D PRESSES PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER ON SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003238

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: D PRESSES PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER ON SECURITY
AGREEMENT, MINORITIES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Speaker Mashadani told DepSec Negroponte
that a majority in the parliament supported the bilateral
security agreement, but that many deputies would not support
it publicly. Noting that other countries benefit from
security agreements with the U.S., he said the continued
American presence "off the Iraqi streets, but on bases in
Iraq" was vital to deter Iran. He pointed to the irony of
many hardline Arab nationalists, now worried about Iranian
power, secretly supporting a continued American military
presence to protect Iraq's Arab identity and prevent a
reigniting of sectarian fighting. Even the Sadrists, he
predicted, would support the SOFA in the end because they too
do not trust Iran. Mashadani said a strong public
information campaign that labeled those who opposed the
agreement as promoters of Iranian influence would help. The
Deputy Secretary thanked Mashadani for his support of the
agreement and said that the U.S. seeks a strong strategic
relationship with Iraq. Iraq's drive to end imposition of
Chapter 7 status means that the U.S. and Iraq need a
bilateral agreement to form the legal basis for continued
American troop presence. Mashadani pledged strong support
for the agreement during the ratification process and asked
for close cooperation with the U.S. as the process moves
ahead. He insisted that a new treaty ratification law --
which could require either a simple majority or a two-thirds
majority for passing the security agreement -- was needed
before the vote. Mashadani also promised that the parliament
would reinsert minorities' quotas into the provincial
elections law. End Summary.

Mashadani -- American Troops Needed to Deter Iran
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2. (C) Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud
Mashadani opened his October 3 meeting with Deputy Secretary
Negroponte with a 35-minute monologue. Although somewhat
rambling, his briefing hit two strong themes, which Mashadani
sees as closely related -- the need for a bilateral security
agreement with the United States and his fear of Iranian
influence in Iraq. Mashadani fears that, without an
agreement, Teheran's malign influence will only increase.
"We have no strategic deterrent," Mashadani said. With Iran
increasingly menacing, either Iraq needed such a deterrent or
American forces must stay. Saying that Iraqis now needed to
exert themselves to improve their security forces, Mashadani
assured Negroponte that Iraq is capable, but could not
succeed "without the help of our friends for the next ten
years." American troops should leave Iraqi streets, but stay
on bases in Iraq, he said.


3. (C) Iraq and the United States, Mashadani continued,
must persuade their adversaries, including Iran, Shia special
militia groups, and al-Qaeda, that they can't defeat the
Iraqi people. He told Negroponte that he worked every day in
the CoR with extreme nationalists. He understood them, he
said, because he himself had "grown up in that environment."
To reform them, he said, is cheaper and easier than to
eliminate them. Part of this is political -- extremists like
Jaysh al-Islami and Ansar as-Sunna who had opposed democracy
now see the virtues in democratic processes. They want to
defend democracy (and keep the Americans in Iraq),he
claimed. Citing another political example, Mashadani claimed
that Prime Minister Maliki had also come from an Islamist
extremist environment, but had grown more moderate with the
responsibility of national office. Mashadani added that
providing more essential services and better education would
reduce the influence of extremists -- it would make the
"incubator" that breeds extremism smaller, he said.
Mashadani concluded that Islamists ("like me") should be in
the mosques but secularists should be in government.

Getting the Votes for the Security Agreement
--------------


4. (C) Mashadani then explained how he intended to get the
security agreement through the CoR. Groups that had opposed
an agreement, he said, were now beginning to feel that the
Coalition was part of the solution. In fact, he said, some
extremists support an agreement more than some moderates,
because the U.S. presence inhibits sectarian violence.
Mashadani added that even hardline Arab nationalists perceive
that the vacuum that would exist in Iraq after a rapid
American withdrawal would be filled by Iran. Ironically, he
concluded, to defend the Arab identity of Iraq, the Americans
had to stay on. Mashadani even claimed that, in
conversations with Sadrist members of the CoR, they had
indicated an openness to an agreement and a desire to open
channels with the United States -- "but Muqtada won't let
us." (Note: In an aside, Mashadani noted that the Sadrists
as Arab nationalists had no genuine tie to Iran. Only the

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competition between the Sadr family and the Hakim family
drove the Sadrists to seek help from Iran. Resolving that
competition would allow the Sadr family to resume their
normally anti-Iran stance, he perceived. End Note) Mashadani
thought even Mutqtada could easily be persuaded "if we got
him to an Arab country." Still, Mashadani acknowledged that
Sadrists were at present among those who oppose an agreement
even if it's in the country's interest.


5. (C) Some groups, Mashadani said, support an agreement
but can't say so publicly. This was true, for example, with
the Sunni Arabs (Mashadani's group) and Fadilah. The Kurds,
he predicted, were "guaranteed" and 90 percent of Tawafuq
would vote for the agreement, as would Fadilah out of its
fear of Iran. Because of the hidden majority for an
agreement, Mashadani is considering holding a secret,
electronic vote. A secret ballot would protect deputies who
are hesitating and afraid. The CoR will vote for the
agreement "not from love, but from interest."

