Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3030
2008-09-21 12:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH
VZCZCXRO7733 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3030/01 2651229 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 211229Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9511 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003030
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH
MISSTEPS AND GROWING ANTI-KURD SENTIMENT, REQUESTS USG
SUPPORT
Classified By: Senior Advisor Thomas Krajeski; reaons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003030
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH
MISSTEPS AND GROWING ANTI-KURD SENTIMENT, REQUESTS USG
SUPPORT
Classified By: Senior Advisor Thomas Krajeski; reaons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In a September 21 meeting, Senior KRG
official in Baghdad Mohamed Ihsan admitted to Senior Advisor
Krajeski that Kurds had mismanaged their political alliances
and were partly to blame for widespread anti-Kurd sentiment.
But he also blamed PM Maliki for seeking to roll back
federalism; the unhelpful role played by Turkey, Iran, and
former Baathists; and waning U.S. influence, saying "we are
paying for our alliance with the U.S." Ihsan asked that the
U.S. play a more proactive role in facilitating solutions to
disputes over hydrocarbons legislation, Peshmerga
authorities, the disputed territories, and the budget. He
admitted the Kurds can not remove Maliki politically, but
said they would prefer Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad Allawi, or Ali
Adeeb. Ihsan has been named chair of the Article 140
subcommittee looking at disputed territories south of
Baghdad, and was skeptical of Shia claims to Nu-khayb
District in Anbar Province. He said Maliki plans to use the
140 Committee to buy support for Da'wa before provincial
elections. The Kurds understand independence is impossible,
and would be glad to give up Kirkuk's oil, but not
administration of the city. End summary
2. (SBU) Senior Advisor for northern Iraq Tom Krajeski,
accompanied by political officers Joe Cassidy and Rebecca
Fong, met on September 21 with Mohamed Ihsan, representative
in Baghdad of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Mohamed
has been named chief Kurdish negotiator on Article
140/Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) issues. He has also
been appointed to chair the subcommittee of the National
Article 140 committee dealing with south and central Iraq,
including the disputed area of Nu-khayb in Anbar Province.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Acknowledges Anti-Kurd Sentiment
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Ihsan stated bluntly that anti-Kurd sentiment in Iraq
is as high as it has ever been, including during the Anfal
years, when at least there was Arab sympathy for the Kurdish
victims. He acknowledged that Kurdish leaders bear
significant blame, saying they had mismanaged their political
alliances on issues like the provincial elections law and
hydrocarbons. But he also cited four other causes: 1) a
desire by Arab nationalists (including PM Maliki) to do away
with meaningful federalism in Iraq; 2) the nefarious but
skillful role played by former Ba'athists seeking to split
the Shia/Kurdish political alliance; 3) the unhelpful role
played by Iran and Turkey; and 4) the waning influence of the
USG, which has prompted those unfriendly to U.S. interests to
attack the Kurds as America's ally. Ihsan said "we are
paying for our alliance with the U.S."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Asks for American Support
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) S/A Krajeski noted that Amb. Crocker has been urging
Kurdish leaders to reach out to Maliki and others in Baghdad
and restore their political alliance based on shared
interests. Ihsan expressed skepticism, arguing that Da'wa
depended on too many Ba'athists to run the country, who in
turn have no love for the Kurds. He said the USG should
serve as a more proactive mediator on the major issues
dividing Iraqi political parties, including the hydrocarbons
law, respective authorities of regional and federal security
forces, Article 140/DIBs, and resource and budget issues.
Ihsan said the passage of time makes these issues less easy
to solve, not easier. On issues like DIBs, "we have already
delayed three years; we are not going to wait another three."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kirkuk a Symbol Worth Fighting For, but Kurdish Independence
is Not Possible
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) S/A Krajeski said the Kurds would have to agree on a
hard compromise on Kirkuk and asked Ihsan what ideas he had
for resolution. Ihsan said the province should be split into
demographically homogenous areas. While the city could be a
separate administrative area, Kurds would not accept having
the city fall outside the KRG. "We have labored for Kirkuk
for the last twenty years, how can we tell people we give up
now?" he asked. If Arabs are worried that the Kurds covet
Kirkuk's oil to create an economically viable state, then let
them separate the oil issue from the administrative status
issue. "It's not in our interest" to gain Kirkuk's oil and
not share in (the vastly more important) oil deposits
BAGHDAD 00003030 002 OF 003
elsewhere in Iraq, Ihsan said. Ihsan said Kurdish leaders
are cold-eyed realists about the impossibility of
independence. "We don't want a fake state caught between
Iraq, Turkey and Iran. We could not export oil and we would
be crushed."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Maliki Will Continue to Press the Kurds
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (S) Ihsan said the Kurds had obtained a September 5 memo
to Maliki, with Maliki's notes in it, indicating that after
Iraqi Army troops pushed Peshmerga out of Diyala Province
they plan to take over Kirkuk and push out the Kurd-dominated
army units stationed there now. Ihsan asked rhetorically how
the Kurds could trust Maliki now. He admitted the Kurds do
not have the power to force Maliki from power (as they did
Jaafari and would have done to Maliki last year but for USG
intervention),but he opined that Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad
Allawi, or Ali Adeeb would all be preferable from a Kurdish
perspective.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Given Responsibility for DIBs South of Baghdad...
