VP HASHIMI: DEFENDING THE SOFA WILL BE DIFFICULT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002969 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2028 TAGS: PREL PINS IZ SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI: DEFENDING THE SOFA WILL BE DIFFICULT, AND SUNNI TRIBAL FIGHTERS MUST BE PROTECTED Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On September 7, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi told the Ambassador that he anticipated major problems trying to defend the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in parliament, and he worried about the destabilization that would result if the Iraqi government mishandled the Sons of Iraq (SOI) as the U.S. turned control over to the GOI. Hashimi predicted that the SOI would realign with al-Qaida (AQI) if the Iraqi government did not handle their reintegration into Iraqi forces and society well. Hashimi raised the possibility of obtaining prior parliamentary authority for entering into Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF) as an alternative to submitting the decision to the CoR. Pointing to recent Iraqi security operations in Diyala, Hashimi warned that the Prime Minister appeared to be targeting Sunni Arabs unfairly. Hashimi stressed the need for the U.S. to remain as a mediating presence between Sunni Arabs and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). END SUMMARY -------------- SOFA -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador noted that negotiators would return soon and aim to conclude an agreement on the SOFA. In response to the Ambassador,s comments that the jurisdiction issue was particularly challenging, VP Hashimi noted that he had received a color-coded current text from PM Maliki (colored according to agreed text, reviewed text, and disputed text). VP Hashimi responded that both sides must think seriously about alternatives to the agreement, since the fragile political situation would complicate efforts at parliamentary endorsement. He further averred that many political leaders were scared or embarrassed to be on the front lines of endorsing the agreement, adding that the Marjaiyya remains unsupportive of a deal while Iran &is putting a lot of pressure on everyone to ensure this deal does not happen.8 ¶3. (S) Hashimi said the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was studying the possibility of getting the parliament to authorize Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to enter into an MOU in lieu of the SOFA. The MOU could give Maliki some political maneuvering room, since the MOU would obviate the need for any subsequent parliamentary approval. Hashimi stressed that this could be an alternative if negotiations reached an impasse, although this is only being "studied" within the IIP. His response was non-committal when the Ambassador inquired if such an arrangement would be constitutional, stressing only that under this plan, the parliamentary authority would resemble guidance or general negotiating principles. Hashimi also indicated he would raise the issue with Council of Representatives Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani if an impasse emerged. ¶4. (S) Hashimi asked what Iraq would do after January 1, 2009, and whether a further UNSC resolution would be considered. The Ambassador commented that the current tensions with Russia would make a clean rollover of the existing UNSC resolution unlikely. Hashimi asked if it was a serious option for the U.S. to pull out its troops after January 1. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. is a nation of laws and must have a legal basis for its presence in Iraq. Without legal cover, U.S. forces would move to immediately consolidate and withdraw from Iraq. With this clarification, Hashimi conceded that the lack of legal status could be a problem. Hashimi's assistant, Dr. Khalil al-Azzawi, suggested that the parties consider a "bridging protocol" based on CPA 17. The Ambassador dismissed the viability of this option due to CPA 17,s fragile ) and easily amendable ) status in the CoR. ¶5. (S) Hashimi further noted that Iran will not make things easier and has bluntly stated that Iraq should not enter into an agreement with the U.S. Hashimi also said that he thought the Marja,iya were saying the same thing as the Iranians. Responding to the Ambassador's comments on the need for the GOI to make the case publicly for the agreement and build broad popular and parliamentary support, Hashimi countered that even marketing the idea would be a real challenge. Citing the U.S. &official statements,8 Hashimi confessed he did not understand the U.S. policy on timetables. He thought that 2011 was a clear timetable and a straightforward agreement, and that there should have been no difficulty with this date. Moreover, he claimed that White House official (press) statements, as reported in USG-financed al-Hurra BAGHDAD 00002969 002 OF 002 television, had put the GOI in a difficult situation by sending &mixed messages8 as to when the U.S. would withdraw combat forces from Iraq. Iraq needed a clear time for withdrawal, Hashimi stated, but the official U.S. message was confusing. Stressing U.S. respect for Iraq,s sovereignty, the Ambassador reiterated that a quick resolution of the SOFA negotiations would be in both nations, interests. -------------- -------------- DIYALA AND SAHWA/SOI INTEGRATION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Hashimi steered the conversation to recent events in Diyala, characterizing it as a setback that increased public, mostly Sunni, worries. Hashimi outlined several key concerns related to the Diyala situation and the SOI integration. He asked if there were any guarantees about ISF activities, and noted that he was concerned about the lack of professionalism and increased sectarianism of the ISF, stressing that U.S. forces were a balance to counter the challenges of sectarian behavior. Moreover, Hashimi stated, the U.S. forces were necessary as a mediating force between the ISF and the SOI. The ISF in Diyala were targeting SOI fighters, as illustrated by the allegations that arrest warrants had been issued for them; some 1,000 SOI left Diyala following the ISF actions. Hashimi also claimed that the events in Diyala were orchestrated at the direction of the Commander in Chief, Prime Minister Maliki. ¶7. (S) He related a recent trip to Baghdad,s Sunni enclase of Adhamiya, where SOI leaders there wanted to know what "the government" (he) was doing to protect them and whether the Americans were abandoning them and &just handing them over to their enemies.8 They said that they risked their lives only to be targeted by the ISF. Hashimi also complained about the list of SOI members, claiming that the GOI figures of 40,000 to 50,000 SOI members were much too low, and that only 20 percent of those members would be integrated into the ISF. Hashimi said he thought the U.S. figure of about 100,000 members was more accurate. Additionally, he objected to the fact that the names were just handed over to the PM with no consultation with him or any other (Sunni) leaders. Hashimi insisted that the issue was not one of money, and it was not about the contracts. He volunteered that he was funding some Sahwa groups from his personal office,s budget. Hashimi claimed rather that it was an issue of security and safety ) the SOI did not feel safe resting their fate in the hands of a sectarian government. The Ambassador again reminded the Vice President that the prompt conclusion of the SOFA would clearly and legally frame U.S. forces, presence in Iraq, thereby allowing for the safeguards Hashimi was demanding. ¶8. (S) Finally, Hashimi declared that the SOI would retreat to AQI for protection if the GOI were the curtail their rights or ability to earn a living. SOI fought AQI to eliminate Iraq as one of their bases, but if SOI was not integrated, Iraq would be a home for AQI for years to come and the U.S. would be blamed. Hashimi also requested a copy of the list of SOI that the USG handed to PM Maliki and demanded a clear written agreement between General Petraeus and PM Maliki that the Sahwa/SOI would be integrated into the ISF. The Ambassador promised that the Coalition would provide him a briefing update on SOI integration, which the VP welcomed. -------------- DETAINEES -------------- ¶9. (S) Hashimi then switched to detainees, asking what the U.S. was going to do about them, and whether they would simply be delivered to the GOI. Despite the Ambassador,s response that detainee affairs, like any U.S. military engagement, is linked to the bilateral agreement, Hashimi objected to the blanket handover, fearing once again that Sunnis would be targeted. Hashimi was very clear that AQI members should be dealt with severely, but stressed that not all detainees were AQI. Some former insurgents could be rehabilitated and returned to society. Ambassador Crocker stressed that the bilateral agreement would allow the U.S. to continue its presence and engagement. CROCKER