THE SADRIST PROGRAM FOR KARBALA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003561 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR IZ SUBJECT: THE SADRIST PROGRAM FOR KARBALA BAGHDAD 00003561 001.5 OF 003 (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle accordingly. Not for Internet distribution. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The PRT obtained in early November a copy of an Arabic-language pamphlet titled The General Program of the Martyr al-Sadr Office in Karbala, signed by Shaykh Muhannad Abd al-Hussein al-Karbala'i, Manager of the al-Sadr Office in Karbala, and dated 2008. We have sent a scanned copy of the pamphlet to the Political Section in Baghdad. PRT translation follows. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Begin Translation: "In the name of God, the Most Merciful and Compassionate. To all faithful people in Karbala, whether affiliated with the al-Sadr Party or not: Because Karbala is a holy city, it is sensitive and special. In my opinion, anyone working here should bear in mind the following: 1) Karbala's history and origins, 2) The present reality of this city and its problems, 3) The future of this city in terms of security and economics." ¶3. (SBU) "I was asked by the headquarters of al-Sadr in Najaf to run the al-Sadr Office in Karbala. I prepared for this by undertaking a study on the background of the active members of the al-Sadr Party and their relationships to persons in Karbala, as well as their weaknesses with regard to the current circumstances. I presented this study to the headquarters in Najaf as a practical guide for the people of Karbala as well as for the members of the al-Sadr Office here." ¶4. (SBU) "I summarize the findings of my study as follows: 1) Misinterpretation of the principles and aims of the al-Sadr Party, including by party members themselves, is a central reason for the deterioration of the party's situation. This has been exacerbated by some people allegedly belonging to the al-Sadr Party. 2) In my view, the al-Sadr Office in Karbala should be administered by locals who know best the suffering and problems of the people. The manager ought to run the Office for at least two years and should not be replaced or interfered with during this time." ¶5. (SBU) "Before I identify the current and future principles and aims of the al-Sadr Office, I wish to explain the following: Everyone should understand that we must let go of past events between the al-Sadr Party and others. I do not hold any negative views toward any religious or governmental entities. We are ready for reconciliation and for working together on behalf of the community of Karbala." ¶6. (SBU) "The Current and Future Principles and Aims of the al-Sadr Office in Karbala: 1) We must rehabilitate the members of the al-Sadr Office, inspired by the principles of our forefathers among the holy people, so that we may consider them as guides in our daily lives. 2) We must form a living, attentive vision of the field of work that derives from a profound understanding of the basic, ideological foundations and missions of present and former religious leaders. This requires understanding the concept and elements of stability and constancy, thus distinguishing them from the state and executive agencies. The misuse of power by some security and executive agencies does not justify individual acts or threats against the state's foundations of stability and growth. 3) The al-Sadr Office is open to everyone and shares with them the country's broad national and religious ties. We ought to realize that the main problem facing us as Muslims and Iraqis is the occupation, and the rescheduling of the withdrawal is a top priority. We must resolve our disputes with local entities and others so that we can achieve this ultimate goal." ¶7. (SBU) "4) People should be treated fairly and impartially under the law, enabling them to retain their dignity and enhancing the stability and security of society. 5) We will fight all deviations within the al-Sadr group, including its various ideological, administrative, financial, and social permutations. 6) We urge the undertaking of community action to awaken public service workers and assisting them in reclaiming their lost rights. 7) We will interact with all open-minded persons in all sectors of Karbala society. We shall make the al-Sadr Office an umbrella for all, with the only thing distinguishing al-Sadr members from others being the members' fear of God. This can be achieved by following the ideology of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his followers, including the late al-Sadr, and by serving the people with humanity." ¶8. (SBU) "The Internal and External Challenges of the Program: The internal problems have to do with the al-Sadr Party itself. 1) Misconception of the principles of the al-Sadr Office by some followers produced a poor understanding of the ways and methods of translating these principles into reality. This prompted some followers of BAGHDAD 00003561 002.2 OF 003 al-Sadr to obey God in terms of civil disobedience and to neglect the directives and orders of the Marja'iya. 2) Infiltration of some bad people into the al-Mahdi Army hurt the reputation of this force as these people misused its name and power. Their apparent aim was to destroy the reputation of the al-Sadr Party. 3) The former leaders of the al-Sadr Party in Karbala failed to implement a fruitful plan and a productive vision aimed at a stable future for al-Sadr followers and Shias in general. They did not balance stability, social harmony, and the objectives of the al-Sadr Party on the one hand with the national interest on the other." ¶9. (SBU) "The External Challenges: 1) There has been a negative perception of the al-Sadr Party stemming from the bad deeds done by some in the al-Sadr group. These left a bad impression on the part of the general public and may have been done deliberately or as a result of narrow views. 2) There is a weak public understanding of the principles and foundations of the al-Sadr Party that has resulted in poor communications between the Party and the community. This has clouded perceptions and led to misunderstanding of the general trend. 