ANBAR'S AWAKENING AT TWO YEARS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003008 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ANBAR'S AWAKENING AT TWO YEARS Classified By: PRT Team Leader James Soriano for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) The Anbar's "awakening movement" was founded in September 2006, a date that arguably marks the turning point in the battle against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). It is now a political party, the Iraq Awakening Conference (Muatammar Sahwa Al-Iraq or MSI) and is competing with the governing Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) for control of the Provincial Council in future elections. However, detractors maintain that MSI's power base, although formidable, is largely a Ramadi phenomenon. In his public statements, MSI leader Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha typically gives the impression that he speaks for all of Anbar's tribes, while the foreign press tends to identify him as the leader of "Sunni Awakening Movement," giving a false impression that there is one monolithic Sunni tribal movement under Ahmed's leadership. The fact that MSI has made the transition from a security-oriented organization during the insurgency to a political party is one of the most singular developments in Anbar in the past two years. End Summary. Tribal Awakening -------------- ¶3. (U) The remarkable rise of the Iraq Awakening Conference, or Muatammar Sahwa Al-Iraq (MSI),is perhaps the most singular development on Anbar's political landscape in the past two years. Its presence on the local scene promises to give the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),which controls the Provincial Council (PC),a run for its money at the ballot box. It will take an election to test the two parties' actual strength. Nonetheless, even MSI's detractors acknowledge that the party has come a long way since its predecessor fought to expel AQI from Ramadi. ¶4. (SBU) MSI's origin can be traced to September 15, 2006, when Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, a relatively obscure Ramadi sheikh, founded the &Anbar Awakening Council8 with some two dozen other tribal sheikhs who joined forces against AQI. By hindsight, the Awakening's founding was the turning point in the Battle for Anbar Province. Under Sattar's leadership, the organization was quick to make several strategic decisions: -- It openly cooperated with the Coalition Forces (CF). Sattar would refer to them as "friendly forces." -- It encouraged Ramadi's youth to join the police force. In the summer of 2006, police recruitment drives barely attracted a dozen or so applicants because of AQI intimidation. That situation changed rapidly by the fall of that year as the Awakening's influence over local security became more widespread. -- With the GOI's blessing, the Awakening raised three "emergency police battalions" for Ramadi. Although these units were part of the Iraqi Police structure, the key point is that the provincial government had virtually nothing to do with forming them. Sattar made an end-run around provincial officials to make a direct appeal to the Prime Minister for assistance. At that time, the provincial government was too weak to take decisive action. Early Tensions -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Even as the Awakening made inroads against AQI, it took aim at two of its perennial targets: the PC and the IIP. Shortly after its founding, the Awakening openly denounced the PC as illegitimate, absent from the scene, and ineffective in the battle against the enemy. There was much truth to those charges. The PC was installed after the January 2005 election, a poll that was widely boycotted. Only 3,775 voters cast ballots were cast in a population of 1.2 million residents. The IIP won some 2,700 votes and the right to form the Council. It is on that shaky foundation that the IIP's control over the PC rests to this day. ¶6. (C) The Awakening did little to conceal its contempt for the IIP and its religious affiliation. In conversations with PRT contacts, Sattar typically described clerQoliticians as "frauds." He denounced the concept of the "honorable resistance" ) the notion that forbids Iraqis from the killing other Iraqis but countenances violence against the CF ) as a moral double-standard. He denounced the IIP as an off-shoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the vehicle that "brought the insurgents into Anbar," and a menace to BAGHDAD 00003008 002 OF 003 public order. ¶7. (C) These sentiments ) the visceral tribal antagonism to a religious-based party, and the charges that the PC lacks public consent and is ineffective ) color the perceptions of many MSI partisans today. A New Political Equation -------------- ¶8. (C) Sattar was assassinated by a bomb planted near his horse stable in Ramadi on September 13, 2007, a day shy of the Awakening's first anniversary. Leadership then passed to his older brother, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. In the past 12 months, Ahmed has overseen the Awakening's transition from a security