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) Ihsan told us that after Ramadan he will travel south
(including Kut, Kerbala, Najaf, Amara, and Basra) as newly
appointed chair of the Article 140 subcommittee on central
and southern Iraq. Ihsan alleged that Prime Minister Maliki
is pushing to have the Article 140 Committee dole out large
amounts of compensation money prior to elections in order to
buy support for Da'wa. Ihsan said he would not allow the
Committee to be used as a partisan political tool. He noted
that the Committee is waiting for $350 million in government
funding to allow it to continue compensation for land claims
and relocations. He also complained that the USG has
neglected the DIBs issue, which is why progress has been so
slow.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
...so will have to Wrestle with Nu-khayb
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) His most controversial issue in the south will be
dealing with Shia Arab demands that the district of Nu-khayb
in southeastern Anbar be transferred to Kerbala province.
Ihsan said Nu-khayb is not a legitimate Article 140 issue.
There were never any large-scale population transfers to
change its demographic balance. Historically and up to
today, the district remains "99%" Sunni Arab, he claimed.
Shia political leaders in the south, however, want to control
the lucrative Haj route going through Nu-khayb. They hope to
gain Kurdish support for their claims by dangling the hope of
Shia support for Kurdish territorial claims in the disputed
territories along the KRG's southern border. Ihsan, said
that PM Maliki does not want Nu-khayb to become an ethnic
flashpoint, but that Shia political party politicians will
keep the pressure on him.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When did "Arabization" Start?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9. (C) We asked Ihsan whether there is agreement among
Article 140 Committee members about when Arabization started,
in order to resolve conflicts about land ownership in
disputed areas. Ihsan said the mandate of the Article 140
Committee covers the period from 17 July 1968 (Ba'ath
takeover) to the end of the Saddam regime in 2003. As a
matter of state policy, though, Arabization began
substantially in 1975, according to Ihsan.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tel Keif Land Dispute
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. (C) Ihsan said he had just returned from Tel Keif
District in Ninewa Province, where there is an ongoing
program to reverse "Arabization" that occurred after 2003.
According to Ihsan, Sunni Arabs from Bayji and other places
in Sala-ad-Din Province forcibly took land from Christian
families in Tel Keif, many of whom fled north to the KRG.
The Article 140 Committee is overseeing a program to remove
those recently arrived Arab residents, compensating them with
20 million Iraqi dinar (approximately USD 17,000) per family
and providing reestablishment money in the same amount to
returning Christian families. The Sunni Arab families have
been given one month to move.
BAGHDAD 00003030 003 OF 003
CROCKER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH
MISSTEPS AND GROWING ANTI-KURD SENTIMENT, REQUESTS USG
SUPPORT
Classified By: Senior Advisor Thomas Krajeski; reaons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In a September 21 meeting, Senior KRG
official in Baghdad Mohamed Ihsan admitted to Senior Advisor
Krajeski that Kurds had mismanaged their political alliances
and were partly to blame for widespread anti-Kurd sentiment.
But he also blamed PM Maliki for seeking to roll back
federalism; the unhelpful role played by Turkey, Iran, and
former Baathists; and waning U.S. influence, saying "we are
paying for our alliance with the U.S." Ihsan asked that the
U.S. play a more proactive role in facilitating solutions to
disputes over hydrocarbons legislation, Peshmerga
authorities, the disputed territories, and the budget. He
admitted the Kurds can not remove Maliki politically, but
said they would prefer Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad Allawi, or Ali
Adeeb. Ihsan has been named chair of the Article 140
subcommittee looking at disputed territories south of
Baghdad, and was skeptical of Shia claims to Nu-khayb
District in Anbar Province. He said Maliki plans to use the
140 Committee to buy support for Da'wa before provincial
elections. The Kurds understand independence is impossible,
and would be glad to give up Kirkuk's oil, but not
administration of the city. End summary
2. (SBU) Senior Advisor for northern Iraq Tom Krajeski,
accompanied by political officers Joe Cassidy and Rebecca
Fong, met on September 21 with Mohamed Ihsan, representative
in Baghdad of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Mohamed
has been named chief Kurdish negotiator on Article
140/Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) issues. He has also
been appointed to chair the subcommittee of the National
Article 140 committee dealing with south and central Iraq,
including the disputed area of Nu-khayb in Anbar Province.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Acknowledges Anti-Kurd Sentiment
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Ihsan stated bluntly that anti-Kurd sentiment in Iraq
is as high as it has ever been, including during the Anfal
years, when at least there was Arab sympathy for the Kurdish
victims. He acknowledged that Kurdish leaders bear
significant blame, saying they had mismanaged their political
alliances on issues like the provincial elections law and
hydrocarbons. But he also cited four other causes: 1) a
desire by Arab nationalists (including PM Maliki) to do away
with meaningful federalism in Iraq; 2) the nefarious but
skillful role played by former Ba'athists seeking to split
the Shia/Kurdish political alliance; 3) the unhelpful role
played by Iran and Turkey; and 4) the waning influence of the
USG, which has prompted those unfriendly to U.S. interests to
attack the Kurds as America's ally. Ihsan said "we are
paying for our alliance with the U.S."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Asks for American Support
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) S/A Krajeski noted that Amb. Crocker has been urging
Kurdish leaders to reach out to Maliki and others in Baghdad
and restore their political alliance based on shared
interests. Ihsan expressed skepticism, arguing that Da'wa
depended on too many Ba'athists to run the country, who in
turn have no love for the Kurds. He said the USG should
serve as a more proactive mediator on the major issues
dividing Iraqi political parties, including the hydrocarbons
law, respective authorities of regional and federal security
forces, Article 140/DIBs, and resource and budget issues.
