DEFENSE UNDER SECRETARY EDELMAN MEETS LEADERS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003468 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DEFENSE UNDER SECRETARY EDELMAN MEETS LEADERS OF KIRKUK,S ETHNIC BLOCS; KURDS REFUSE TO ATTEND Classified By: Kirkuk PRT Leader Howard Keegan: Reasons 1.4 (b and d) THIS IS A PRT KIRKUK REPORTING CABLE. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman engaged Arab, Turkoman and Christian provincial leaders of Kirkuk on 20 October 2008 to discuss ethnic cooperation and Article 23 of the provincial elections law. Kurdish leaders declined to attend due to the inclusion of Sheik Abu Saddam, a Sunni Arab leader from Hawija district. The Turkomen representatives blamed Kirkuk,s problems on outside forces, claimed an increase in the activities of "non-official police" in the province, and expressed support for the draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as long as it does not infringe on Iraqi sovereignty. Arab representatives voiced their support for the Article 24 Committee, especially where it concerns joint administration. They stated firmly that Kirkuk cannot join the KRG. The Christian representative commented on the plight of Christians in Iraq, and criticized the removal of Article 50 (dealing with minority rights) from the provincial elections law. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman traveled to Kirkuk on 20 October 2008 to meet leaders of the province,s main ethnic groups. He opened the meeting by praising the people of Kirkuk for their history of living and working together in harmony. He stated that politics is not a zero-sum game, but instead requires compromise. He said that the United States does not play favorites among the ethnicities of Iraq, and asked for patience as complicated issues such as land reform are tackled. Under Secretary Edelman finished by commenting that the problems of Kirkuk will be solved through the spirit of patience and compromise, not from people or entities outside of Iraq that seek to influence events in their favor. ¶3. (C) Absent from the event were any Kurdish leaders. The PRT invited Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) Chairman Rizgar Ali (PUK) and Kurdish KPC member Mohammed Kamal (KDP). Upon receiving the invitation on 19 October 2008, Rizgar expressed displeasure over the inclusion of Arab Sheik Hussein Ali Salih (aka Abu Saddam). He explained that as a district level leader, Abu Saddam should not be elevated to the level of a provincial leader. After discussions with the PRT Team ;Leader, however, Rizgar indicated that despite his objections, he would attend the event. Approximately one hour prior to the meeting with Under Secretary Edelman, Rizgar surprised the PRT by advising it that he would not attend. Mohammed Kamal likely followed Rizgar,s lead and also did not attend. ¶4. (C) Hassan Toran and Tahseen Kahea, both KPC members, represented the Turkomen people of Kirkuk. Hassan Toran said forces outside the province such as Saddam Hussein and the two main Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP) created the problems in Kirkuk. While indicating that the Turkomen are not against the return of legitimately displaced Kirkukis, Toran objected to the Kurds' political abuse of the right of return. Toran also mentioned that "non-official police" (referring to the Kurdish secret police, the Asayish) are increasing their activity in the province and are abusing human rights. Kahea stated that the Turkomen had no objections to the draft SOFA, as long as its provisions did not infringe upon Iraq,s sovereignty. ¶5. (C) Abu Saddam, a Hawija district leader, and Mohammed Khalil, KPC member, represented the Arabs. Both Arab leaders commented on the Kurdish failure to follow through on the "December 2 Agreement" (also known as the &Thirteen Point Agreement8) which ended the Arab boycott of the KPC last December. Abu Saddam said that, if the Kurds had acted in good faith on this agreement, &eighty-percent8 of the problems of Kirkuk would be solved by now. Abu Saddam continued that Article 24 must be implemented in full, especially where it concerns joint administration. He finished by saying, &Kirkuk cannot joint the KRG, the Iraqi people won,t stand for it." Khalil predicted that the KDP in particular will obstruct the work of the Article 24 Committee. Khalil said that the Arabs support the reintroduction of Article 50 into the elections law &to protect our Christian brothers,8 and the establishment of a &special status8 for Kirkuk. ¶6. (C) Sylvana Bouya, KPC member, represented the Chaldo-Assyrian Christians. The removal of Article 50 from the provincial elections law created a problem for the Christians. She hoped that the "a system8 will be reintroduced because it &helps the Christians and other minorities.8 She quoted that 30 Christian families fled to BAGHDAD 00003468 002 OF 002 Kirkuk from the violence in Mosul. She claimed a further 2,354 families recently fled Mosul to other locations. ¶7. (C) Under Secretary Edelman closed the meeting by expressing optimism over the following common themes he heard: adherence to rule of law and the constitution; building on Kirkuk,s history of tolerance; and the necessity of humane treatment for all. He encouraged the leaders of Kirkuk to work with the Article 24 Committee as they begin their work. Under Secretary Edelman mentioned Article 50, saying that his colleagues in Baghdad are working to get the spirit if not the letter of the article in place. He referred to the SOFA as a &very important agreement8 that &fully reflects Iraq,s sovereignty.8 He stated that the draft SOFA is consistent with agreements the USA has with other governments in the Middle East. He stressed the importance of passing the SOFA, saying it will provide a basis for a strategic partnership between the U.S., Iraq, and the entire region. ¶8. (U) This cable has been cleared by USD(P) Edelman. CROCKER