DPM SALIH ON: THE SOFA, KURDISH ISOLATION, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003097 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EINV IZ SUBJECT: DPM SALIH ON: THE SOFA, KURDISH ISOLATION, THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE, CORE ISSUES REF: BAGHDAD 2968 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met September 20 with DPM Barham Salih for an exchange of views that included: the status of the SOFA negotiations, increasing Kurdish isolation, the crisis of confidence resulting from recent tensions between the Kurds and the GOI, and the need to tackle the core issues. On the SOFA negotiations, Salih said that the Kurds would not cause much trouble, yet would likely seek additional language referencing the constitution and its implicit guarantee of territorial integrity. Ambassador said that it is imperative that the Executive Council endorse and not try to negotiate the SOFA document when it is submitted. On increasing Kurdish political isolation and the crisis of confidence between Kurds and their traditional Shi'a allies, Salih said that Masoud Barzani and the KRG leadership agree with Ambassador's recommendation that Kurds must engage in Baghdad, create issue-based alliances, and try to tackle the core issues. Ambassador reiterated admonitions he had given both Barzani and Maliki -- that neither side should provoke a confrontation, but rather work to lower temperatures. The passage of a Provincial Elections Law would be a good place to start. In other matters, Salih raised the idea of expanding the next U.S.-Iraq Business Forum to include a trade mission and other programs to indicate a tangible demonstration of the international community to the future of Iraq. End Summary. SOFA: Kurdish Language -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Crocker, accompanied by poloffs, met with DPM Barham Salih to discuss key issues in Baghdad.Starting with the SOFA negotiations, Ambassador Crocker said that the U.S. hoped that parties would not use the security agreement as a political football, that leaders would not give in to the strong temptation to treat bilateral issues as elements of local politics. Ambassador said he thought Prime Minister Maliki's comments on the SOFA at a media roundtable had been somewhat constructive. The Prime Minister characterized the situation much as we see it: that if a agreement is not reached, Iraq might seek a UN Security Council resolution that would be difficult to achieve in the light of recent U.S.-Russian tensions over Georgia and that, in the end, might be vetoed by the U.S. Responding to Salih on the timetable of a U.S. response to Iraqi requests on the SOFA, Ambassador said that the US team planned to hold a final meeting on September 22 to take a careful look at the issues before returning to Baghdad. ¶3. (C) DPM Salih asked whether Ambassador thought the SOFA would be an "eleventh hour" issue, volunteering that, on this particular issue, his sense was that such would be the case. Ambassador replied that there is already a broad agreement on the issues other than the issue of jurisdiction and the withdrawal language. Once those two points have been agreed upon, the agreement should go to the Executive Council. Ambassador said that it was important that the Executive Council understand that it should not try to further negotiate it, but rather endorse it in the same way it handled the Declaration of Principles. Opening up the document, once agreed upon, risks having all the strands come apart. Ambassador said he understood some (Kurdish) MPs publicly started. ¶4. (C) Salih replied that what is being sought is some wording" that guarantees of the idea of "territorial integrity," something that can be achieved by a reference to the constitution, adding that the more references to the constitution that are placed in the SOFA agreement, the better for everyone. Ambassador noted that when the U.S. talks about "territorial integrity," it is usually referring to international borders (vice the disputed internal boundaries suggested by Salih's comments). Ambassador continued that everyone talks about the constitution and yet for different people these can be radically different things. Ambassador said that in back to back meetings with KRG President Masoud Barzani and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, each had referred to the constitution but each interpreted it in different ways. Salih concluded the discussion on the SOFA with the comment that the U.S. would not find the Kurds any trouble on the SOFA. (Comment: He appeared to dodge the Ambassador's questionas to whether the Kurds would press for such a reference inthe Executive Council, saying he had not yet seen the textand reiterating the importance of an agreed reference to the constitution. End Comment.) Kurds: Isolation, Alliances, Too Close for Comfort -------------- -------------- BAGHDAD 00003097 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Salih said that President Talabani would return to Baghdad via Austria and Kurdistan on/about October 8, following his speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Salih asked whether, during their recent talks, KRG President Barzani had indicated to Ambassador that he would be traveling to Baghdad. Ambassador said he had suggested to Barzani that Kurdish interests are best defended from Baghdad -- that Jalal Talabani and Barham Salih had been working in Baghdad for the future of the Kurds. The Kurds, Ambassador noted as an example, should not leave the education of Iraq's children solely in the hands of the likes of (conservative Da'wa Party member) Education Minister Khodair al-Khozaei. And if the army is important then military appointments and military academy appointments must be monitored in the capital. ¶6. (C) Ambassador said that Barzani had complained about the situation in Khanaqin, noting that the Peshmerga had been there at the request of the federal government, had invoked Article 140 of the Constitution and Article 53A of the TAL, declared "they" are trying to force us back to the borders of the Saddam era, and concluded that there was a "crisis of confidence." Ambassador said he had told Barzani that the Kurds were increasingly isolated and that they had placed potential allies such as Tariq Hashimi in a difficult position as a result of the problem of Kirkuk and the perception that the Kurds have overreached. In the end, Ambassador said, Barzani had acknowledged the need for the KRG to manage affairs in Baghdad and to look into maintaining and creating alliances based on issues. ¶7. (C) Salih agreed that the atmosphere "has never been more poisonous." Nevertheless, Ambassador