Ihsan said the passage of time makes these issues less easy
to solve, not easier. On issues like DIBs, "we have already
delayed three years; we are not going to wait another three."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kirkuk a Symbol Worth Fighting For, but Kurdish Independence
is Not Possible
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) S/A Krajeski said the Kurds would have to agree on a
hard compromise on Kirkuk and asked Ihsan what ideas he had
for resolution. Ihsan said the province should be split into
demographically homogenous areas. While the city could be a
separate administrative area, Kurds would not accept having
the city fall outside the KRG. "We have labored for Kirkuk
for the last twenty years, how can we tell people we give up
now?" he asked. If Arabs are worried that the Kurds covet
Kirkuk's oil to create an economically viable state, then let
them separate the oil issue from the administrative status
issue. "It's not in our interest" to gain Kirkuk's oil and
not share in (the vastly more important) oil deposits
BAGHDAD 00003030 002 OF 003
elsewhere in Iraq, Ihsan said. Ihsan said Kurdish leaders
are cold-eyed realists about the impossibility of
independence. "We don't want a fake state caught between
Iraq, Turkey and Iran. We could not export oil and we would
be crushed."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Maliki Will Continue to Press the Kurds
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (S) Ihsan said the Kurds had obtained a September 5 memo
to Maliki, with Maliki's notes in it, indicating that after
Iraqi Army troops pushed Peshmerga out of Diyala Province
they plan to take over Kirkuk and push out the Kurd-dominated
army units stationed there now. Ihsan asked rhetorically how
the Kurds could trust Maliki now. He admitted the Kurds do
not have the power to force Maliki from power (as they did
Jaafari and would have done to Maliki last year but for USG
intervention),but he opined that Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad
Allawi, or Ali Adeeb would all be preferable from a Kurdish
perspective.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ihsan Given Responsibility for DIBs South of Baghdad...
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) Ihsan told us that after Ramadan he will travel south
(including Kut, Kerbala, Najaf, Amara, and Basra) as newly
appointed chair of the Article 140 subcommittee on central
and southern Iraq. Ihsan alleged that Prime Minister Maliki
is pushing to have the Article 140 Committee dole out large
amounts of compensation money prior to elections in order to
buy support for Da'wa. Ihsan said he would not allow the
Committee to be used as a partisan political tool. He noted
that the Committee is waiting for $350 million in government
funding to allow it to continue compensation for land claims
and relocations. He also complained that the USG has
neglected the DIBs issue, which is why progress has been so
slow.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
...so will have to Wrestle with Nu-khayb
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) His most controversial issue in the south will be
dealing with Shia Arab demands that the district of Nu-khayb
in southeastern Anbar be transferred to Kerbala province.
Ihsan said Nu-khayb is not a legitimate Article 140 issue.
There were never any large-scale population transfers to
change its demographic balance. Historically and up to
today, the district remains "99%" Sunni Arab, he claimed.
Shia political leaders in the south, however, want to control
the lucrative Haj route going through Nu-khayb. They hope to
gain Kurdish support for their claims by dangling the hope of
Shia support for Kurdish territorial claims in the disputed
territories along the KRG's southern border. Ihsan, said
that PM Maliki does not want Nu-khayb to become an ethnic
flashpoint, but that Shia political party politicians will
keep the pressure on him.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When did "Arabization" Start?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9. (C) We asked Ihsan whether there is agreement among
Article 140 Committee members about when Arabization started,
in order to resolve conflicts about land ownership in
disputed areas. Ihsan said the mandate of the Article 140
Committee covers the period from 17 July 1968 (Ba'ath
takeover) to the end of the Saddam regime in 2003. As a
matter of state policy, though, Arabization began
substantially in 1975, according to Ihsan.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tel Keif Land Dispute
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. (C) Ihsan said he had just returned from Tel Keif
District in Ninewa Province, where there is an ongoing
program to reverse "Arabization" that occurred after 2003.
According to Ihsan, Sunni Arabs from Bayji and other places
in Sala-ad-Din Province forcibly took land from Christian
families in Tel Keif, many of whom fled north to the KRG.
The Article 140 Committee is overseeing a program to remove
those recently arrived Arab residents, compensating them with
20 million Iraqi dinar (approximately USD 17,000) per family
and providing reestablishment money in the same amount to
returning Christian families. The Sunni Arab families have
been given one month to move.
BAGHDAD 00003030 003 OF 003
CROCKER