BAGHDAD PC CHAIRMAN FIGHTS TO STAY ON TOP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000354 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ SUBJECT: BAGHDAD PC CHAIRMAN FIGHTS TO STAY ON TOP REF: A. BAGHDAD 2039 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2040 ¶C. BAGHDAD 2044 ¶D. BAGHDAD 1645 Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andrew A. Passen for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary. The Chairman of the Baghdad Provincial Council, Mueen al-Khademy (ISCI/Badr) is working overtime to shore up his position in the increasingly uncertain environment of provincial politics in Baghdad. Chairman Mueen must prepare for provincial powers legislation that weakens the Provincial Council and strengthens the Governor's hand. Mueen must fend off the encroachment of the national government into his province's business. Mueen's grip over the city is in jeopardy as the Mayor, another ISCI/Badr strongman, anticipates future legislation granting the City of Baghdad more independence from the directives of the Provincial Council. Mueen must strategize how his party will emerge victorious against the Sadrists in the next round of provincial elections and maintain ISCI/Badr control over provincial government. A crafty politician, Chairman Mueen is working every angle to make sure he, the body he chairs, and the party he leads stay at the helm of Baghdad. His recent behavior indicates that he sees the USG as a possible ally against the Governor, the Mayor, the national government and the Sadrists. Mueen's challenges afford Baghdad PRT an opportunity to promote our own objective of improving GoI/USG coordination of essential service delivery in Baghdad. End Summary. -------------- -- Chairman Mueen as architect of PC's power plays -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Chairman Mueen al-Khademy is the party leader of the ISCI/Badr coalition on the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC). He controls the votes of 28 of the 51 seats on that body through his strict enforcement of party discipline. Upon election in 2005, the PC capitalized on CPA Order 71's (Local Government Powers) omission of language specific to Baghdad to consolidate power over a number of institutions governing Baghdad. The PC seized direct control over the Amanat (City Hall),absorbed the Regional Council, the body responsible for administration of the outlying provincial communities, and reduced the authorities of the local councils in Baghdad's districts and neighborhoods (refs A,B,C). With 
political support from his ISCI/Badr loyalists and the expanding institutional ability of the PC, Mueen made himself the dominant figure in Baghdad provincial politics. -------------- -------------- His authority challenged by Governor's new powers -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Mueen told us on January 25 that the draft provincial powers law currently before the Council of Representatives (CoR) will greatly strengthen the power of the Governor at the expense of the Provincial Council. According to Mueen, the version of the law he was familiar with explicitly defines powers for the Governor but offers vague mandates for the Provincial Council which do not lend themselves well to enforcement. The proposed law looks like a retrenchment among Iraqi political leaders who do not trust democracy, Mueen said. ¶5. (C) While Mueen may in fact bemoan the state of democratization in Iraq, it is likely his own political future that truly concerns him. Governor Hussein al-Tahan is an ISCI/Badr colleague but has shown disdain for the Provincial Council in the past and told us that his office deserves more power because "this is where the real work gets done." Mueen believes that in future conflicts between the PC Chairman and the Governor, the Governor will likely have the law on his side. -------------- -------------- He tells national leaders to stay out of 'his business' -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Immediately prior to the January 24 Joint Planning Commission (JPC) meeting between USG and GoI services institutions, Mueen tipped us off that there might be a "confrontation" at the meeting. Mueen and other provincial leaders consistently criticized Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki throughout the past year for the creation of committees supporting Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) (a.k.a. Baghdad Security Plan) that assigned major responsibilities to national GoI figures and minimized the input of Baghdad's provincial government. Mueen used the platform of the JPC on BAGHDAD 00000354 002 OF 003 January 24 to censure the national government for this neglect and stated that the JPC, currently managed in part through the office of former Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zobai, should be a function of the PC's Essential Services Committee. Mueen made his case and set in motion the PC's future absorption of the JPC, winning a round against both the national government and the Mayor of Baghdad. -------------- - He wants to keep a grip on the City of Baghdad -------------- - ¶7. (C) In 2005 the Baghdad Provincial Council declared the Baghdad City Council dissolved and forcibly removed its members from the Amanat. Within a few months the PC installed one of its own, Saber al-Esawi (ISCI/Badr),as the new Mayor. The PC justified its actions under CPA 71, claiming that the historical status of the Amanat as an arm of the national government was no longer valid. The City of Baghdad