AMBASSADOR PRESSES CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003538

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2018
TAGS: KIRF PGOV PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO
CONSOLIDATE GAINS, CONTEST ELECTIONS

REF: BAGHDAD 3506

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Classified By: By Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During a November 5 meeting, the Ambassador pressed
four Christian leaders to consolidate the gains from the
November 3 Article 50 vote and avoid the Sunni disaster of
2005 by not boycotting the upcoming provincial elections.
The Ambassador acknowledged that the paucity of seats
allocated to minorities by Article 50 as passed was a
disappointment to the USG but stressed the need for
Christians to set aside their differences, contest the
elections, and move forward. In November 7 meetings with
President Talabani and VP Al-Mahdi, the Ambassador urged the
Presidency Council to sign off on the new legislation as
quickly as possible; emboffs have vigorously pressed other
contacts to do the same. The four leaders expressed concern
over the future for Christians in Iraq, particularly in light
of the recent killings and intimidation of Christians in
Mosul and what they perceive as past GOI negligence in
protecting Christians. The leaders said they were unclear
who was behind the violence in the north, but the Ambassador
said the USG view was that Al Qaeda, taking advantage of the
complicated political environment, was responsible. Bishop
Wardouni raised the issue of compensation for MNC-I's
occupation of Chaldean Church properties and his concern
about security for the facilities once MNC-I leaves. The
Ambassador assured him of US commitment to the security of
the property. End Summary.

Frustration Over Too Few Seats
--------------


2. (C) On November 5, the Ambassador met with Chaldean
Auxiliary Bishop Shlaimon Wardouni, Christian
parliamentarians Younadam Kanna and Ablahad Afram Sawa, and
Non-Muslim Endowments Director Abdullah al-Naufali. Bishop
Wardouni, who is Chaldean Patriarch Cardinal Emmanuel Delly's
representative, launched into a bitter denunciation of the
Council of Representative (CoR) November 3 passage of a
Provincial Elections Law (PEL) that gives Christians only
single seat quotas in Baghdad, Ninewa and Basrah (reftel).
Wardouni lamented that Christians, the "original inhabitants
of Iraq," were being treated as though they do not exist.
According to Wardouni, after Article 50 had been excluded
from the PEL passed on September 24, Christians had appealed
to the highest levels of the GOI, to UNAMI, the USG, Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, the Sadrist bloc, and tribal sheikhs --
all of whom agreed that Article 50 should be reinstated.
Wardouni was adamant that Christians should reject the PEL as
voted and demand greater rights.


3. (C) Both Chaldean Democratic Union Party (Kurdish
Alliance) leader Ablahad Afram Sawa and Assyrian Democratic
Movement (ADM) leader Younadam Kanna espoused the view that
CoR members and other senior GOI officials conspired to
defeat an Article 50 that would have allowed three-seat
quotas for Christians. Kanna said he was lied to by senior
GOI officials, including President Talabani and Vice
President Al-Mahdi, and that Article 50 was ultimately
sabotaged by KDP member Mohsin Sa'adoun (Kurdish Alliance).
Sawa claimed that all protestations of support for minority
rights and quotas were only lip service and that Christians
were deceived by everyone, including SRSG de Mistura and CoR
Speaker Mashadani. According to Sawa, boycotting the
upcoming elections would be better than accepting the
single-seat quotas. In contrast, Al-Naufali commented that
the problem stems from the Christians' own disunity, and
urged his co-religionists to convey a unified message.
(Note: At the conclusion of the meeting, Kanna handed the
Ambassador a copy of a letter to the Presidency Council
signed by both Sawa and himself. The letter deplores the PEL
as passed on November 3 and characterizes the legislation as
degrading and insulting to the minorities concerned. It
further requests the Presidency Council to veto the PEL and
return to the original formulation (three seats for
Christians in Baghdad, three in Ninewa, and one in Basrah) or
do away with this "shameful quota" all together. End Note).


4. (C) The Ambassador assured his interlocutors that the
U.S. would have preferred a different outcome to the Article
50 vote. However, noting that the principle of guaranteed
minority representation is now established, he said it is
important for Iraq's Christians to seize on the gains and
move forward. The Ambassador stressed that a boycott of the
provincial elections is not in anyone's interest, citing the
Sunnis' disastrous experience in the 2005 elections. He
urged the Christians to unify and set aside some of their

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differences to achieve the common interests of the community.
Boycotting the elections, the Ambassador stressed, would
only marginalize the community further.


5. (C) In separate meetings on November 7, the Ambassador
urged President Talabani and VP Abel Al-Mahdi to sign off on
the legislation as soon as possible. The Ambassador noted
that he had met the previous day with the Papal Nuncio, who
had made the Vatican's position clear: the Vatican supported
the bill -- one minority seat for Ninewa Baghdad, and Basrah
-- as passed by the COR. Emboffs have followed up these
conversations with similar demarches to UNAMI and other GOI
contacts.