3) The ideological and other priorities of some entities in Karbala have conflicted with the stability and growth of the al-Sadr Party. These have been advanced to suit the majority interests at the expense of the al-Sadr Party." ¶10. (SBU) "Before I detail our program, I wish to mention that we have chosen a good staff for the al-Sadr office in Karbala. It consists of skilled professionals selected from universities as well as the best non-sectarian and rational clerics. My project focuses on studying the following: 1) Religion. A) We should pay no attention to what happened previously in Karbala and encourage people to forget the tragic results. B) Dialogue should include all faiths and be aimed at minimizing differences, thus enabling all to freely exchange views. C) Citizens should work together to sign a Charter of Honor that would put pressure on the local government to do what is right. D) Karbala should establish a Hawza and support it by hiring lecturers, promoting Islamic subjects, and supporting the students morally and financially. E) The Shia Office should be strengthened by hiring active clerics in mosques and husayniyas. Their role is to educate and to give advice." ¶11. (SBU) "2) Politics. A) The Provincial Council members should be active, well-known, decent, and neither secular nor sectarian. They ought to be a representative sample in both their religious views and attitudes toward their national responsibilities, and they would indicate this by signing the Charter of Honor which will facilitate peace among all parties. B) The judiciary must be independent and never beholden to any party or religious interests. ¶12. (SBU) "3) Tribes. A) A tribal desk should be reestablished within the al-Sadr Office to focus on identifying leaders able to resolve disputes. B) The tribes should be patriotic. They belong to Iraq. C) The tribes should take a more active role in society and thereby support reconciliation and enhance security. D) The tribes in Karbala should back the provincial government and be ready to serve the people. E) The tribes should play a lead role in advancing justice and equality and should serve as bridges enabling their members to strengthen ties and exchange views with other tribes." ¶13. (SBU) "4) Media. A) All Party communications will be disseminated via the print and broadcast media. B) The Party will undertake a series of speeches prompting the people of Karbala to reevaluate their current circumstances and to support those authorized to bolster the province's security. C) The Party periodically will issue ideological and cultural leaflets incorporating articles and detailed studies about the current life of Muslims in Karbala. D) The Party will seek to match new thinking about religious society in Karbala with the reasons for the conflicts among the different ideologies, thereby helping to find solutions and maintaining an open-minded dialogue with others. E) The Party will enable academicians to play a role in assessing the situation in Karbala and finding solutions to the province's political and religious crises. F) The Party will use the local media to make people aware of the real situation in Karbala and to minimize the differences among ideologies." ¶14. (SBU) "5) Security. A) The Karbala security staff and others wielding governmental power should be independent and honest in discharging their duties. Security forces should be neither sectarian nor secular. B) The powerful provincial security agencies should work together with the Karbala government to achieve intelligence cooperation that will help to defeat terrorism." BAGHDAD 00003561 003.2 OF 003 ¶15. (SBU) "Now that I have identified the features of our program, I wish to address the followers of the al-Sadr Party concerning how we will fulfill our destiny and win the battle of self-correction. Perhaps some in Karbala see this program as a tactic to rebuild the al-Mahdi Army and believe we intend to again dominate the city and oblige them to do our bidding, but our principles and ideologies are opposed to such ideas. We are a humanitarian and ideological party and we strive to enlighten by following these examples in our work: A) The Indian leader Ghandi was an example to humanity. As he stated, he learned many lessons from Imam Husayn that helped him to win his struggle. So, we as well as Ghandi consider Husayn's suffering the best way to achieve the real victory, and we regard this suffering as a guide in accomplishing our objectives. B) We will undertake our self-correction patiently and logically to guarantee its endurance. C) We will undertake our self-correction independently, relying on nothing and no one except Islamic instruction as a guide." ¶16. (SBU) "Conclusion. 1) Objectivity and seriousness enable laws to be respected by the people, who will support the laws so long as they preserve civil rights and dignity. First Recommendation: To my brothers who are affiliated with the al-Sadr Party in Karbala. The Islamic parties, al-Sadr included, have entered a sensitive and dangerous time. This danger is embodied in the upcoming election and in our battle for self-correction. I encourage my followers not to be disappointed because I believe it is likely that we will re-unite our Party." ¶17. (SBU) "2) Second Recommendation: To the people of Karbala. The events that occurred in Karbala last year between the followers of the al-Sadr Party and the security forces left a bad impression about members of our Party. These events convinced people that al-Sadr followers are outlaws who seek violence. I want to make clear the distinction between the good among the followers of al-Sadr and the bad, because some are attempting to create problems between al-Sadr followers and others." ¶18. (SBU) "3) Third Recommendation: To the Governor of Karbala. My brother, I hope you will reconsider your views about the al-Sadr Party in Karbala; you may have a mistaken impression because you have not received the truth from the hypocrites around you. This is an auspicious time to rid the al-Sadr Party of Karbala of bad elements, and I support efforts to go after outlaws irrespective of their affiliations." ¶19. (SBU) "4) Fourth Recommendation: To the Karbala security forces. My brothers, we can move from an era of tension to a new era of peace by cooperating with one another. Such cooperation requires us to forget past events. I am sure we all have some regrets about how we behaved before. Thanks Be to God. Sheikh Muhannad Abd al-Hussein al-Karbala'i, Manager of the al-Sadr Office in Karbala Province." End Translation CROCKER