Selling It to the Public
--------------


6. (C) Mashadani emphasized the need to move quickly to
persuade the public that the agreement was in Iraqi interests
in order to avoid charges that those voting for the accord
"had sold Iraq." Time was short, he noted, and we had to
convince the Iraqi people that there was no alternative --
other than more Iranian influence -- to an agreement. He
suggested labeling anyone opposing the agreement as a
"Persian" (he used the Arabic word "ajami"). "Real" Arabs
would support the SOFA, he predicted. Mashadani pointed to
the many other countries like Kuwait, Bahrain and Japan that
have security arrangements with the U.S. and benefit from
them. However, the SOFA would be opposed vigorously by
Teheran, he warned. "I'm not afraid of anything but the
Iranian lobby." He had many Iranian friends and contacts, he
said, and had visited Teheran before. He would do so again
in order to plumb the reasons behind Iran's rejection of a
security agreement. Given the gains Iran had made in Iraq
due to the Americans' allowing Iranian friends to come to
power, he found the Iranian attitude against the Americans in
Iraq mystifying.

Negroponte Cites Need for Legal Basis
--------------


7. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that this was his fifth
visit to Iraq since ending his posting as Ambassador to
Baghdad in March of 2005. The situation had improved
considerably in all respects and Iraq was now in a
particularly interesting period. There was a real need, he
said, to agree on how we proceed together in 2009. The real
driving force was Iraq's desire to no longer be under Chapter

7. If the United States is to stay in Iraq after this
December, we need a bilateral agreement that provides a new
legal basis for the troops' presence. Negroponte expressed
appreciation for Mashadani's leadership and for the important
role he will play in leading the agreement through the CoR.
He asked about the legislative process with respect to the
security agreement.

New Treaty Law Essential
--------------


8. (C) Mashadani noted that, according to the Constitution,
the CoR must ratify all international agreements and
treaties. Ultimately, he said, the CoR must pass a new
treaty law because there would be a "hurricane" in the CoR if
the security agreement was passed without a new law. It
would give extremists a pretext for claiming that the CoR had
sold out Iraq. The content of the treaty law, Mashadani
continued, would determine the quorum required. Summing up
the state of current discussions of the matter, he said that,
for example, "strategic agreements" might require an absolute
majority or a two-thirds majority, economic agreements might
require an absolute majority, and cultural agreements might
be passed with a simple majority. Pressed on the point by
Negroponte, however, Mashadani retreated, saying that nothing
had been decided and it could happen that the security
agreement could be passed by a simple majority. Mashadani
then described the normal, three-reading legislative process
that would govern the agreement's passage. He would, he
said, use his skills in leading CoR sessions "to silence
those listening to outside forces." Shia Islamist party
Dawa-Tanzim would oppose the SOFA, he was sure, but Mashadani
said he would shut them up by reminding them that were it not
for the Americans, he and Dawa-Tanzim would both still be in
exile.

"What's Plan B?"
--------------

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9. (C) Departing momentarily from Arabic, Mashadani asked
about "Plan B." The CoR might fail to pass the agreement,
and Mashadani wondered what would happen then. The
Government would need a back-up plan. In this case, the
CoR's role would be to support the Government in its efforts
to find an alternative. Winding up discussion of the
security agreement, Mashadani asked that the U.S. stay in
close contact with him throughout the process, in order to
identify obstacles and solutions. Negroponte assured him
that we look forward to working closely together. Mashadani
told Negroponte that he had read the text of the agreement
(presumably, a version published some weeks ago on web-sites)
and had found it good. "Even my extremist wife liked it."
Negroponte agreed that it was a good document, with many
advantages for Iraq. He assured Mashadani that the United
States shares his concerns about Iraq.

Minorities in Provincial Elections
--------------


10. (C) Negroponte said that he would like to raise the
quotas for minority groups in provincial elections.
Mashadani noted that the law does not distinguish among Arabs
and minorities like Christians and Yezedis, nor does it
marginalize anybody. Christian areas, he predicted, would
elect Christian representatives. That said, Mashadani went
on, he himself had inserted Article 50 (on minority
representation) into the elections law that had passed (and
was soon afterward vetoed) on July 22. The CoR had voted for
it, but the Presidency Council had vetoed it. It had then
failed to pass on the next vote, on September 24, much to his
surprise, Mashadani claimed. Mashadani noted the irony that
the Presidency Council, having vetoed language on minority
set-asides, was now calling for it to be restored.


11. (C) Mashadani assured Negroponte that the CoR will pass
the missing article. "In Iraq," he said, "we have no
problems with minorities, only majorities." (Comment: It
isn't clear how the minorities language might be restored.
One possibility is an amendment to the provincial elections
law once it has officially become law, but little time
remains for such a maneuver. End Comment) Negroponte
expressed the hope that the problem could be solved without
reopening the entire law, which has many good features, like
open candidate lists. He congratulated Mashadani on it, who
then called the law his best accomplishment.


12. (C) DepSec staff has cleared this cable.
CROCKER