WASIT ISCI PARTY CHIEF SLAMS DA'WA, SADRISTS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003024 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: WASIT ISCI PARTY CHIEF SLAMS DA'WA, SADRISTS, AND IRAN REF: A. BAGHDAD 2471 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2089 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1761 ¶D. 07BAGHDAD 0212 Classified By: PRT Wasit Team Leader Robert Kagler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. PRT met on September 14 at al-Kut's ISCI headquarters building with Wasit ISCI party chief Ahmed al-Hakim. Al-Hakim is vehemently critical of Da'wa and the tribal support council concept, and mildly negative about ISCI's electoral prospects given public irritation over the lack of services. He was dismissive of Sadrist electoral prospects and criticized Iran for helping arm Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) fighters. Al-Hakim also made a renewed plea for the release of detained Provincial Council (PC) members Sayid Qasim al-Araji and Fadhil Jasim Mohammed al-Zirgani. End summary. Provincial Elections Law Leads to Shifting Alliances -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) PRT met September 14 at al-Kut's ISCI headquarters building with Wasit ISCI party chief Ahmed al-Hakim and ISCI media affairs chief Qasim al-Lami. Hakim described ISCI's preferred alternative elections proposal, using the 2005 law but with the addition of open lists. "We must have elections by the end of the year, for the good of the country, for the good of the country, for the legitimacy of the PC." Dawa,s role in ramming an elections law through the CoR in July has significantly strained ISCI's working relationship with Da'wa. "Da'wa took some steps without thinking," al-Hakim said, adding that the relationship in Wasit had suffered as a result. &We do not work harmoniously with Da'wa in Wasit now. We work with the Communists and with (Independent PC member, and son-in-law of al-Kut Sistani representative) Saad Sharhan," he commented. Tribal Support Councils Too Powerful -------------- ¶3. (C) Additional stress is building between the parties as a result of Da'wa pushing the Tribal Support Council (TSC) concept. "ISCI supported the TSCs in Anbar when the government was weak. But we are afraid that the councils will get too strong and will be supervising the security forces, and that is not right," said al-Hakim. (Note: Al-Hakim used interchangeable phrases when describing TSCs and Sons of Iraq units.) "If the national government is sending us the names of people that we have no control over, that is a problem. We have very strong tribes here. We could take 100 people from each tribe and direct them to assist the security forces. There is probably a political motive here: Da'wa wants these tribes to support them during the elections. But they need to follow the regulations of the Iraqi Security Forces." Asked to clarify, al-Hakim said the idea of taking 100 members from each tribe was "an idea," not a plan. (Note. Although there have been reports of as many as 20 TSCs in Wasit, al-Hakim referred to just one, the League of Sayyids and Tribes -- Rabbatat al Sadat wal Ashayer -- which is run by Sheikh Mohammed Reda al Nomani. End note.) ¶4. (C) Al-Hakim decried government tendencies to centralize power and undermine democratic principles. The strength of the country, he said, is in the constitution, but the constitution is being ignored. "We have to follow the constitution even when it does not benefit us directly. The Supreme Court is just people writing on paper. But in the future it could be the most powerful institution in the country." Asked for examples of transgressions against the constitution, he mentioned Iraqi Army activities in Khanaqin and the proliferation of TSCs. Electoral Prospects -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked about the common refrain among Wasit's political class (REF A) that ISCI will seek to manipulate voting and elections results, al-Hakim was unfazed: "People just talk. There has been no official discussion of influence in elections. In fact, we have helped IHEC by getting the word out about registering, on our TV station (al Nahrain) and during the elections we will provide donkeys to help rural voters get to the polls." ¶6. (C) Asked about ISCI's political prospects in provincial elections (REFS B and C) al-Hakim did not raise expectations, and again returned the discussion to the power of tribes. "The security operations in Basrah and Mosul have helped push us (ISCI) up a little, but we are hurt much more by public unhappiness at the lack of services." He argued, however, BAGHDAD 00003024 002 OF 002 that ISCI will still attract support since maybe 80 or 90 percent of the members for other parties are based in al-Kut, whereas ISCI maintains strength in the outer areas. "The simple people in the countryside follow the marja'iyya and their sayyid. The tribes have a strong connection with the rural people, and we have a solid bond with the tribes, who respect Sayyid Mohammed Mohsin al-Hakim going back 50 years." Role of Religious Leaders -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Hakim described the role of religious leaders in steering voters as a one-two punch, in which senior leaders encourage voting in general while local clerics give more direct guidance to voters. "The marja'iyya are concerned that the people will not vote. There has to be a relationship between the people and the ballot box. It is forbidden to direct the congregation of a mosque in how to vote, but during Ramadan, in the evening, the sayyids give public lectures on moral topics, and they also discuss political matters and how to vote." Sadrists and Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked about Sadrist electoral prospects, al-Hakim noted that "Sadr does not want anyone who enters the Muhamidoon to run for office, so the Sadrists will run under Jaafari's National Reform Trend (tayyar al-islah al-watani) and some will run as independents. The Sadrists have made some big mistakes. Now that they are getting help from Iran and the people are beginning to hate Iran for contributing to violence here." Request to Release Detainees -------------- ¶9. (C) In conclusion, al-Hakim turned to the continuing detention of PC members Sayid Qasim al-Araji and Fadhil Jasim Mohammed al-Zirgani (a.k.a. Abu al-Tayyib). (Note: CF detained both members on January 16, 2007 during a PC meeting, see REF D. End note.) "It would be a good thing for the American forces to release these men. It would change the image of U.S. forces, and it would be a gift to two powerful tribes. It would build a bridge of love and respect." PRT explained that a recent review of the cases indicated that they would not be released soon, but noted that control over many detainees could shift, post the expiration of the UN Mandate. ¶10. (C) Comment. Al-Hakim was at pains to talk up ISCI's connections with Wasit's tribes, which he described as the second most important force in Wasit politics after the marja'iyya. The latter's apparent reticence to endorse candidates leaves tribal leaders holding more power than they did in the 2005 cycle, per al-Hakim. (Note. Tribal groups have virtually no representation in the current PC. End note.) Al-Hakim's criticism of Iran is more perplexing, but may be nothing more than his way of pushing back on the common criticism of his party's linkages with that country. End comment. CROCKER