INSPECTORS GENERAL SEEK TO CLARIFY THEIR ROLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003087 SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/C/CP, INL/I, NEA/I AND S/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: KCOR KCRM PGOV EAID PREL IZ SUBJECT: INSPECTORS GENERAL SEEK TO CLARIFY THEIR ROLES REF: BAGHDAD 02122 Classified By: Anti-Corruption Coordinator Lawrence Benedict for reason s 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Numerous Iraqi Inspectors General (IGs) have voiced to us confusion about their oversight role and frustration with other Iraqi entities either at the ministerial or national level to usurp the IGs' monitoring authorities. How the IGs develop is subject to pending legislation before the COR that will codify their relationship with Iraq's other primary anti-corruption bodies, the Commission of Integrity (COI) and the Board of Supreme Audit. Ambiguities in the current CPA orders governing these entities, coupled with the diffuse structure of the IGs compared to the centrally organized and independent COI and BSA, have led to the IGs' current confusion and frustration. The Central Bank recently dismissed its IGs without notice, adding further to their concerns. This tension came to a boil in recent weeks regarding an audit by the BSA of the IGs' performance. The IGs have in recent months become increasingly organized, although this has been largely under the guidance of the Health Ministry IG who is himself widely believed to be involved in corruption. Given the IGs' frustration and the uncertainty of their role under a new legislative framework, ACCO plans to award in the coming days a grant that will work with GOI stakeholders including the IGs to clarify their respective roles. END SUMMARY. IG LEGISLATION UPDATE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ACCO received an updated copy of draft legislation that would mandate the authorities granted to Iraq's Inspectors General. As reported reftel, the previous draft of the IG law failed to complete its second reading in the COR in June after a group of IGs objected to their diminished stature under the draft as compared to how they have operated under CPA Order 57. The IGs approached in June COR member and senior ISCI official Jalal al Din Saghier, who advised them to reach out to others in parliament as well as Council of Ministers Secretary General Ali Alaq with their concerns. Following this outreach, according to a memo from seven IGs addressed to the Prime Minister's office, COR Speaker Mashadani recommended that the three pieces of draft legislation pertaining to the IGs, the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Commission of Integrity be withdrawn from the COR. The IGs drafted a formal request to the Prime Minister's Office, which instructed the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs to with draw the three pieces of draft legislation from the COR on June 25. ¶3. (SBU) The IGs' memo to the Prime Minister's office also contained a new draft of the IG law that incorporated many of the changes the IGs had lobbied to Saghier. Notably, the draft eliminated the proposal to create a "Super IG." Instead, it called for the creation of a committee to oversee the IGs, headed by someone of the rank of a deputy minister. The draft IG law also contained language specifying that the COI would not have the authority to launch investigations without the prior authorization of an investigative judge. (NOTE: This language was included in the previous draft COI law, but not the draft IG law. END NOTE.) We have not seen further updates of the draft COI and BSA laws since reftel report. INSPECTORS GENERAL NOT SURE OF THEIR ROLE -------------- ¶4. (SBU) At a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) workshop in Jordan in August, numerous IGs voiced to us uncertainty over their role and frustration with what they perceived to be the efforts of other Iraqi entities either at the ministerial or national level to usurp the IGs' monitoring authorities. As an example, one IG cited the case of a recent procurement audit. Based on his authorities laid out under CPA Order 57, the IG involved in the case considered himself the head of any such internal investigation. However, the ministry's internal auditing division took the lead on the investigation, leaving the IGs to inspect the work of the internal auditors. The Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) similarly became involved in the case, adding to the IG's confusion. In late August, a group of IGs met with the BSA in an effort to promote better coordination between the agencies, but we are not aware of any procedural changes since this meeting. ¶5. (SBU) Numerous IGs told us that upward of 80 percent of the cases forwarded by their respective ministers to the Commission of Integrity (COI) were internal matters that had already been resolved within a particular ministry. The result was a paper backlog between the IGs and the COI that impeded the transfer of legitimate anti-corruption cases from any particular ministry to the national authorities. IGs also complained that once legitimate anti-corruption cases were picked up by the COI, there was no feedback from the COI on how the case was progressing towards prosecution. CENTRAL BANK IGs DISMISSED -------------- ¶6. (SBU) On