SRSG DEMISTURA ON PROSPECTS FOR PROVINCIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003066

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TU
SUBJECT: SRSG DEMISTURA ON PROSPECTS FOR PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS AND A RESOLUTION OF KIRKUK AND OTHER DISPUTED
AREAS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: SRSG DeMistura told the Ambassador that
revalidating the 2005 election law could work as a Plan B if
the CoR does not pass a new election law, but that IHEC would
still need 135 days to prepare for an election. He said that
IHEC could promulgate regulations under the 2005 law to allow
for IDP voting and mandate women's representation, but that
CoR action would be required for an open list election. The
Ambassador stressed the need for an open list election, but
acknowledged a lack of enthusiasm for this in the political
leadership. DeMistura said UNAMI is working with CoR Speaker
Mashadani on resolving the Article 24 issue, but was not
optimistic these efforts would succeed. Expressing concern
that UNAMI would be blamed for the inability to pass the
election law if it is too publicly associated with ongoing
efforts to resolve Article 24, DeMistura suggested that the
U.S. and UNAMI scale back their engagement, wait out the
political maneuvering, and revert to the 2005 law option.
The Ambassador disagreed. Revalidation of the 2005 law may
end up being the fallback position, but we should not give up
yet.


2. (C) On Kurdish-Arab tensions in Khanaqin, the Ambassador
told DeMistura that his message to both sides was that
neither should push to the point of armed conflict, that
Kurdish-Arab violence would be a catastrophe, and that the
U.S. will not support either side. He said he had urged
President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki to use the
Executive Council as a means to discuss the underlying
issues, and that these talks need to address Peshmerga
deployments south of the green line as well as Kurdish
concerns about Maliki's increasingly centralized style of
governance. As a means to enable a cooling off period,
DeMistura proposed freezing ongoing UNAMI Disputed Internal
Boundaries (DIBs) reports and to explore ways to the
reinvigorate the Article 140 constitutional process to
resolve Kirkuk and other disputed areas. The Ambassador
urged that the DIBs process continue. He said reinvigorating
the Article 140 process could have some effect, but that this
alone would not address the fundamental problem. There needs
to be a broader discussion that deals with the core issues so
that the Kurds do not feel isolated. DeMistura also briefed
the Ambassador on his recent trip to Tehran; this will be
reported septel. END SUMMARY


Provincial Elections



3. (C) In his overview of the political state-of-play
regarding the provincial elections, the Ambassador told
recently returned UNSYG Special Representative Staffan
DeMistura September 13 that the only change since the
beginning of August has been CoR Speaker Mashadani's position
on the draft election law. Acknowledging that this may be
style more than substance, the Ambassador said Mashadani is
talking the right talk by stressing the need for consensus
and for all communities to refrain from imposing solutions.
He noted that Mashadani convened and is personally overseeing
a new committee to resolve the Article 24 dispute, but
predicted the committee would not succeed. (NOTE: Citing
its lack of progress, Mashadani abruptly disbanded the new
committee on September 13. He has tasked the Legal and
Provincial Affairs committees to come up with a solution by
September 17. END NOTE.) Unfortunately, there has been no
fresh positioning by any of the parties. Grand Ayatollah
Sistani's clear signal that elections must happen, with an
open list system, is helpful. Current discussion is on the
long UNAMI text. The Ambassador said his sense is that party
leaders are not adequately engaged, noting that Vice
President Abdul Mehdi during a meeting the evening of
September 12 did not seem up to date on the election law
debate. He also discerned a lack of commitment in the
political leadership to an open list election.


4. (C) The Ambassador said Prime Minister Maliki had told
him that elections needed to be held this year so that the
current Provincial Councils would not lose their legitimacy.
The PM predicted that passing a new election law would take
time, but that if there is no new law by mid-October, the
Presidential Council could decree an election and use the
2005 election law. The Ambassador expressed concern that
there may not be adequate time to prepare for elections with
an election law only at such a late date. He also wondered,
given their inability to agree on the draft elections law,
whether the political leadership would be able to agree on
revalidating the 2005 law, which would allow for postponing
Kirkuk provincial council elections by citing security
concerns.


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5. (C) DeMistura said UNAMI is working with the new Article
24 Committee but was not convinced this was a serious effort
by Mashadani. He opined that revalidating the 2005 law could
work as a Plan B. The Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC) would still need 135 days to prepare for an election.
He added that while IHEC could promulgate regulations under
the 2005 law to allow for IDP voting and mandate women's
representation, CoR action would be required for an open list
election -- and this could reopen the Article 24/Kirkuk
issue. DeMistura was fearful that engaging too intensively
in what he viewed as a futile process would set UNAMI up to
be blamed for the inability to pass the election law. He
wondered whether it might be best for the U.S. and UNAMI to
scale back their engagement, wait out the political
maneuvering, and revert to the 2005 law option. He worried
that even if UNAMI were to develop a third "medium text"
compromise, Mashadni would likely publicly accept it but
ensure that someone else kills it.


6. (C) The Ambassador disagreed. He stressed the
importance of not giving up on trying to get the draft law
passed. Leaders need to agree on one of the several
compromise proposals. We should not allow the draft law to
die at the committee level. Revalidation of the 2005 law may
end up being the fallback position, but we should not give up
yet.