said, the Kurds must not provoke a fight -- if the situation turns into a shooting war, the Kurds will have lost everything gained. Ambassador said he had delivered the message both to Barzani and to Maliki in recent days that a confrontation must be avoided. Ambassador noted general agreement that Talabani's return to Baghdad will be important as he may be able to help stabilize the situation. But in fact, pulling back the Peshmerga would be the best way to achieve stability. ¶8. (C) Commenting that recent events have been instructive, but perhaps "too close for comfort," Salih said that ForMin Zebari and DefMin al-Ubaidi have been working to develop policies to defuse future such instances. Any future operation in Mosul would be more difficult. In Mosul, an effective solution would require security; there is a need for transitional arrangements and the military needs to be taken out of the equation. Ambassador said that transitional arrangements, which have been tried successfully in Anbar, for example, would be a good approach to the problem. Salih said that Minister of Interior al-Bulani was also interested in reducing tensions and working to rebuild confidence between the Kurds and the Shi'a. The problem, Salih said, lies with PM Maliki who, having gained some confidence, has tended to interpret issues his way, has insisted on a centralized system of government and structures which Kurds oppose and is trying to concentrate power in the hands of his Da'wa party. This concentration of power poses a problem both for the Kurds Da'wa's Shia Islamist ally, the ISCI party. While it may be true that the Kurds are isolated with some groups, on the larger issues, Maliki is becoming increasingly so. Core Issues; Kirkuk, Control, Consultation -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador said that the larger issues are precisely where there needs to be discussion. The U.S., he commented, had been struck by the extent to which the issue of Kirkuk has dictated the course of other negotiations. The U.S. was disappointed by Iraqi leaders' failure to deal with the core issues which can no longer be ignored For instance, it is likely that there will some day be other regions, and there must be an agreement arrived at as to how the process will proceed. What if Karbala were to become a region and then proceeded to move into Nukhayb in Anbar Province, arguing that its Shi'a population had been a part of pre-Saddam Karbala? Ambassador said the temperature in Baghdad needs to be lowered and passage of the Provincial Election Law could help do that. An agreement also would further improve overall Kurdishrelations with Shi'a. But Iraq must move forward on this with a consensus; a community cannot be forced out "intothe night". Ambassador said that Barzani fully appreciatesthat Kurds have to deal with the law so that all of the people -- Kurds, Turkoman and Arabs -- are considered. ¶10. (C) Salih said that Kurdish bloc chief Fu'ad Ma'asum and Tuwafuq bloc chief Ayad al-Samaraee were talking, and that CoR Speaker Mahmud Mashhadani, July 22 bloc leader Salih BAGHDAD 00003097 003 OF 003 Mutlaq and others were scheduled to visit him on September 21y to discuss the Provincial Election Law. Salih continued with familiar refrains: "Above all the current confrontation is about power in Baghdad, nothing more;" "Kirkuk is about the future character of Iraq;" and "There needs to be a win/win solution." Salih concluded that on Kirkuk, Maliki wants to say "We are here and we are in control;" but, in fact "They are not here; they are not in control; and there needs to be consultations." An Expanded U.S.-Iraq Business Dialogue -------------- ¶12. (C) Salih said he had discussed with Ambassador Wall the idea of holding US-Iraq Business Forum early next year that, in addition to the usual discussions, would involve a large American trade delegation and the participation of the Iraqi private sector. Discussions about "developing the private sector," and exhibitions by American companies, including setting up of offices in Baghdad, would be tangible evidence of progress, Salih offered. Ambassador said he would take on the project and agreed that setting up offices in Baghdad would be important in the future because firms must be in Iraq to be truly effective. He added that the next set of discussions should also focus on what Iraq has to do to create the conditions for such trade to be possible. Other Issues, Comments -------------- ¶13. (C) Other issues that arose during the conversation: --- Salih reported that CoR member Mithal al-Alusi, whose recent trip to Israel had resulted in a CoR vote to lift his immunity and protection privilege, visited on September 19. Salih had told him it was stupid to have gone to Israel. That said, Salih professed to be concerned for al-Alusi's safety. Ambassador said we had spoken with the PM's office and to NSA Muwafaq al-Rubaie on the seriousness of the issue, adding that the CoR does not have many fine hours and this was not one of them. --- On filling the open Justice Minister position, Salih said that Maliki has indicated he will not accept the Kurdish nomination of Kurdish Islamic Party (KIP) member Dindar Baijan al-Douski for Justice Minister. Salih said that the Kurds "dropped the ball" and that he was going to talk to the parties about renewing the nomination of Darra for the position. --- On budget execution, Salih said that he wanted to compare his numbers with those of the U.S. He said that this month and next month, the execution rates would go up. --- Salih said he had spoken with UN Envoy Ibrahim Gambari Friday night about a proposed regional forum. Salih said he was not keen on the idea at the moment. --- Salih said that he did not believe that Iraqiyya leader Ayad Alawi would pose much of a problem in the SOFA debate: he would make noises and would allow no one to outdo him in nationalist rhetoric, but he has not been and would not be a player in the SOFA talks. --- Salih asked whether Ambassador had heard that the Bahrainis had recalled their ambassadors to Iran and Iraq, supposedly because of the interference of some religious clerics. PMIN offered that the Bahraini ambassador had yet to arrive in Iraq and was not due here until some time after Eid al Fitr. --- Ambassador raised the upcoming U.S. Higher Education Fair and asked how (Senior Adviser to VP Adil Abdul Mehdi) Zuhair Humadi's plan to send ten thousand students to the US for training was proceeding. Salih, consulting a copy of the PM's budget said he could find no special line in the budget for it and unless it was a part of the education budget itself, was probably not in the budget proposal. CROCKER