organization to a political party. The MSI appears to be relatively well-financed, has opened offices in many parts of Anbar (as well as outside the province),and has been active in encouraging Anbaris to register to vote. Indeed some 360,000 Anbaris are now registered, nearly 100 times the size of the electorate in 2005. Some analysts say that it is likely that MSI might gain control of the PC if an election were held today, but the party's showing would not be a blow out given the strong IIP following in the population centers of Ramadi and Fallujah. ¶9. (C) Ahmed has sought to broaden MSI's tribal base by attracting technocrats into the party ranks. On this score, MSI is playing catch-up to the IIP, as the latter is generally an urban phenomenon and home to many Anbari technocrats, while the MSI still has a rural and tribal character. However, Ahmed has signaled that if MSI is to be competitive at the polls, it must attract educated party loyalists. ¶10. (C) Strangely, even as MSI opens to technocrats, the IIP has a strategy of seemingly going in the opposite direction ) strengthening its ties to Anbar's tribal leaders, who are observed in large numbers sitting in the provincial council offices of IIP leaders. Both parties grasp that the effectiveness in local politics ) and on the national scene - depends on a marriage of technocratic skill with a strong tribal base. ¶11. (C) Such a combination would have a unifying effect on the Sunni voice in national politics. The concern for strengthening Sunni solidarity is certainly behind the IIP overtures to Anbari sheikhs; it may also be behind some recent talk of a possible joint IIP-MSI bloc in the next election. That is an interesting prospect, but MSI would need to be on guard lest it be co-opted by IIP maneuverings. A Blurred Distinction -------------- ¶12. (C) Under Sheikh Ahmed, MSI has developed contacts with "awakening movements" in other provinces and especially seems to have good relations with some Shi'a tribal leaders. Many of these awakenings, however, are independent movements with doubtful or even no linear connection to Ahmed, although in his public statements Sheikh Ahmed tends to blur the distinction between MSI and a broader movement. For example, when he visited the U.S. last year with a group of other Anbari notables, Ahmed irked some of his traveling companions by failing to give credit in public to other anti-Al-Qaeda tribal movements in Anbar that were wholly not associated with the Awakening, such as to the Abu Mahal tribe near the Syria border town of Al-Qaim. In any case, Ahmed's proclivity to self-promotion fits into the familiar Iraqi mold of a tribal sheikh unilaterally speaking on behalf of other tribal sheikhs. ¶13. (C) The foreign press also tends to blur the distinction between Ahmed and a broader movement and at times identifies him as the leader of "Sunni Awakening Movement" (e.g., The Chicago Tribune, July 28). Such descriptions give the false impression that there is one monolithic Sunni tribal movement under AQ's leadership. IIP partisans in Ramadi are quick to correct that misconception. In their view, MSI's power base, although formidable, is largely a Ramadi phenomenon, and that MSI's roster of affiliated tribal leaders tends to be padded with the names of second-drawer sheikhs, while the IIP courts Anbar's big tribal names. Dissent Within the Ranks -------------- ¶14. (C) Apart from the IIP, Ahmed has detractors within MSI ranks, and on at least one occasion expelled potential rivals from the MSI inner circle. He has come in for criticism on several counts: -- Ahmed is frequently out of the country (he has business BAGHDAD 00003008 003 OF 003 interests in Dubai),which creates the impression that he is out of touch. -- MSI hard-liners also have criticized him for sometimes appearing to be too chummy with the IIP. Not as strident as his late brother, Ahmed seems to have good relations with IIP loyalists on an individual basis; it is the institutional relationship between the two parties that sets the sparks flying. -- Moreover, several Anbari sheikhs who were Awakening co-founders claim that Ahmed has sequestered a large sum of money which ought to be shared with the Awakening leaders who fought AQI. Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) MSI certainly has its work cut out if it makes pretentions to control the provincial government and to be a player on the national scene. Ahmed's grasp on leadership is by no means certain. MSI has a strong base in Ramadi, but its election-day appeal elsewhere in the province has not been tested. The organization's relations with other "awakenings" are ambiguous, and may actually be little more than bonds of moral affinity having scant impact on national politics. What is remarkable, however, is that MSI has gotten as far as it has. Two years ago its founders pledged their honor to rid Ramadi of terrorists. For the Coalition, they were dependable war-time allies. Today MSI has made the transition from the insurgency to the period of post-conflict recovery - a significant achievement in Iraq's western most province. CROCKER