OMS LEADER REQUESTS U.S. SUPPORT, MUQTADA CALLS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003503 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ IR SUBJECT: OMS LEADER REQUESTS U.S. SUPPORT, MUQTADA CALLS FOR RESISTANCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 3144 ¶B. BASRA 51 Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Sheikh Mohammed al-Faraji, self-described Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) representative for Basra and the surrounding provinces, met with Senior Advisor Gordon Gray to demand that the U.S. engage more directly with Iraqi-born Shi'a clergy. In the October 28 meeting, Faraji argued that the lack of emerging alternatives to foreign-born Shi'a religious hierarchy in Najaf strengthens Tehran's hand and pushes nationalist-leaning Sadrist/Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements into Iran's orbit. While claiming approval from Muqtada al-Sadr to hold the meeting, he showed dissatisfaction with Muqtada and pushed for more contact with OMS-linked cleric Qassem al-Taie. Faraji's primary aim may be to strengthen his faction's hand in an upcoming intra-OMS power struggle. While the sheikh said that he has instructed local Sadrists to refrain from attacking Coalition Forces, British forces in Basra intercepted a letter earlier this month, signed by Muqtada, urging his followers to continue resistance. End summary. -------------- A Hawza for Iraqis -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Describing himself as the OMS representative for Basra, Maysan, Wasit, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna provinces, Faraji emphasized to Gray that he is both Sadrist and nationalist. Accompanied by Majid Asari, leader of the similarly religious-nationalist Revolutionary Uprising Movement (Harkat Thawra al-Intifada al-Shaabaniyah),he drove home points similar to those made in meetings earlier this year with Basra REO (ref B) and Force Strategic Engagement Cell(FSEC) representatives: - The U.S. must support Iraqi-born Shi'a religious authorities to prevent increasing Iranian influence over Iraqi politics and security; - To further this relationship, the Embassy should help set up an interview on al-Hurra television with Najaf-based cleric Qassem al-Taie; - The Embassy should broker meetings between leading Iraqi figures (Jalal Talabani was mentioned by name) and Iraqi-born Shi'a clerics. He mentioned Mohammed Sadiqi and Mohammed al-Yacoubi (actually Iranian-born) in addition to al-Taie. ¶3. (S/NF) Faraji argued that the U.S. "did Iraq a favor" by overthrowing Saddam, but then boxed itself into a corner by elevating religious parties (ISCI, Da'wa) led by persons trained in Iran. He expressed sharper criticism for the international community's neglect of the broader Iraqi Shi'a religious community in its unsuccessful efforts to appeal to Iranian-born Ayatollah Sistani and, to a lesser extent, Najaf-based Ayatollahs Ishaq al-Fayed (from Afghanistan) and Mohammed Bashir Hussein Najafi (Pakistan). He lambasted the recent UNAMI visit to Sistani and other overtures made toward his office, saying they weakened local clerics without having any strategic value on key issues regarding Iraqi security. Regarding the SOFA, Faraji said that Sistani listens to opinions from local leaders and then "asks Kazem al-Haeri in Qom what to do." -------------- OMS Leadership Vacuum -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) In addition to repeated charges about the malign influence of the Najaf-born and trained Ayatollah Haeri (a former Da'wa leader and reputed Muqtada advisor),and criticisms toward Baghdad-based JAM leader Abdal Hadi al-Daraji (now in CF custody) as a tool of Iran, Faraji leveled some criticism toward Muqtada himself. He argued that "Muqtada leaned on his father's reputation" to become the voice of OMS after the invasion but "was not qualified." Though he claimed that Muqtada approved his meeting with Gray through contacts at the Najaf OMS office, Faraji showed little reverence toward his leader, saying that Muqtada is in Qom now and will not be soon returning. He suggested that JAM/Sadrist members -- many of whom fought against Iran in the 1980s -- know there is an ongoing OMS power vacuum and are looking for signals about where to turn next. -------------- BAGHDAD 00003503 002.2 OF 002 Keeping the Sadrists Away from Iran? -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Faraji made the case that he is working at great personal risk to pry local Sadrist (including JAM) elements loose from Iran's grip. He said that 40 percent of the members who fled after Charge of the Knights have returned to Basra, and that his organization has provided them with some money to cover basic needs. He lamented, however, that if he gives 100 USD per month, Iran will give 1,000 USD. Faraji claimed to largely have control over whether local JAM elements attack Coalition Forces (CF),saying that attacks on CF in Basra and Maysan were greatly reduced after his initial meeting with the Basra REO Director in May. He also said that he had called off locally-planned attacks on CF projects in the low-income Hyaniyah and 5-Mile Market neighborhoods. Faraji posited that he could not control his members much longer and said that he may have to return to attacking U.S. forces at some point. To emphasize this, Faraji at one point refused to accept a glass of water when he was coughing on the grounds that it would be a false sign of reconciliation. -------------- From Muqtada, To Whom It May Concern -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) A letter intercepted by British Forces on October 18 in the swamp region near al-Faw indicates that the day when Sadrist/JAM members again take up arms could be soon approaching. The undated letter, apparently signed and thumbprinted by Muqtada, calls on his followers to "remain on your Jihad" and "continue your resistance." While the letter's opaque writing style leaves it open to interpretation, the call of "your blood for Hussein Imam al-Mahdi" and various exhorations to "resist the occupiers" strongly suggest that the letter is a call to renewed armed struggle. The letter's message diverges significantly from communications delivered to us recently by OMS contacts, such as the September letter from Muqtada given to PRT Wasit by Ahmed Hassan E'barah, which outlined plans to turn the Sadrist movement into a social services organization. (Note: in late October, Karbala police detained local youths distributing fliers containing a similar "message from Muqtada." End note.) ¶7. (S/NF) There has been no increase in attacks on Coalition Forces since this letter was discovered; security conditions continue in Basra have continued to improve. In an October 28 meeting with Gray, British Brigadier General Richard Iron estimated that 80 percent of JAM's pre-Charge of the Knights revenue came from Basra, most of it from control of the ports. The actual amount that JAM was receiving is unknown, but rough estimates by British forces in Basra and Umm Qasr suggested between 5 and 10 million USD monthly. Since Charge of the Knights, JAM has found no alternative funding source within Basra. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) It is difficult to argue with Faraji's basic thesis that a stronger Iraqi-born clerical hierarchy would be more protective of Iraq's security interests vis-a-vis Iran, and that it would send a message to disaffected JAM members that backing from Iran is not the answer. We will exercise caution in responding to his specific requests, however, especially given the unclear and likely unstable role that Faraji and his benefactor al-Taie maintain in the OMS power structure. Faraji's claims that he is risking his life to meet with us are likely true, given his differences with Iran, Muqtada, significant OMS/JAM figures, and Badr Corps (which monitors visits to the REO). Given the need for the U.S. to build stronger relationships with Shi'a religious leaders in Iraq, we will seek to develop an appropriate and effective means of outreach. End comment. CROCKER