IRAQI CLERICS AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003294 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2018 TAGS: PREL KISL MOPS IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI CLERICS AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT Classified by Political Minister Counselor Robert Ford, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Recent conversations with prominent Iraqi Islamic clerics revealed support for a bilateral security agreement from several interlocutors, but another expressed strong reservations. In our conversations, only one prominent Islamic figure indicated a willingness to publicly advocate for an agreement and some saw the Iraqi public as hostile to a deal. A prospective security agreement has periodically been a topic in the Friday sermons of leading clerics, with the Sadrists most vociferous in their opposition. Other sermons have allowed for potential endorsement of a deal if consistent with Iraq's national interest and religious values. As key influencers of Iraqi public opinion, Iraq's clerics could play an important role in either fanning opposition to a deal or supporting it during the ratification process. We are starting to seek out a select group of influential Muslim clerics to explain the advantages of a bilateral security agreement. End summary. -------------- Support from Clerics Exists... -------------- ¶2. (C) The President of the Sunni Waqf (religious endowment), Sheikh Ahmad Abdel Ghaffour Al-Samara'ie, told the Ambassador during a late September Ramadan banquet that he strongly favored a security agreement. Al-Samara'ie, who repeatedly complained during the dinner of sectarian bias and Iranian influence, thought Iraq needed an enduring strategic relationship with the U.S. to secure Iraq's border with Iran and contain the Tehran government's interference in Iraqi affairs. ¶3. (C) In an October 8 conversation with poloff, Shi'a Dr. Salah Salem Abdel Razaq declared himself a strong supporter of a bilateral security agreement, seeing it as a major enhancement of Iraqi sovereignty. A senior member of the Shi'a Waqf (also a member of Baghdad's provincial council), Abdel Razaq thought an agreement would be a major improvement over the status quo. He remarked "under the current setup, the CF could, if they saw fit, arrest the President of the Republic and Iraq would have no legal recourse." ¶4. (C) Abdel Razaq strongly agreed that establishing a strong strategic relationship with the U.S. was in Iraq's interest. He also pointed to important cultural and commercial benefits that would accompany a SoFA. When poloff asked why we rarely (if ever) heard prominent Iraqis taking this case to the public, he said "once we have a text" agreed by both sides - he and others would work to build public support for it. -------------- ...But Public Suspicions... -------------- ¶5. (C) In another October 8 conversation, Sunni Sheikh Jamaleddin Badri told poloff he also supported a bilateral security agreement, but criticized the U.S. for failing to make a case to the Iraqi public. Sheikh Jamaleddin, formerly of the Sunni Waqf and a likely (independent) candidate for the Salaheddin Provincial Council, argued that radio silence and closed-door deliberations would only prompt suspicions among the Iraqi public. ¶6. (C) The U.S. should consult with a representative body of influential Iraqis to help the public feel their views are being taken into account, Badri believed. The U.S. should also do public outreach/civic education to explain the benefits to an Iraqi public still wary of the CF. When poloff opined that this message would carry more weight if delivered by Iraqis rather than Americans, he admitted that he was reluctant to speak out publicly, lest he be targeted by extremists. -------------- ...And Hard Feelings Persist -------------- ¶7. (C) Sunni Sheikh Mahmoud Eissawi, speaking to poloff on October 7, was reluctant to say anything good about a bilateral security agreement, or the presence of U.S. forces. The Imam of the important Abdel Qadir Al-Geilani Mosque in central Baghdad, Sheikh Mahmoud was traumatized by a U.S. military raid on his home in 2005, in which he accused the soldiers of terrifying his family and trashing his belongings. Asked whether he worried a CF withdrawal would hurt Baghdad's Sunnis, his initial response was that Sunnis would prefer to take their chances rather than endure further occupation. BAGHDAD 00003294 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) On reflection, Sheikh Eissawi thought a residual presence of CF troops "on bases and off the streets," might be prudent. In principle, he conceded, a SoFA "which fully protects Iraqi sovereignty" might be palatable. However, he asserted that the "Iraqi street" hates the U.S. forces and selling an agreement to the public would be an uphill battle. -------------- Friday Sermons -------------- ¶9. (C) The prospect of a bilateral security agreement has periodically been addressed by prominent Iraqi Imams during Friday sermons. Predictably, Sadrist clerics have been the most fervent in expressing opposition. As reported on a Sadrist website, on October 3, Sadrist Imam Sheikh As'ad al-Nasiri railed against an agreement during his Friday sermon. As Iraqis commemorate the end of Ramadan, Nasiri proclaimed, "...the first thing the government should do is kick the occupier out of our holy land and not sign any agreement..." ¶10. (C) Sheikh Sadr al-Din Al Qabbanji, a leading cleric with the (Shi'a) Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs (ISCI), offered a more nuanced view of the agreement, also during an October 3 Friday sermon, delivered in Najaf, as reported by a news agency affiliated with ISCI. Qabbanji complained of U.S. pressure on Iraq to sign an agreement, accusing the U.S. of using high pressure tactics to force Iraq to comply. "We refuse to sell out Iraq in return for liberating it from Chapter VII," he stated. Qabbanji believed a deal could, in principle be reached, provided it was cleared with "the higher religious authority," - a reference to the Marjaiya - the Shi'a clerical establishment based in Najaf. He called on the GOI to "...not submit to foreign pressures...to be patient and to fear God in its negotiations..." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) As important influencers of public opinion, Iraqi clerics have the power to either help mobilize Iraqis against the agreement or help build support for it. While we doubt many clerics will stake out public positions strongly supporting a security agreement with the U.S., they could help, if only through silence or relative restraint, tamp down public opposition to ratification once a text is agreed by the two sides. The Embassy is beginning low-key discussions with a group of Muslim clerics to explain the advantages of an eventual security agreement. End comment. CROCKER