Turkish Contradictions



7. (C) DeMistura pointed to an apparent disconnect in
Turkish policy. He said Turkey's Special Envoy to Iraq Murat
Ozcelik had reassured UNAMI that Turkey supported a
compromise solution on the election law, but Turkey at an OIC
ministerial meeting on the margins of the UNGA September 12
tabled an unhelpful resolution expressing concern about the
situation in Kirkuk and specifically mentioning the
provincial elections law. (The resolution failed after Iraq
objected.) The Ambassador noted that Ozcelik had told us
that he supported the short UNAMI text. DeMistura expressed
concern that Ankara might be encouraging Maliki to take a
hard line vis-a-vis Kirkuk and the Kurds. The Ambassador
noted the need to convey to Ozecelik that we appreciate his
support for the short text, but that this message is not
getting across to the Turcoman bloc in the CoR.


Needed: A New Kurdish Approach to the Fundamental Issues



8. (C) The Ambassador related that bad weather had caused
him to postpone his trip to Erbil, but said the delay might
be helpful in that it would allow for the eventual discussion
to focus on more than just the immediate crisis of Khanaqin.
He told DeMistura that his message to both sides was that
neither should push to the point of armed conflict, that
Kurdish-Arab violence would be a catastrophe, and that the
U.S. would not support either side. He said he had urged
President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki to use the
Executive Council as a means to discuss the underlying
issues, and that these talks need to address Kurdish
encroachment south of the green line as well as Kurdish
concerns about Maliki's increasingly centralized style of
governance. The Ambassador said that the core of the current
conflict is existential: what is the common vision of Iraq?



9. (C) Continuing, the Ambassador stressed the need for
President Talabani to engage on this issue as soon as he
returns to Iraq. He said his message to Barzani is that his
attempt to create facts on the ground through Peshmerga
deployments is an approach closer to politics as practiced
during the Saddam and Qasim regimes, not with ongoing efforts
to create a new, profoundly different Iraq. He said the
Kurds are not using their institutional power to develop
appropriate policies for the new Iraqi state with regard to
the Kurdish region. Kurdish interests are best advanced in
Baghdad, not in Khanaqin. There must be a fundamental
discussion; the issue is bigger than the DIBS process,
Kirkuk, and Peshmerga deployments south of the "green line."


10. (C) DeMistura expressed concern that the DIBs process
and UNAMI's Kirkuk proposals are being overtaken by events.
He worried that some believe the U.S. will be distracted over
the next three months due to the presidential election and
might seek to exploit a perceived lack of U.S. leverage to
advance their political agendas. Specifically, he feared
that Maliki, eager to assert central government authority,
may assess that with newfound Sunni political support, now is
the time to counter the Kurds. At the same time, the Kurds

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are being inflexible. DeMistura said the Kurds should have
tried to diffuse the Khanaqin situation by asking the UN to
study it rather than deploying Peshmerga units. The SRSG
proposed a joint approach by the U.S., UNAMI, and the EU to
impress upon Barzani the need for restraint and to warn him
that neither the U.S. nor the UN will intervene in Khanaqin.
DeMistura said Barzani needs to understand that Kurdish
interests are best advanced by being integrated into Iraq.
Kurdish unilateralism risks causing a repeat of tragic
Kurdish history. DeMistura also proposed, as means to enable
a cooling off period, to freeze ongoing UNAMI DIBs reports
and to explore ways to the reinvigorate the Article 140
constitutional process to resolve Kirkuk and other disputed
areas.


11. (C) The Ambassador agreed it was a tense time, but
noted that all sides were still talking and still meeting,
and that there hasn't been any violence. He questioned the
wisdom of freezing the DIBs process. Even if the imminent
danger in Khanaqin is gone, the situation there and in other
disputed areas is not stable. The key is changing the larger
dynamic. The Ambassador said reinvigorating the Article 140
process could have some effect, but that this alone would not
address the fundamental problem: the Kurds do not have faith
in the process, Article 140 or otherwise. There needs to be
a broader discussion that deals with the core issues,
including the Prime Minister's centralization of power, so
that the Kurds do not feel isolated. The Ambassador and
DeMistura agreed to meet again when the Ambassador returns
from Erbil.


Comment



12. (C) UNAMI has expressed increasing concern that rather
than offer a possible framework for resolution of Kirkuk and
other disputed areas, the DIBs reports could just fan the
flames of Kurd-Arab mutual distrust and contribute to the
possibility of violence. UNAMI would then be blamed for
failing to resolve a critically important issue while also
failing to assist the parties to a compromise provincial
election law. There are already calls for DeMistura,s
removal and replacement by some Sunni, Shi,a and even
Kurdish parties. UNAMI officials tell us that their NY HQ is
growing nervous about the prospects of another UN failure in
Iraq when they so badly need success to restore the UN,s
tarnished image here. For now, we think UNAMI should
continue working on the DIBs reports, with a careful eye out
on the situation in Kirkuk before deciding on when and if the
report is shared with Iraqis and Kurds. We will also closely
engage UNAMI in our efforts to push Iraqi parties towards an
election compromise. DeMistura is a practical, intelligent,
and dedicated diplomat who needs our - and NY,s - support
and confidence.
CROCKER