Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD307
2008-02-02 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
ZEBARI URGES INCREMENTAL ACTION ON 140; COMPLAINS
VZCZCXRO8005 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0307 0331405 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021405Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5543 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000307
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI URGES INCREMENTAL ACTION ON 140; COMPLAINS
OF TURKISH MEDDLING
Classified By: Classified by Special Adviser David Pearce for Reasons 1
.4(d/b)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000307
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI URGES INCREMENTAL ACTION ON 140; COMPLAINS
OF TURKISH MEDDLING
Classified By: Classified by Special Adviser David Pearce for Reasons 1
.4(d/b)
1. SUMMARY. (C) In a short January 31 meeting, Foreign
Minister Zebari told Special Adviser Pearce that to create
momentum that would facilitate resolution in areas with more
complex problems, the USG and UNAMI should focus their
Article 140-related work on disputed territories where the
issues were more "clear cut." Pearce argued that solving
technical issues and mustering adequate political will were
the only way to move forward across the spectrum of Article
140 topics. Zebari described UNAMI,s proposals as
"workable" and agreed that all parties should downplay
deadlines and emphasize implementation progress. Without
being specific, Zebari hinted the Turks were trying to
interfere with the 140 process but conceded that they had
never raised the issue with him. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Zebari opened by relating to Special Adviser David
Pearce and Political Counselor Matthew Tueller that Massoud
Barzani was "so upset" by reports the Prime Minister had
dissolved the Article 140 committee that he had instructed
Zebari to "pack his bags" if they proved correct. Zebari
claimed that Barzani had gotten "the wrong end of the story"
and calmed his nephew down by explaining that the Prime
Minister had merely postponed a committee hearing about
disputed territories in Southern governorates. Zebari
volunteered that President Talabani was in Erbil urging his
(PUK) people "to take it easy" on the 140 issue, particularly
in light of some recent media comment that 140 was "dead."
Zebari assessed that the six-month postponement was "a good
thing" which did not at all signal the Article 140 process
was dead. Both agreed that at this stage it would be best if
parties downplayed deadlines and stressed implementation
progress.
3. (C) Zebari noted he had recently spoken to SYGSR Staffan
de Mistura who suggested that passing national hydrocarbon
legislation would make resolving Article 140 issues easier.
Zebari characterized de Mistura's 140 proposals as "workable"
and Special Adviser Pearce stressed that the USG "strongly"
supported UNAMI and de Mistura's work. The Secretary's
December 18 visit to Kirkuk, Pearce continued, had been
intended to signal the USG's commitment to finding a solution
to disputed territories issues. Pearce explained that the
Secretary was originally scheduled to visit Anbar, but that
SIPDIS
Embassy Baghdad argued successfully that Article 140's
importance compelled her visit to Kirkuk.
4. (C) Zebari maintained that the USG and UNAMI would be
best served to deal first with "clear cut" disputed
territories like Makhmur, and Akraa and by so doing create
adequate momentum to tackle areas with more complex issues.
Pearce countered this "low hanging fruit" argument by saying
that in order to proceed, the parties had to address
fundamental technical and political questions. On the
technical side, Pearce said that, for example, the parties
had to create practical property claim compensation
mechanisms and clearly define what boundaries were disputed.
He added that UNAMI had specific expertise to assist with
many technical issues. Pearce also stressed that the Article
140 Committee had to include more Sunnis to dispel
perceptions of an imbalance favoring Kurdish and Shi'a
interests.
5. (C) On the political front, Pearce acknowledged that the
need to deal with Southern disputed territories made the
Kirkuk question more complex, because it threatened at any
moment to disrupt the sequence of events in the North. Once
the technical issues were in order and the facts were no
longer in dispute, Pearce said the decision of "what went
where" would be political, perhaps taken at the Presidency
Council-level. Pearce stressed that it was up to the
political leaders ultimately to decide "what were the
trade-offs."
6. (C) Without being specific, Zebari also said that the
Turks were "making noise" about the Article 140 process.
