SAHWA LEADER ABU AZZAM AN AMBITIOUS POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003263 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER IZ SUBJECT: SAHWA LEADER ABU AZZAM AN AMBITIOUS POLITICAL WANNABE REF: BAGHDAD 2831 Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Sahwa leader Thamir Al Tamimi, aka Abu Azzam, said that the Sahwa issues are not yet over for the government of Iraq (GOI),despite his own claims in the press that the process is going smoothly. This is not the only time Abu Azzam has issued contradictory statements weeks. He has also said that Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki is both good and bad for the Sunni Arabs. He predicted that the Iraqiyya-Hewar coalition announced in the first week of October would endure and he has also said it would not survive the first crisis. He has called the IIP weak, divided, and untrustworthy, but he also labeled it a nationalist party that possibly would make an acceptable coalition partner. He said that the SOFA is good and would help Iraq avoid a civil war, but he also predicted publicly that even without the SOFA Iraqis could come together. These inconsistencies are part and parcel of regular interactions with Abu Azzam. We conclude from our private discussions with him, and the contrasts with what he says in public, that Abu Azzam is an opportunistic and relatively hardline Sahwa leader with big political ambitions who says different things to different audiences. Is the Sahwa Finished: Not Yet -------------- ¶2. (C) Sahwa leader Abu Azzam told poloffs on October 6 that it is still too early to predict whether the Sahwa transition to GoI supervision can be considered a success. This transition depends on the government's delivery of its promise to pay Sahwa members salaries, beginning on November ¶1. He claimed that only five percent of Baghdad Sahwa members have transitioned to the GoI. The problem is that powerful political parties with militias (i.e. ISCI) are forcing the GOI to slow the transition process. The militias, according to Abu Azzam, also have infiltrated Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and are targeting Sahwa leaders in an effort to deter Sahwa members from joining the ISF. He hopes that, based on the agreement with the GOI, qualified Sahwa members would be able to join ISF - regardless of the 20 percent quota - while those who are not qualified for entry into ISF should be offered civilian jobs. ¶3. (C) Abu Azzam said that the slow integration process and uncertainty surrounding Sahwa members' future are causing �A;them to lose their enthusiasm and ignoring their security duties. He added that currently, if a Sahwa member saw someone planting an IED (Improvised Explosive Devise) he would turn the blind eye. He told poloffs that Sahwa members prefer to be incorporated with the Iraqi Police (IP) instead of the (Iraqi Army). Most army soldiers get posted to unfamiliar provinces, and Sahwa members prefer to join the police in order to remain in their own neighborhoods, among their own people and tribe. A Sahwa Leader Shopping for Political Support: -------------- ¶4. (C) Abu Azzam told poloffs that he had spoken with Salih Mutlaq (Tawafuq) and Ayad Allawi (Iraqiyaa) to form an alliance to run in the upcoming provincial elections. However, he doubts that Ayad Allawi was serious about the alliance with Abu Azzam. He said that Mutlaq and Allawi are in agreement to run as a tandem in the upcoming election, Allawi aiming to be the next Prime Minister, and Salih Mutlaq to be the President. Abu Azzam doubts that this coalition would survive without a strong Sunni backing. He added that Allawi lacks popularity among Iraqis and Salih Mutlaq lacks Sunni support. Regardless, Abu Azzam did not eliminate the possibility of working with them when and if the opportunity arises. Abu Azzam also told us that he is talking to other hardline Sunni political figures, such as Khalaf al-Ulyan and Adnan ad-Dulaymi. ¶5. (C) Abu Azzam said he was not in favor of forming an alliance with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). He indicated that IIP's murky relationship with ISCI and the Kurds makes them an unfavorable ally and one not to be trusted. He said that IIP was losing its popularity, influence, and credibility among Sunni Arabs due to their approval of the constitution in 2005. (Comment: However, he also in media interviews praised the IIP as a "nationalist" party opposed to Iranian intervention. Perhaps for this reason, he admitted to us reaching out to the IIP several times, although IIP rebuffed him. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) Abu Azzam also told us on October 6 that he had spoken with the Prime Minister's advisor, Sami Al-Askeri in late September and told Al-Askeri that cooperation with the IIP in the upcoming provincial elections could not be ruled BAGHDAD 00003263 002 OF 002 out. Abu Azzam said that he is convinced Maliki is trying to divide Sunni political opposition, especially the IIP. Abu Azzam added that by forming a strong Sunni alliance among various Sunni groups, he would be stronger politically and more popular than the IIP. SOFA: It Would Be Good Against Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Abu Azzam, parliament will veto a security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq. He also asserted that if the U.S. forces decided to withdraw from Iraq, a civil war would be forthcoming. By contrast, in his October 2 interview with Al-Arabiya Arabic TV-channel, he said if the U.S Forces withdrew from Iraq now or in 2011, eventually Iraqis would be able to work together in resolving their problems. The real work now, he said, is to get Sunni Arabs more engaged in the political arena in order to fight Iranian influence which remains the real and dangerous threat to Iraq and the region. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: In private meetings with poloffs, Abu Azzam vehemently expressed his dislike of the Shia-led Government and called Al-Maliki a corrupt Iranian puppet. Yet, in his media interviews he is much less critical of Maliki, occasionally even laudatory. His positions with regards to the leading Sunni political parties are likewise dichotomous - public support and private criticism. When asked about the divergent positions, Abu Azzam told poloffs that in his media interviews he would like to give a false impression that Iraqis are united and Maliki is competent. It is clear that he is trying to manipulate the media in an attempt to raise his profile among Iraqi voters, perhaps seeking more support for his new political party "Iraqi Dignity Front" and promoting his own political agenda. Even though he described himself as a friend of the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, we have doubts about his political agenda. Above all, he is an opportunistic political hopeful who so far doesn't look too scrupulous to us. To give him credit, Abu Azzam's message about Iran remains the same whether he was addressing the media or us. END COMMENT. CROCKER