PM DEMANDS ACTION TO PROTECT CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003383 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 TAGS: IZ KIRF MARR MASS MOPS PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: PM DEMANDS ACTION TO PROTECT CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL AT IRAQI NSC MEETING OCTOBER 19, 2008 REF: BAGHDAD 3325 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. In an uncharacteristically short meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council (I-NSC),Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded quick action by the Government of Iraq (GOI) to end the intimidation and fear that had driven thousands of Christians from their homes in Ninawa Province and said he wants measures taken to ensure that this will not happen again. He expressed his concern that Iraq Security Forces (ISF) commanders in Ninawa had played a role in the involuntary displacement of Christians. With regard to the difficult security situation in the province's capital, Mosul, PM Maliki said that he wants to see the insurgency there brought under control before he would entertain the possibility of introducing awakening councils to the city. He made clear his belief that Baathists operating with the support of Syria are a serious threat in the Mosul area and equal to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The meeting ended with an additional installment in the continuing discussions within the I-NSC on the deficiencies within and implementation of the new Amnesty Law. End Summary. PM Displeased over Plight of Christians in Ninawa. ¶2. (S) Returning to the issue that had dominated the I-NSC meeting the previous week (REFTEL) the Prime Minister opened the October 19 meeting by expressing his concern about the plight of Christians in Ninawa, stating that he had received several letters that charged that local commanders were at best criminally negligent, and probably complicit, in the violence and forced displacement of Christians that had occurred there. Maliki said that the GOI must move now, launch an investigation immediately, and that if his government fails to take action, the Christians would never return to their homes. He was vehement in his assertion that precautions must be put in place to insure that this could never occur again. ¶3. (S) In response to Maliki's remarks, Minister of Defense (MinDef) Abdul Qadir Mohammed al-Mufraji expressed the view that of the more than one thousand Christian families that had fled, most had left their homes from fear rather than actual acts of intimidation. He noted this fear was real and said the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) are working together to respond. The MOD was deploying an additional brigade to the area, to augment troops already there, and these new troops would complete their movement within 72 hours. He expected that most of the displaced Christians would return in the wake of the rapid GOI response that was already underway. Some twenty families had reportedly returned in the past forty-eight hours. ¶4. (S) The PM reacted sharply to the Minister's presentation pointing to several letters he had received from Christians in Mosul specifically complaining about the situation and naming military officers they accused of being involved in allowing intimidation of Christians. Abdul Qadir replied that an investigating committee had been formed and was being dispatched, but Maliki retorted "so we wait?" The MinDef responded that no, the GOI would not wait, and that new troops are the answer because police are more susceptible to infiltration by insurgents responsible for the threats to Christians. He said that the investigation was already under way, and the entire 2nd Iraqi division would be scrutinized. The only thing to wait for would be the committee's final report. Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani interjected that the MOI had sent a committee to Ninawa that will work closely with Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) to look at changing the disposition of security forces in the province. The MinDef added that the field commanders in Ninawa would have to be replaced as well. The PM called for quick action to investigate and deal with any inappropriate behavior by the military. ¶5. (C) Continuing on the subject of what to do in Mosul, the PM stated that the problem there is primarily political. The Deputy Director of the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) Dr. Mohammed Salman made an impassioned plea for active engagement at the political level. He said that the situation in Mosul is different from that in other Iraqi cities, and that the GOI needs to "control the ground" before all else. Reassuring residents in their neighborhoods is critical. He said if given authorization he could &immediately8 establish at least twenty support councils, which could provide basic municipal services in addition to improving neighborhood security in Mosul. Stating that it requires &more than just talk,8 he BAGHDAD 00003383 002 OF 003 said he had been engaging with the different political trends and believes the time is right for quick action. He said he could establish temporary contracts for local &awakening council8 type security groups in Mosul which would have an immediate, positive impact. ¶6. (C) Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Barham Salih, stating that he also thinks the problems in Mosul to be political in nature, urged caution in establishing councils, as