NSC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 21, 2008: SECURITY OPTICS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003096 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: NSC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 21, 2008: SECURITY OPTICS, HALTING ASSASSINATIONS, TRANSITIONING DETAINEES, AND SQUATTERS ON MOD LAND REF: BAGHDAD 3022 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/REL MCFI) Summary. The September 21 meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council (I-NSC) opened with the Ministry of the Interior asserting its control of the Petroleum Security Police (PSP). Emphasizing his desire both to improve optics in the international zone for the Iraqi public, and the flow of traffic, PM Maliki called for the removal of traffic barriers wherever the security situation permitted, including the International Zone. The PM stressed the need for more effective coordination of police, military, and intelligence efforts to halt the assassination of Iraqi officials. During a discussion on the need for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to address the status of detainees held by the coalition, MNF-I commander GEN Odierno said that the Coalition would assist the GOI by continuing the training of guards to be ready to physically hold more detainees and to coordinate with the GOI on the evidence against those detainees held by the coalition. On the issue of illegal squatters occupying Ministry of Defense (MOD) properties, PM Maliki expressed surprise both at the size of his military and the requirements to properly garrison it. The PM agreed to the displacement of squatters from MOD property but only if citizens were treated well and compensated financially and through the provision of new homes. End Summary. The Oil Police ¶2. (SBU) PM Maliki presided over a lengthy exchange of views concerning the control and funding of the PSP. Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani dominated the discussions, outlining for the PM a scheme that placed the PSP under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) for administrative purposes, such as pay and equipment, but would deploy them in accordance with Ministry of Oil (MOO) desires. Bulani also asked that the Ministry of Finance release 82 billion Iraqi Dinars supposedly allocated for the support of the PSP. After posing a series of questions, including one asking why the PSP is not under the direct control of the MOO, the PM accepted Bulani,s explanation of the current operating concept. PM Calls for Removal of Traffic Impediments to Improve Optics and Traffic Flow ¶3. (S/REL MCFI) Noting both the negative visible impression that extensive barrier walls conveys, and Baghdad residents' growing frustration at the traffic delays barriers cause, PM Maliki stated that the time had come to review which barriers were still necessary and to remove those that no longer serve a purpose. He named several specific locations, including some in the International Zone, where he thought the time was ripe for a change to a more traffic friendly posture. The PM tempered his request, stating that the process of barrier removal would have to proceed with caution and close coordination between the relevant traffic and security related agencies. Following yet another lengthy exchange, Minister Bulani again asserted that primary responsibility for this issue lay with MOI. LTG Aboud, Baghdad Operations Center Commander, said that barrier removal from select locations would be complete by the end of October. Halting the Assassination of Iraqi Officials ¶4. (S/REL MCFI) PM Maliki told the NSC that he wanted action taken to halt the continuing assassinations of GOI officials. He noted that while the police and military were capable of dealing with the killers when they could find them, a dearth of intelligence often rendered their efforts ineffective. Following a lengthy exchange over the disposition of uniformed and plain clothes officers in high threat areas, the PM reiterated that all security forces and intelligence services must coordinate their efforts to end the assassinations. Maliki stated that while this issue was primarily the responsibility of the MOI, he expected to see close cooperation between the police and the military. ¶5. (S/REL MCFI) In a similar vein, Maliki raised with Chief Prosecutor Badran the problem of judges failing to bring assassins to justice. In an attempt to deflect this criticism, the Chief Prosecutor stated that suspects often had convictions overturned on appeal on dubious grounds, and that even in cases where the accused had received the death penalty, permission to carry out the sentence was often not received. Maliki, while conceding that there was a problem with the Presidential Council refusing to sign execution BAGHDAD 00003096 002 OF 002 warrants, and that the Supreme Judiciary Council,s performance had been less than perfect, stated that many who had been given the death penalty had their sentences reduced because their cases were criminal, without any political dimension, and involved mitigating circumstances. ¶6. (S/REL MCFI) The PM agreed that not all judges are fair, and that in some cases, the first judge to hear a case manipulated the evidence so thoroughly that further judicial review was effectively impossible. He decried that judges and witnesses were being intimidated, causing some prosecutions to fail. The PM made it clear that he expected judges to do their job even in the face of threats. ¶7. (S/REL MCFI) PM Maliki reiterated his concern with the Chief Prosecutor's performance in cases involving politically motivated killings, stating, "whenever we try to give you help, you have an excuse; we go to all of the trouble to catch them, then you release them." An extended exchange among the NSC members followed over the weakness of many cases due to the poor quality of many criminal investigations. Discussion concluded with the PM,s statement that while Iraq,s criminal justice system had not yet achieved European standards, "we want to see it moving in the right direction." Detainees ¶8. (S/REL MCFI) National Security Adviser Muwafaq al-Rubaie stated that at the end of the year, detainees currently in MNF-I custody would be transferred to the GOI, and that the government should form a committee to prepare for this eventuality. MOI Bulani stated that prison guards in Iraqi detention facilities had been well trained by MNF-I, and that "we should use the training and assume responsibility for the prisons." He then went on to state that some MNF-I trainers could stay until Iraqi facilities are ready. Bulani added he would coordinate with MNF-I. The Chief Prosecutor said his staff was ready to review the files of detainees. ¶9. (S/REL MCFI) General Odierno stated that there were two pieces to this issue. First, transition will take some time, and MNF-I would assist the GOI to assume physical responsibility for the detainees. Second, MNF-I lawyers would work with the GOI so that Iraqi judges could use evidence collected by the Coalition, as Iraqi courts might be unaccustomed to some of the more technical forms of evidence employed by the U.S. Squatters on MOD Properties ¶10. (S/REL MCFI) Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir raised the issue that squatters continue to occupy MOD facilities throughout the country now needed by the military. The minister said that as many as five to six hundred properties had to be cleared of illegal squatters. The PM asked why the military needed as much land today as it had in the past, if it no longer had as many divisions. He was surprised to find out that the army is in fact considerably larger than he had thought. Abdul Qadir pointed out that unlike the period during the war with Iran, when troops were concentrated in trench lines at the front, soldiers now need to be billeted in barracks spread throughout the country. Maliki stated that the GOI could not just throw people off the MOD land, especially in the case of poor families. Instead, squatters would have to be eased out, with monetary compensation and a new place to live. The PM suggested that the MOD draw up a prioritized list, and essential facilities would be cleared as necessary, with appropriate compensation to squatters provided on a case by case basis. CROCKER