IRAQI HYDROCARBONS LEGISLATION: PERHAPS STILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003467 SIPDIS DOE FOR PERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 TAGS: EPET ENRG PGOV EINV IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI HYDROCARBONS LEGISLATION: PERHAPS STILL STUCK? REF: A. BAGHDAD 3446 ¶B. BAGHDAD 3347 Classified By: Economic Counselor Michael Dodman, reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: There are conflicting stories about why the hydrocarbons legislation briefly moved to parliament in recent days. Confusion also remains about which is the "right" version of the law. Parliamentary Committee on Oil and Gas Chairman Ali Balo believes that a political decision on hydrocarbons legislation could be reached quickly, but he also noted that Prime Minister Maliki is focused entirely on the SOFA. Prime Ministerial advisor and ex-Oil Minister Thamir Ghadban opined that no movement would occur on hydrocarbons legislation for the remainder of the year. We agree. End summary. Parliamentary Rejection -------------- ¶2. (C) During an October 29 meeting, Balo offered his explanation of the recent developments with the Hydrocarbons Framework Law (HCFL) (ref A). Bobo said that his Council of Representatives (COR, or Parliament) Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Committee had unexpectedly received a draft of the HCFL that it had not previously seen before. This version contained new edits from the Ministry of Oil that led the committee to conclude that the Prime Minister had improperly endorsed it without the appropriate Cabinet review and approval. Thus, the committee had returned the draft with a request that the Prime Minister's office expeditiously forward the February 26, 2007, draft that the entire Cabinet had approved. Balo added that a version with the textual edits made by the Shura Council, but without objectionable substantive changes, would actually be preferable, since the Shura Council's language was more professional. Fishing in Murky Waters -------------- ¶3. (C) Balo said he was personally surprised by the sudden submission of the HCFL, since a process was in place to collect input and develop consensus on the HCFL. Three weeks previously, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani had met with representatives of other political factions and formed five committees to examine specific topics; among the committees was one on petroleum and finances. The committee members were PM Maliki (Da'wa al-Islamiya Party); Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, ISCI); Tariq al-Hashimi (Iraqi Islamic Party, IIP); Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK); and Rowsch Nuri Shaways (Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP). This committee had been requested to provide its recommendations regarding hydrocarbons legislation by November 15. (Note: Other sources state the meeting actually took place more recently, on October 15, and that four committees were formed of four members each. Balo, however, provided the committee membership twice during our conversation. See ref B.) ¶4. (C) The planned November 4 meeting with PM Maliki reported in the press (ref A) will not take place due to Maliki's unavailability, so Oil and Gas Committee members and Parliamentary Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani met with Cabinet Secretary Ali al-Alaq to urge that the February 27, 2007, draft law be sent quickly to Parliament. Alaq was himself perplexed as to the reasons why the draft had been submitted. The Parliamentary members urged him to conduct an investigation to determine whether the draft had been improperly submitted and how it had happened. The committee also sent a letter directly to PM Maliki with the same questions. ¶5. (C) During an October 30 meeting, Prime Ministerial advisor Thamir Ghadban offered his explanation of events. He said that some Oil and Gas Committee members had asked to receive the HCFL draft, because they thought the time was ripe to move the legislation forward. Unfortunately, the Cabinet Secretariat had sent the wrong version of the law. Thamir commented that no one knows what the right version is, so he did not expect any forward movement until a political decision is reached on the preferred version. A decision could be reached only if PM Maliki and Oil Minister Shahristani met with KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Abdullah al-Hawrami. Thamir, however, did not expect such a meeting to happen anytime soon, so he predicted that the HCFL or the law to form the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) would not pass this year. (Note: Thamir is the leading candidate to head INOC.) BAGHDAD 00003467 002.4 OF 002 Parliamentary Preferences -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Balo said the Oil and Gas Committee prefers to review the HCFL as a package with the three other related laws (the INOC law, the Revenue Management Law, and the Ministry of Oil (MoO) Reorganization Law). The GOI's executive branch had drafted a Revenue Management and INOC law, but had not consulted on the language with Parliament or presented them to the Cabinet. Balo acknowledged that the central government and KRG differed on the other laws, but he claimed that the HCFL was the most contentious, which would take up "75%" of the committee's time, with the remainder devoted to the Revenue Management Law. With respect to the percentage of oil revenue that would go to the central government for national or strategic investments before allocations were made to regions and provinces, Balo said the central government wanted 20% but the KRG would be willing to accept 10%. (Note: Balo, a Kurd, represents the Kurdistan Alliance Party.) Balo also said provisions of the INOC law were problematic, since the draft currently granted INOC with control over 80% of Iraq's oil production; INOC should have to bid on an open, competitive basis with other oil and gas companies for its assets. Balo blamed Maliki and Shahristani's desire to maintain control over the petroleum sector for the failure to pass the legislation over a period of nearly two years after the Cabinet had approved a draft. ¶7. (U) Balo explained that the Shura Council's substantive changes had to do with deletions to the HCFL draft that returned authority and power to the Minister of Oil. The February 2007 draft provided for the establishment of a Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC),which would include the Oil Minister as one of a half-dozen or so members. The "12-13" substantive changes reduced the FOGC's role, which, by default, meant that the powers and authorities reverted to the Oil Minister. Comment: Another Wait -------------- ¶8. (C) Balo tried to put a positive spin on the current situation, arguing that, since the Cabinet had already reviewed and approved the February 26, 2007, draft, a straightforward political decision was all that would be needed to pass the legislation quickly. He might have indicated his real views, however, when he noted that the Oil and Gas Committee could not meet with Maliki because he was totally consumed with the SOFA negotiations. While the underlying dynamic might have shifted somewhat, we agree with Thamir that, absent some breakthrough on the broad package of issues with the Kurds, Maliki is unlikely to devote the attention necessary to move the hydrocarbons legislation this year. CROCKER