IRAQI CLERICS AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003294

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2018
TAGS: PREL KISL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI CLERICS AND THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

Classified by Political Minister Counselor Robert Ford, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Recent conversations with prominent Iraqi
Islamic clerics revealed support for a bilateral security
agreement from several interlocutors, but another expressed
strong reservations. In our conversations, only one
prominent Islamic figure indicated a willingness to publicly
advocate for an agreement and some saw the Iraqi public as
hostile to a deal. A prospective security agreement has
periodically been a topic in the Friday sermons of leading
clerics, with the Sadrists most vociferous in their
opposition. Other sermons have allowed for potential
endorsement of a deal if consistent with Iraq's national
interest and religious values. As key influencers of Iraqi
public opinion, Iraq's clerics could play an important role
in either fanning opposition to a deal or supporting it
during the ratification process. We are starting to seek out
a select group of influential Muslim clerics to explain the
advantages of a bilateral security agreement. End summary.


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Support from Clerics Exists...
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2. (C) The President of the Sunni Waqf (religious endowment),
Sheikh Ahmad Abdel Ghaffour Al-Samara'ie, told the Ambassador
during a late September Ramadan banquet that he strongly
favored a security agreement. Al-Samara'ie, who repeatedly
complained during the dinner of sectarian bias and Iranian
influence, thought Iraq needed an enduring strategic
relationship with the U.S. to secure Iraq's border with Iran
and contain the Tehran government's interference in Iraqi
affairs.


3. (C) In an October 8 conversation with poloff, Shi'a Dr.
Salah Salem Abdel Razaq declared himself a strong supporter
of a bilateral security agreement, seeing it as a major
enhancement of Iraqi sovereignty. A senior member of the
Shi'a Waqf (also a member of Baghdad's provincial council),
Abdel Razaq thought an agreement would be a major improvement
over the status quo. He remarked "under the current setup,
the CF could, if they saw fit, arrest the President of the
Republic and Iraq would have no legal recourse."


4. (C) Abdel Razaq strongly agreed that establishing a strong
strategic relationship with the U.S. was in Iraq's interest.
He also pointed to important cultural and commercial benefits
that would accompany a SoFA. When poloff asked why we rarely
(if ever) heard prominent Iraqis taking this case to the
public, he said "once we have a text" agreed by both sides -
he and others would work to build public support for it.

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...But Public Suspicions...
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5. (C) In another October 8 conversation, Sunni Sheikh
Jamaleddin Badri told poloff he also supported a bilateral
security agreement, but criticized the U.S. for failing to
make a case to the Iraqi public. Sheikh Jamaleddin,
formerly of the Sunni Waqf and a likely (independent)
candidate for the Salaheddin Provincial Council, argued that
radio silence and closed-door deliberations would only prompt
suspicions among the Iraqi public.


6. (C) The U.S. should consult with a representative body of
influential Iraqis to help the public feel their views are
being taken into account, Badri believed. The U.S. should
also do public outreach/civic education to explain the
benefits to an Iraqi public still wary of the CF. When
poloff opined that this message would carry more weight if
delivered by Iraqis rather than Americans, he admitted that
he was reluctant to speak out publicly, lest he be targeted
by extremists.

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...And Hard Feelings Persist
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7. (C) Sunni Sheikh Mahmoud Eissawi, speaking to poloff on
October 7, was reluctant to say anything good about a
bilateral security agreement, or the presence of U.S. forces.
The Imam of the important Abdel Qadir Al-Geilani Mosque in
central Baghdad, Sheikh Mahmoud was traumatized by a U.S.
military raid on his home in 2005, in which he accused the
soldiers of terrifying his family and trashing his
belongings. Asked whether he worried a CF withdrawal would
hurt Baghdad's Sunnis, his initial response was that Sunnis
would prefer to take their chances rather than endure further
occupation.


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8. (C) On reflection, Sheikh Eissawi thought a residual
presence of CF troops "on bases and off the streets," might
be prudent. In principle, he conceded, a SoFA "which fully
protects Iraqi sovereignty" might be palatable. However, he
asserted that the "Iraqi street" hates the U.S. forces and
selling an agreement to the public would be an uphill battle.

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Friday Sermons
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9. (C) The prospect of a bilateral security agreement has
periodically been addressed by prominent Iraqi Imams during
Friday sermons. Predictably, Sadrist clerics have been the
most fervent in expressing opposition. As reported on a
Sadrist website, on October 3, Sadrist Imam Sheikh As'ad
al-Nasiri railed against an agreement during his Friday
sermon. As Iraqis commemorate the end of Ramadan, Nasiri
proclaimed, "...the first thing the government should do is
kick the occupier out of our holy land and not sign any
agreement..."


10. (C) Sheikh Sadr al-Din Al Qabbanji, a leading cleric with
the (Shi'a) Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs (ISCI),
offered a more nuanced view of the agreement, also during an
October 3 Friday sermon, delivered in Najaf, as reported by a
news agency affiliated with ISCI. Qabbanji complained of
U.S. pressure on Iraq to sign an agreement, accusing the U.S.
of using high pressure tactics to force Iraq to comply. "We
refuse to sell out Iraq in return for liberating it from
Chapter VII," he stated. Qabbanji believed a deal could, in
principle be reached, provided it was cleared with "the
higher religious authority," - a reference to the Marjaiya -
the Shi'a clerical establishment based in Najaf. He called
on the GOI to "...not submit to foreign pressures...to be
patient and to fear God in its negotiations..."

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Comment
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11. (C) As important influencers of public opinion, Iraqi
clerics have the power to either help mobilize Iraqis against
the agreement or help build support for it. While we doubt
many clerics will stake out public positions strongly
supporting a security agreement with the U.S., they could
help, if only through silence or relative restraint, tamp
down public opposition to ratification once a text is agreed
by the two sides. The Embassy is beginning low-key
discussions with a group of Muslim clerics to explain the
advantages of an eventual security agreement. End comment.
CROCKER