looks likely to regain this special status when the Council of Representatives passes the law required to fulfill Article 124 of the Constitution. The irony for Mueen is that the Mayor and other Amanat officials put in place by the PC are now major proponents of legislation making the Amanat more independent of provincial government and more closely connected to the national government, in line with pre-CPA Iraqi law. Mueen must therefore strengthen his authority over the workings of the Amanat before a new law limits his power; by taking over the JPC he may be able to retain a degree of influence over the Amanat in lieu of direct legal authority. His calculation may also include the fact that controlling the JPC also provides him access to and influence over USG resources that may bolster his position relative to his major challengers: the Mayor, the Governor, the national government and the Sadrists. -------------- He plays nice with USG to bolster his status -------------- ¶8. (C) On January 27, Mueen co-chaired a new forum called the Baghdad Provincial Executive Planning Session (BPEPS) with Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andy Passen and Multi-National Division - Baghdad (MND-B) Deputy Commanding General - Support (DCG/S) BG Milano. The new forum is an outgrowth of the formerly Coalition-only executive planning session for the JPC. The new bi-weekly meeting will bring together Baghdad's PC Chairman, Governor, Mayor and key Coalition reconstruction entities to discuss strategic political and services issues. Mueen immediately seized the initiative to establish a secretariat for the forum responsible for setting the agenda and conducting follow-up to the meeting's decisions. Mueen told us that he sees BPEPS as an opportunity for Baghdad's provincial leaders to take a greater role in supporting the Baghdad Security Plan. Taking the lead on BPEPS also helps Mueen strengthen his position in relation to the Governor and Mayor in front of key USG leaders, who command considerable resources. -------------- Can he hold off the Sadrists in an election? -------------- ¶9. (C) Mueen's personal political future is also tied to his party's ability to fend off challengers in the next round of provincial elections; imminent passage of provincial powers legislation starts a countdown for this event. Provincial politicians of all stripes believe that the Sadrists will win big in Baghdad's next election, perhaps even capturing an outright majority. Notable Baghdad Sadrist Deputy Governor Qassim al-Duraji told us that his party is more organized than it was in 2005 and will no doubt perform well at the polls. Baghdad PC's Da'wa party leader Mazin Makiya said that the next provincial election will see ISCI/Badr lose its dominant position to the Sadrists, a view held by many (ref D). ¶10. (C) Mueen acknowledged that ISCI/Badr will face a real challenge at the polls, but expressed confidence that the people of Baghdad will recognize all the hard work done by the current PC under his leadership and will turn out in support of his party. Many PC members say that 'election season' is heating up in the province as parties busily prepare campaigns to reach out to Baghdad's voters. -------------- -------------- Comment: Baghdad politics makes for strange bedfellows -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Comment. Mueen's relationship with Baghdad PRT has ebbed and flowed as his personal standing and ISCI/Badr policy towards the USG shifted back and forth over the past three years. The relationship is closest when Mueen has a BAGHDAD 00000354 003 OF 003 specific need for our support or a shared objective with our policy. A perfect storm may now be steering him closer to us. Chairman Mueen faces unprecedented challenges to his position of authority within the province: he has personal, political, legislative and institutional rivals arrayed against him. His relatively recent interest in joint USG/GoI forums such as the JPC and BPEPS seems to signal his need for our support in bolstering his position of authority amongst these rivals. ¶12. (C) Comment cont'd. Mueen also makes a point of applauding USG efforts to reach out to various Sadrists, stating that this helps splinter the movement into rival groups. Sadrists will have to choose sides between groups willing to support 'legitimate' government and those against it, according to Mueen. It is clear that Mueen made these comments to indicate that our objective of supporting legitimate government is linked to his objective of preventing a Sadrist election victory. He also implied that it may be in the USG's best interest to see a delay in provincial elections to prevent "the turmoil" that would undoubtedly occur in seating a new provincial government (the further implication being that this turmoil would be greater if the Sadrists emerged victorious). For a number of reasons, Mueen finds it advantageous to strengthen his relationship with Baghdad PRT and the Coalition. ¶13. (C) Comment cont'd. For a number of reasons, we also find this strategic partnership worthwhile. If Mueen proves willing and able to harness the tension of the current environment and transform it into momentum on improving services -- which we believe will help to legitimize the GoI, satisfy the population, decrease terrorist financing, and diminish any remaining allure of militia groups -- then our objectives are indeed aligned. And if Mueen brings a few Sadrists to the table who are willing to talk with us, then we all may be better off. End comment. BUTENIS