September 16, without warning, the Iraqi Central Bank Governor Dr. Sinan Alshibebi dismissed its IGs. The Governor reportedly took this decision on the basis that the bank is not a ministry and, therefore, does not require an IG office. The bank IG, who was officially appointed in 2004, was forced to retire on August 31. Neither CPA Order 57 nor the draft IG law limits the appointment of IGs only to ministries, but both allow extending the IG offices to agencies like the Iraqi Central Bank and such others as municipalities, the three Endowments, the Commission to Resolve Property Disputes, and, most recently, the Haj Commission. On September 22 the Prime Minister's Anti-Corruption Coordinator Office (PMACCO) wrote to the Prime Minister (PM) to inquire about the legality of dissolving the Central Bank IG office. PMACCO expressed its concerns about the fate of other IGs and their offices should the bank dismissals be allowed to stand without forward procedures. PMACCO urged the PM to intervene in this case. IG'S CRITICAL OF BSA PERFORMANCE AUDIT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Compounding the tension between the IGs and BSA in recent months has been the BSA's undertaking of performance reviews for the IGs as called for under CPA Order 77. The recent reviews, which were delivered to the Prime Minister's Office, are the first to be undertaken since the creation of the IGs. The performance reviews were delivered to the Prime Minister's office. As a result of the audit, four IGs were dismissed and two were forced into retirement. Numerous IGs told us that they felt penalized by the audit, for which there had been no preliminary agreement on performance indicators and which were at times conducted with minimal IG involvement. The review in 2008 was not done in a timely fashion as it covered the period of 2004-2006. Issues and recommendations could not be carried out two years after the events had taken place. The IG for the Sunni Endowment, for example, told us that the BSA had not visited his office prior to giving him his evaluation. IGs also claimed the three year monitoring period was too long, taking into consideration how new the IGs work and the lessons they have learned since their creation. Other IGs told us they also felt singled out by the BSA because the assessment lacked a peer performance component. WHAT THE INSPECTORS WANT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) First and foremost, Iraq's IGs have expressed to us a desire for clarity in the new legislation of their powers and responsibilities. The IGs expressed to us a strong desire for more professional and technical training based on practical examples and best practices pertaining to inspection, auditing, and investigation. The IGs have received some training to date from USAID's Tatweer Program, MNSTC-I, and the United Nations. The IGs complained, however, that the majority of the training they have received has included no follow-up. In addition, the IGs expressed a keen interest in establishing standard operating procedures for their work and a more standardized reporting system, including better connectivity with the BSA and COI. COMMENT AND NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (C) Unlike the independent and centrally organized BSA and COI, each of Iraq's Inspectors General must fend for his or herself within a particular ministry. The Central Bank decision to dissolve its IGs further increases the IGs' confusion and concern and the PM's response (or non-response) to the request for intervention in this case could send another signal to the IGs. Faced with these uncertainties, the IGs increasingly appear to be rallying together to clarify their ill-defined authorities and assert their powers. Unfortunately, their majordomo has been Ministry of Health IG Dr. Adil Muhsin, whose own possible implication in corrupt acts is believed to be as great as anyone the IGs are likely to investigate. Adil continues to act as the de facto leader of the IGs. He signed the memo to the Prime Minister's Office on behalf of the other IGs and organized their meeting with BSA. In a particularly crafty move, it is likely that by downgrading the position of the "Super IG" to a committee head at the rank of a deputy minister, Adil is attempting to maintain his chokehold over the other IGs in a position that does not require COR confirmation. ¶10. (C) The confusion the IGs voiced over their role underscores the need for general technical assistance, the development of a stronger anti-corruption legal framework, and a clearer delineation of the division of labor between the IGs and Iraq's other anti-corruption agencies. Representatives from UNDP told us the UN intends to fund the development of standard operating procedures for the IGs based on a similar successful program with BSA. In the coming days, ACCO intends to award a grant with the goal of legislative strengthening vis-a-vis anti-corruption. The first priority of this program will be to work with GOI stakeholders including the IGs to clarify their respective roles under the pending legislation. Our challenge will be to encourage the long-term viability of the IGs, including the promotion of greater collaboration and reinforcement among themselves, without the pernicious opportunism of actors such as Dr. Adil. CROCKER