincial Elections Law, which calls for a power-sharing
agreement among the Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen in Kirkuk in
advance of provincial elections there. Both of these are
extremely volatile issues that UNAMI will not be able to
address without security assistance from MNF-I.
3. (C) Comment: In a 45-minute meeting designed to brief
the JCPAT on all of UNAMI's projects, it is striking that the
SRSG spent a significant portion of that time discussing
basing issues. He commented on the often-heard belief that,
as the U.S. presence draws down and PRTs are consolidated,
UNAMI will be able to step in and fill the gap. He corrected
that belief, stating, "If you go, we go." While we encourage
UNAMI to fulfill its mandate, it is important to keep in mind
that it will only be able to accomplish this through
co-locating at PRTs. We do not see the PRTs disappearing any
time in the near future, and are working closely with MNF-I
as it considers its re-basing options to ensure support for
civilian activities where PRTs are located, pointing out that
the security situation is only part of the assessment. To
that end, the Office of Provincial Affairs and MNF-I led a
meeting to discuss Kirkuk support issues on October 31.
Solutions for the short term were identified and
recommendations for the long term have been forwarded to
Commanding General Odierno. The Commanding General has
directed MNF-I to provide the needed security and movement
support specifically for UNAMI in Kirkuk and for UNAMI
operations in general moving forward. Life support and
movement will be provided to ensure both the PRT and UNAMI
can fulfill their mandates. We will do a similar review for
each PRT. End Comment.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI'S DE MISTURA CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE PRT
DRAW-DOWN
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) In a brief meeting with the visiting Joint Campaign
Plan Assessment Team (JCPAT) on October 20, UNAMI SRSG
Staffan de Mistura expressed considerable concern over the
negative impact of possible military/PRT drawdowns on UNAMI
operations in the provinces. He pointed out that UNAMI's
expanded mandate requires more personnel on the ground and
greater visibility. UNAMI is in the process of co-locating
at five PRTs (Basrah, Najaf, Anbar, Ninewa and Kirkuk) and
depends on MNF-I for off-FOB movements. He reminded the
group the 2003 Canal Hotel bombing still colors the UN's
security stance, and that without MNF-I support, especially
at the PRTs, it would be difficult for UNAMI to fulfill its
expanded mandate. Except in Erbil and Najaf, UNAMI has been
unable to identify Iraqi security forces able to protect its
personnel out in the provinces.
2. (C) De Mistura is particularly concerned about the PRT
in Kirkuk. The military drawdown there will greatly harm
UNAMI's ability to oversee a disputed internal boundary (DIB)
resolution, the cornerstone of its mandate. UNAMI may also
be called upon to assist in implementing Article 24 of the
Provincial Elections Law, which calls for a power-sharing
agreement among the Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen in Kirkuk in
advance of provincial elections there. Both of these are
extremely volatile issues that UNAMI will not be able to
address without security assistance from MNF-I.
3. (C) Comment: In a 45-minute meeting designed to brief
the JCPAT on all of UNAMI's projects, it is striking that the
SRSG spent a significant portion of that time discussing
basing issues. He commented on the often-heard belief that,
as the U.S. presence draws down and PRTs are consolidated,
UNAMI will be able to step in and fill the gap. He corrected
that belief, stating, "If you go, we go." While we encourage
UNAMI to fulfill its mandate, it is important to keep in mind
that it will only be able to accomplish this through
co-locating at PRTs. We do not see the PRTs disappearing any
time in the near future, and are working closely with MNF-I
as it considers its re-basing options to ensure support for
civilian activities where PRTs are located, pointing out that
the security situation is only part of the assessment. To
that end, the Office of Provincial Affairs and MNF-I led a
meeting to discuss Kirkuk support issues on October 31.
Solutions for the short term were identified and
recommendations for the long term have been forwarded to
Commanding General Odierno. The Commanding General has
directed MNF-I to provide the needed security and movement
support specifically for UNAMI in Kirkuk and for UNAMI
operations in general moving forward. Life support and
movement will be provided to ensure both the PRT and UNAMI
can fulfill their mandates. We will do a similar review for
each PRT. End Comment.
CROCKER