Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD3030
2008-09-21 12:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3030/01 2651229
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O 211229Z SEP 08
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9511
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003030 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH
MISSTEPS AND GROWING ANTI-KURD SENTIMENT, REQUESTS USG
SUPPORT

Classified By: Senior Advisor Thomas Krajeski; reaons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003030 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: SENIOR KURDISH OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGES KURDISH MISSTEPS AND GROWING ANTI-KURD SENTIMENT, REQUESTS USG SUPPORT Classified By: Senior Advisor Thomas Krajeski; reaons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 21 meeting, Senior KRG official in Baghdad Mohamed Ihsan admitted to Senior Advisor Krajeski that Kurds had mismanaged their political alliances and were partly to blame for widespread anti-Kurd sentiment. But he also blamed PM Maliki for seeking to roll back federalism; the unhelpful role played by Turkey, Iran, and former Baathists; and waning U.S. influence, saying "we are paying for our alliance with the U.S." Ihsan asked that the U.S. play a more proactive role in facilitating solutions to disputes over hydrocarbons legislation, Peshmerga authorities, the disputed territories, and the budget. He admitted the Kurds can not remove Maliki politically, but said they would prefer Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad Allawi, or Ali Adeeb. Ihsan has been named chair of the Article 140 subcommittee looking at disputed territories south of Baghdad, and was skeptical of Shia claims to Nu-khayb District in Anbar Province. He said Maliki plans to use the 140 Committee to buy support for Da'wa before provincial elections. The Kurds understand independence is impossible, and would be glad to give up Kirkuk's oil, but not administration of the city. End summary ¶2. (SBU) Senior Advisor for northern Iraq Tom Krajeski, accompanied by political officers Joe Cassidy and Rebecca Fong, met on September 21 with Mohamed Ihsan, representative in Baghdad of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Mohamed has been named chief Kurdish negotiator on Article 140/Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) issues. He has also been appointed to chair the subcommittee of the National Article 140 committee dealing with south and central Iraq, including the disputed area of Nu-khayb in Anbar Province. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ihsan Acknowledges Anti-Kurd Sentiment - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Ihsan stated bluntly that anti-Kurd sentiment in Iraq is as high as it has ever been, including during the Anfal years, when at least there was Arab sympathy for the Kurdish victims. He acknowledged that Kurdish leaders bear significant blame, saying they had mismanaged their political alliances on issues like the provincial elections law and hydrocarbons. But he also cited four other causes: 1) a desire by Arab nat
ionalists (including PM Maliki) to do away with meaningful federalism in Iraq; 2) the nefarious but skillful role played by former Ba'athists seeking to split the Shia/Kurdish political alliance; 3) the unhelpful role played by Iran and Turkey; and 4) the waning influence of the USG, which has prompted those unfriendly to U.S. interests to attack the Kurds as America's ally. Ihsan said "we are paying for our alliance with the U.S." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ihsan Asks for American Support - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) S/A Krajeski noted that Amb. Crocker has been urging Kurdish leaders to reach out to Maliki and others in Baghdad and restore their political alliance based on shared interests. Ihsan expressed skepticism, arguing that Da'wa depended on too many Ba'athists to run the country, who in turn have no love for the Kurds. He said the USG should serve as a more proactive mediator on the major issues dividing Iraqi political parties, including the hydrocarbons law, respective authorities of regional and federal security forces, Article 140/DIBs, and resource and budget issues. Ihsan said the passage of time makes these issues less easy to solve, not easier. On issues like DIBs, "we have already delayed three years; we are not going to wait another three." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kirkuk a Symbol Worth Fighting For, but Kurdish Independence is Not Possible - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) S/A Krajeski said the Kurds would have to agree on a hard compromise on Kirkuk and asked Ihsan what ideas he had for resolution. Ihsan said the province should be split into demographically homogenous areas. While the city could be a separate administrative area, Kurds would not accept having the city fall outside the KRG. "We have labored for Kirkuk for the last twenty years, how can we tell people we give up now?" he asked. If Arabs are worried that the Kurds covet Kirkuk's oil to create an economically viable state, then let them separate the oil issue from the administrative status issue. "It's not in our interest" to gain Kirkuk's oil and not share in (the vastly more important) oil deposits BAGHDAD 00003030 002 OF 003 elsewhere in Iraq, Ihsan said. Ihsan said Kurdish leaders are cold-eyed realists about the impossibility of independence. "We don't want a fake state caught between Iraq, Turkey and Iran. We could not export oil and we would be crushed." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Maliki Will Continue to Press the Kurds - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (S) Ihsan said the Kurds had obtained a September 5 memo to Maliki, with Maliki's notes in it, indicating that after Iraqi Army troops pushed Peshmerga out of Diyala Province they plan to take over Kirkuk and push out the Kurd-dominated army units stationed there now. Ihsan asked rhetorically how the Kurds could trust Maliki now. He admitted the Kurds do not have the power to force Maliki from power (as they did Jaafari and would have done to Maliki last year but for USG intervention),but he opined that Adel Abdel Mahdi, Iyad Allawi, or Ali Adeeb would all be preferable from a Kurdish perspective. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ihsan Given Responsibility for DIBs South of Baghdad... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Ihsan told us that after Ramadan he will travel south (including Kut, Kerbala, Najaf, Amara, and Basra) as newly appointed chair of the Article 140 subcommittee on central and southern Iraq. Ihsan alleged that Prime Minister Maliki is pushing to have the Article 140 Committee dole out large amounts of compensation money prior to elections in order to buy support for Da'wa. Ihsan said he would not allow the Committee to be used as a partisan political tool. He noted that the Committee is waiting for $350 million in government funding to allow it to continue compensation for land claims and relocations. He also complained that the USG has neglected the DIBs issue, which is why progress has been so slow. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ...so will have to Wrestle with Nu-khayb - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) His most controversial issue in the south will be dealing with Shia Arab demands that the district of Nu-khayb in southeastern Anbar be transferred to Kerbala province. Ihsan said Nu-khayb is not a legitimate Article 140 issue. There were never any large-scale population transfers to change its demographic balance. Historically and up to today, the district remains "99%" Sunni Arab, he claimed. Shia political leaders in the south, however, want to control the lucrative Haj route going through Nu-khayb. They hope to gain Kurdish support for their claims by dangling the hope of Shia support for Kurdish territorial claims in the disputed territories along the KRG's southern border. Ihsan, said that PM Maliki does not want Nu-khayb to become an ethnic flashpoint, but that Shia political party politicians will keep the pressure on him. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - When did "Arabization" Start? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) We asked Ihsan whether there is agreement among Article 140 Committee members about when Arabization started, in order to resolve conflicts about land ownership in disputed areas. Ihsan said the mandate of the Article 140 Committee covers the period from 17 July 1968 (Ba'ath takeover) to the end of the Saddam regime in 2003. As a matter of state policy, though, Arabization began substantially in 1975, according to Ihsan. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Tel Keif Land Dispute - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Ihsan said he had just returned from Tel Keif District in Ninewa Province, where there is an ongoing program to reverse "Arabization" that occurred after 2003. According to Ihsan, Sunni Arabs from Bayji and other places in Sala-ad-Din Province forcibly took land from Christian families in Tel Keif, many of whom fled north to the KRG. The Article 140 Committee is overseeing a program to remove those recently arrived Arab residents, compensating them with 20 million Iraqi dinar (approximately USD 17,000) per family and providing reestablishment money in the same amount to returning Christian families. The Sunni Arab families have been given one month to move. BAGHDAD 00003030 003 OF 003 CROCKER

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