assistance to one faction is likely to invoke the ire of others unless the effort is carefully coordinated. Salman responded that the issue is complex, but that local security organizations have an advantage over the military in controlling insurgents, as they are familiar with the areas in which they operate and the people who live there. MOI Bulani noted that local security forces had demonstrated the ability to fight Al Qaeda in other locations, and that difficulties resulted from the illegal actions of some of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). He said that Mosul suffers from both political and economic problems, and that some insurgent groups benefit from the chaos they create. ¶7. (S) Maliki stated that he had received reports indicating that the situation in Mosul is complex, AQI and Baathists having infiltrated "the very marrow" of the city. He suggested that many of the institutions of government in Mosul are infiltrated by insurgents. He said that informants working for the ISF are easily targeted, and because the people do not feel secure, they are unwilling to take action against the insurgents. Further adding to the difficulties there are sharp divisions between tribes in the urban core and those living in the countryside. He said that while reconciliation is necessary if Mosul's problems are to be solved, conditions in the city are not currently favorable, and premature efforts to achieve reconciliation are bound to fail. The GOI would need to create the essential security preconditions in Mosul first, and both the military and the police would have to take a new and different direction. The PM called for an increase in the GOI's intelligence efforts as a means to counter AQI operations. ¶8. (C) DPM Barham Salih said that much of the problem in Ninawa is that officials in the province are not cooperating with the national government. Bulani agreed, stating that there is no cooperation from local government. The DPM added that there is no strong leadership in the province, and that the problem is entirely within the executive offices of the provincial government. NSA Rubaie said that with no strong governor and no executive exercising authority the situation is awful. The Minister of Defense concurred strongly, stating that only two percent of the budget has been spent. Barham Salih stated that the provincial elections in Ninawa are absolutely vital. ¶9. (S) General Odierno informed PM Maliki that approximately ten days previously, the Coalition had captured the operational commander for AQI, and with him thousands of documents that detailed AQI's operational plan. The latter is based on developing the group's relationship with Sunni Arabs in Mosul, who are vulnerable to AQI because of poor governance, Arab-Kurd tensions, and the lack of groups such as the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in the city. The General said that the plan calls for continued recruiting of Sunnis in Mosul, where AQI is making its last stand, and assured the PM that we will continue to share information. PM: &Baath Worrisome8 ¶10. (C) Maliki said that SOI would be good for the operational forces, but that the Baathists had also infiltrated the city thoroughly, and if the GOI attempts to establish awakening councils now, they would be dominated by the same people who had created the problems in the city in the first place. The PM stated that the GOI would need to clear them out first, and efforts in Mosul would have to proceed in two phases--remove those responsible for problem, and only after that had been accomplished, establish awakening councils. Bulani dissented, stating that the GOI could move forward now with SOI in Mosul. Maliki responded that "I am not against it, but we don't control the land yet." He then called for additional study of the situation, stating that the GOI needs more clarity. ¶11. (S) Expanding on his concerns about the Baath Party, the PM said, "When I hear AQ, I think Baath." He said that Iraqi Baathist meetings are still being held in Syria, and that large quantities of explosives continue to flow in from that country as well. According to Maliki, even the prisons in Mosul have been infiltrated. The solution to this complex problem, he explained, requires gathering intelligence, BAGHDAD 00003383 003.2 OF 003 deploying the necessary forces, interdicting or arresting the insurgents, and establishing effective control of the Iraq-Syria border. More on the Amnesty Law ¶12. (S) Turning to an item that was not on the meeting agenda, the MinDef then noted a list of 160 names he said illustrates the previous week's discussion on the problems with the amnesty law (REFTEL). The Minister said the names on the list are all related to corruption cases and those involved are seeking to use loopholes in the amnesty law in order to escape justice. Maliki noted that, as had been discussed the previous week, the law is problematic in that criminals seem to be able to escape justice. He hinted that the law might reflect corrupt influences on the Council of Representatives. The result was that criminals were released who should have been prosecuted. Abdul Qadir said that in some cases, the courts applied different paragraphs of the law to similar crimes in order to facilitate amnesty for suspects who could afford to pay bribes. The PM and the MinDef concluded the meeting with a lengthy exchange on the specifics of several cases that illustrated how deficiencies in the Amnesty Law had created the potential for abuse. CROCKER