Mosul Security Improved--But How Long Will It Last?
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Bishop Wardouni deplored the GOI's past negligence
in providing adequate security for Christians in Mosul, who
fled in large numbers after a series of killings in early
October. Wardouni said Mosul's Christians were relieved when
the GOI did finally send security reinforcements, but he
wondered how long they would remain. Wardouni noted that the
Bishop's Councils of Mosul and Iraq were pleased that an
estimated 500 to 600 Christian IDP families had returned to
Mosul. He added there had been attempts -- he did not say by
whom -- to offer the IDPs money to stay in the villages where
they had taken refuge. Kanna voiced suspicions that elements
of the Iraqi forces in Mosul were themselves involved in the
violence, adding that the GOI need to be pressured more on
security for Christians. Sawa commented that the reasons for
the Mosul violence and displacement of Christians were
unclear, and the GOI was not offering any explanation.


7. (C) The Ambassador said that information available to
the USG indicated that Al-Qaeda, taking advantage of the
complicated political situation, was responsible for the
Mosul killings. PM Maliki's response -- ordering an
investigation and sending additional troops -- was positive
and suggested that changes would be made with regard to
security measures in Mosul. When asked if he was satisfied
with the current increase in security, Wardouni replied yes,
but expressed concern that the extra forces might eventually
be reduced. The Ambassador assured him that the U.S.
believes the additional Iraqi Army units should remain in
Mosul and would remain in close touch with the GOI.

MNC-I's Departure From Babel College
--------------


8. (C) Wardouni said when MNC-I forces began to use a
Chaldean Church property, Babel College, in the Doura area of
Baghdad as billeting in March 2007, Muslims accused
Christians of collaborating with the "occupiers." According
to Wardouni, the Church never received any compensation from
the U.S. Army for damages and now the MNC-I has begun to
leave the premises. Fearing that Muslims will loot and
destroy everything as soon as MNC-I is gone, Wardouni said
that if nothing is done by the USG to secure the property, he
will air his grievances publicly. Kanna expressed surprise
at hearing that MNC-I was leaving so soon, and suggested that
the Sahwa (Sons of Iraq--SOI) forces in the area could be
asked to step in to protect the property. He added that the
Iraqi Army could eventually assume security responsibility
for the Church properties. The Ambassador assured Wardouni
that the embassy would follow up to ensure the security of
the premises and that strong liaison and communication
existed between Christian leaders and the U.S. military, to
their satisfaction. (Note: On November 6, Baghdad 1 e-PRT
leader reported that Wardouni had met with him and U.S.
military authorities the same day and agreed to recommend to
Cardinal Delly that the Chaldean Church sign a lease for the
period of U.S. Army occupancy at Babel College to include
rent and responsibility for repairs on the building as well
as a claim submitted under the Claims Act for compensation
for the building's contents. Wardouni acknowledged that U.S.
forces are leaving, requested that the surrounding T-walls be
left in place, and agreed that custody of the walls should be
transferred to the Ministry of Interior. Wardouni will make
arrangements for the SOI to provide interior security; ISF
will provide exterior security. Further details will be
addressed after Wardouni consults with Delly. End note.)


9. (C) Al-Naufali noted that the Non-Muslim Endowments
Office (NME) has 650 security guards for all non-Muslim
houses of worship in Iraq -- not even 25 percent of the
number needed to provide adequate security. The NME is able
to provide security only for Baghdad churches and some
Sabaean-Mandaean and Yezidi houses of worship. According to
al-Naufali the NME does not lack funds to maintain and
renovate churches and other religious sites; the problem is
non-availability of engineers and trained technical staff.

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Wardouni noted that the NME had submitted to PM Maliki and
Deputy PM Barham Salih many requests detailing security needs
for non-Muslim religious sites, but had never received a
response. He added that protecting the aforementioned Babel
College would require 30-40 guards alone. The Ambassador
indicated that he supported their requests for additional
guards for churches and other non-Muslim religious sites.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) While the leaders of the minority communities are
indeed upset with the reduced number of seats for minorities,
they have not yet made a decision to boycott the provincial
elections. Press reports indicate that the Presidency
Council will approve the new legislation very soon, but such
a move will likely only increase the ire of leaders such as
we met with on November 5, who are digging in their heels on
the threat of a boycott. Such a move would be extremely
short-sighted, and we continue to reach out to minority
contacts to urge them to avoid a step that would only serve
to undermine the relevance and stature of the minority
communities in Iraq.
CROCKER