PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS LAW: MORE CHURNING BUT NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003007 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS LAW: MORE CHURNING BUT NO DEAL YET Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A parliamentary committee came close to agreement September 16 evening on language for the disputed Kirkuk election language of the draft provincial elections law. Proposed changes by Arab and Turcoman members about this disputed text for Article 24 of the draft law scuttled consensus and led to a chaotic scene on the floor of the parliament September 17. There were even shouting matches among members of the Sunni Arab-Turkoman "July 22 Group" that has so far blocked consensus among the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni Arab parliamentary blocs. As of midday September 18 a parliamentary committee was still trying to hammer out an agreed text for an article 24. The key sticking point seems to revolve around the timing of changes to the Kirkuk provincial administration and whether those changes must be fully implemented prior to the holding of the eventual Kirkuk provincial election. Some members and UNAMI seem unusually, if quite cautiously, optimistic a solution will be found. If no deal enables the parliament to move ahead with a new law, one influential parliamentarian told us September 18 that the Presidency Council will move next week to call for provincial elections using the 2005 election law. End Summary. Inside the Negotiations -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On Tuesday, September 16, an ad hoc Council of Representatives (CoR) committee consisting of members of the Legal and Provincial Affairs Committees came tantalizingly close to agreement on language for Article 24 of the provincial elections law. Article 24 deals with elections in Kirkuk governorate, and has long been the key obstacle to passage of the law. ¶3. (C) We spoke to Hashim al-Ta'e, Chairman of both the Provincial Affairs Committee and of the ad hoc committee, on September 16 just after the committee's afternoon session. Al-Ta'e explained that the committee had been working on the basis of a new UNAMI-provided text of the disputed Article 24, a variant of an earlier version. He said that agreement had been reached on adopting the text with only two changes: in Article 1, which deals with the sharing of administrative posts in the governorate, Arabs and Turcomen wished to replace the sharing formula "fair and balanced" by "equal." Second, the Arabs and Turcomen wished to drop Article 4, which specifies the joint responsibility of the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government to finance and provide security for a committee to be created in order to examine issues of power-sharing, demography and property losses. According to Al-Ta'e, the Kurdish representative had agreed to these changes ad ref, but had asked for a few hours to get instructions to accept the changes. ¶4. (C) Ambassador heard a somewhat different version during his visit to Kurdish President Masood Barzani in Kurdistan on September 16-17. Barzani told the Ambassador September 16 evening that he had just received the text and could offer only initial comments. He said that he could accept a "fair and balanced" distribution of administrative seats in Kirkuk's provincial administration but he rejected the word "equal." Equal, he said, implied that the communities were roughly equal in size, and that should be left to the elections to determine. Barzani also warned that the constant fiddling with the proposed Article 24 texts was not helpful; it was hard to know which text was the operative one, he observed. Instead of changing texts, Barzani stated, the political bloc leaders had to make some hard decisions to move a provincial elections law forward. Barzani stated that he could accept the UNAMI compromise article 24 text as it was, without changes. New changes would cancel that deal, however. ¶5. (C) Al-Ta'e claimed that, late at night, the confirmation of Kurdish acceptance had arrived. By then, however, the Arabs and Turcomen had requested additional changes. UNAMI political officer Mohamed Najjar, who wrote the UNAMI proposed text, told us September 18 morning that the main change was still stuck on the issue of power sharing in Kirkuk. The Sunni Arabs/Turkoman hardliners now wanted the "equal" personnel changes in the Kirkuk provincial administration fully implemented before the Kirkuk provincial elections take place. (They argue that without those changes, the Kirkuk administration will utilize government resources on behalf of the Kurdish parties.) The original UNAMI text said the personnel changes would be underway when the Kirkuk elections are held. The Kurds on September 17, BAGHDAD 00003007 002 OF 002 responding to Barzani's instructions, responded by saying that, if the Arabs and Turkoman wanted further text changes, then the Kurds, too, would have changes to make. A tired and somewhat embittered Al-Ta'e told us that he had become the target of the anger of the sides when he transmitted various proposals made by the sides. Sunni Arab Islamic Party floor leader Ayed Sammarai'e commented to us September 17 evening that he doubted the hardline Sunni Arabs and Turkoman (in a bloc called the July 22 group) really wants a compromise deal. Every time a compromise appears ready, such as with the original UNAMI compromise text, the Sunni Arab/Turkoman hardliners put forward new amendment ideas that scuttle the deal, Sammarai'e observed bitterly. Chaos on the floor Wednesday -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Frustration and acrimony were apparent during the September 17 CoR session when Speaker Mashadani announced that there was still a "dilemma" concerning the negotiations. He proposed dissolving the Al-Ta'e committee and creating another one. As Al-Ta'e vainly tried to explain the state of play from the rostrum, various members began expressing their discontent. Several criticized the idea of creating yet another committee, especially when the current one had made such good progress. The low point of the debate came when several members of the July 22 Group (those who voted against the Kurds on Article 24 when the elections law was first passed on July 22) stood and shouted at one another at length. Chaos was complete when a Sadrist member stood to apologize for the behavior of another Sadrist member. What's next? -------------- ¶7. (C) Finally, Mashadani managed to hammer the chamber to silence, then asked the Al-Ta'e committee to continue its work, with a view to a vote Thursday, September 18. Our contacts on September 18, however, told us there likely would be no floor vote before September 20 or September 21. ¶8. (C) Shaykh Humam Hamoudi, the leader of the Shia Islamist Coalition, the largest single bloc in the parliament, told us September 18 morning that the Sunni Arab/Turkoman group and the Kurds might yet come to a deal; he didn't think the differences were so great. If they do not reach a deal by early next week, however, he anticipated the Presidency Council would announce provincial elections using the 2005 election law. PMIN asked how the Presidency Council could do that and still have an open-list system. Hamoudi said that the Presidency Council would first make its announcement and then the parliament would move to amend the 2005 election law to allow for open lists. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Dealing with a barely tractable issue halfway through Ramadan adds another element of uncertainty and raw emotion. Still, we have been impressed in our conversations, and even by the debate on the floor, that many members do seem to believe that this could be the final, successful push. This even includes some hard-line Sunnis. The long-suffering Al-Ta'e told us that, once Article 24 has been agreed, the several other, more minor changes required by the Presidency Council veto of the earlier version of the law should not delay things further. His committee, he said, had already dealt with those, either through agreed new text or through options to be voted on. He predicted, therefore, that if a successful vote on Article 24 could be arranged, then the entire law could be approved relatively quickly. UNAMI's Nejjar speculated that the Iraqi Islamic Party, which heretofore has been reluctant to break with the harder line July 22 bloc, might finally accept the current UNAMI compromise text. If the Islamic Party does, the Shia Islamist Coalition and the Kurds are ready to join with it immediately and pass the law with a floor vote that would include finally Shia, Kurds and (a large group of) Sunni Arabs. Even Speaker Mashadani, whose role has not always been helpful, seems tired of the constant haggling. He told Ambassador and a group of Sunni Arab parliamentarians at iftar September 17 that if the Parliament can't pass a provincial elections law now it should be dissolved and new national elections held. CROCKER