Under no circumstances, he continued, should the Government
of Turkey be allowed to intervene in these "most sensitive"
issues. It was extremely important, he groused, to avoid
even the "appearance" of Turkish meddling. However, to the
Political Counselor's direct question, Zebari conceded that
the Turks had "never" raised Article 140 directly with him.
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI URGES INCREMENTAL ACTION ON 140; COMPLAINS
OF TURKISH MEDDLING
Classified By: Classified by Special Adviser David Pearce for Reasons 1
.4(d/b)
1. SUMMARY. (C) In a short January 31 meeting, Foreign
Minister Zebari told Special Adviser Pearce that to create
momentum that would facilitate resolution in areas with more
complex problems, the USG and UNAMI should focus their
Article 140-related work on disputed territories where the
issues were more "clear cut." Pearce argued that solving
technical issues and mustering adequate political will were
the only way to move forward across the spectrum of Article
140 topics. Zebari described UNAMI,s proposals as
"workable" and agreed that all parties should downplay
deadlines and emphasize implementation progress. Without
being specific, Zebari hinted the Turks were trying to
interfere with the 140 process but conceded that they had
never raised the issue with him. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Zebari opened by relating to Special Adviser David
Pearce and Political Counselor Matthew Tueller that Massoud
Barzani was "so upset" by reports the Prime Minister had
dissolved the Article 140 committee that he had instructed
Zebari to "pack his bags" if they proved correct. Zebari
claimed that Barzani had gotten "the wrong end of the story"
and calmed his nephew down by explaining that the Prime
Minister had merely postponed a committee hearing about
disputed territories in Southern governorates. Zebari
volunteered that President Talabani was in Erbil urging his
(PUK) people "to take it easy" on the 140 issue, particularly
in light of some recent media comment that 140 was "dead."
Zebari assessed that the six-month postponement was "a good
thing" which did not at all signal the Article 140 process
was dead. Both agreed that at this stage it would be best if
parties downplayed deadlines and stressed implementation
progress.
3. (C) Zebari noted he had recently spoken to SYGSR Staffan
de Mistura who suggested that passing national hydrocarbon
legislation would make resolving Article 140 issues easier.
Zebari characterized de Mistura's 140 proposals as "workable"
and Special Adviser Pearce stressed that the USG "strongly"
supported UNAMI and de Mistura's work. The Secretary's
December 18 visit to Kirkuk, Pearce continued, had been
intended to signal the USG's commitment to finding a solution
to disputed territories issues. Pearce explained that the
Secretary was originally scheduled to visit Anbar, but that
SIPDIS
Embassy Baghdad argued successfully that Article 140's
importance compelled her visit to Kirkuk.
4. (C) Zebari maintained that the USG and UNAMI would be
best served to deal first with "clear cut" disputed
territories like Makhmur, and Akraa and by so doing create
adequate momentum to tackle areas with more complex issues.
Pearce countered this "low hanging fruit" argument by saying
that in order to proceed, the parties had to address
fundamental technical and political questions. On the
technical side, Pearce said that, for example, the parties
had to create practical property claim compensation
mechanisms and clearly define what boundaries were disputed.
He added that UNAMI had specific expertise to assist with
many technical issues. Pearce also stressed that the Article
140 Committee had to include more Sunnis to dispel
perceptions of an imbalance favoring Kurdish and Shi'a
interests.
5. (C) On the political front, Pearce acknowledged that the
need to deal with Southern disputed territories made the
Kirkuk question more complex, because it threatened at any
moment to disrupt the sequence of events in the North. Once
the technical issues were in order and the facts were no
longer in dispute, Pearce said the decision of "what went
where" would be political, perhaps taken at the Presidency
Council-level. Pearce stressed that it was up to the
political leaders ultimately to decide "what were the
trade-offs."
6. (C) Without being specific, Zebari also said that the
Turks were "making noise" about the Article 140 process.
Under no circumstances, he continued, should the Government
of Turkey be allowed to intervene in these "most sensitive"
issues. It was extremely important, he groused, to avoid
even the "appearance" of Turkish meddling. However, to the
Political Counselor's direct question, Zebari conceded that
the Turks had "never" raised Article 140 directly with him.
BUTENIS