DPM SALIH PLEDGES TO TRY TO DEFUSE KHANAQIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002968 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: DPM SALIH PLEDGES TO TRY TO DEFUSE KHANAQIN CONFRONTATION BUT WARNS KURDS TIRING OF MALIKI REF: A. BAGHDAD 2859 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2838 ¶C. BAGHDAD 2820 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Although the Kurds say they have complied with the August 30 agreement by withdrawing additional "new" Peshmerga from the Khanaqin area, the situation remains tense. DPM Barham Salih agreed to continue defusing the situation. Salih believes that Prime Minister Maliki,s decision to move tanks into the area was a political maneuver that the PM hoped would provoke a Kurdish military response, uniting Arab Sunnis and Shia. The Ambassador warned that the USG would publicly condemn any military action from either side. Salih promised to promote calm but cautioned that Kurdish trust in the GOI is waning. He warned that if Maliki continues to renege on agreements, there would be an "October" surprise worse than we could possibly imagine. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On September 7, the Ambassador met with DPM Barham Salih for an update on Khanaqin. Salih stated that even after the withdrawal of the "new" Peshmerga from Khanaqin to their original locations in Kalar and Kefri, the situation remains tense. Salih clarified that the location of the 34th brigade Peshmerga is exactly where they were before this situation arose. In Khanaqin city, the Peshmerga have been replaced by the local guards. Salih said he has been in frequent contact with Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr who has been very helpful. He added that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) representative in Diyala has been working side-by-side with the Iraqi Army (IA) Commander of the Diyala operations. Salih stated that PM Maliki simply changed his mind about the agreement and opposes the withdrawal of IA troops. Salih claimed he persuaded PM Maliki to cancel the emergency PCNS and allow the four-way political party talks (the so-called Gang of Four -- PUK/KDP/ICSI/DAWA) to resolve the situation. Salih acknowledged that the PM has the legal right to move troops anywhere in Iraq. However, the Kurds must insist that there be notification and coordination with the KRG. -------------- Risking Confrontation -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador urged Salih to defuse this crisis, and focus on issues where the Kurds have support and allies. The Ambassador stated that the U.S. will not support armed confrontation by either side. Both should expect the U.S. to loudly condemn all military action. Salih agreed that military action would be disastrous. He reported that the Kurds are committed to Article 140 to resolve disputed areas. The Ambassador stressed that Masoud Barzani and PM Maliki must find a way to deal with each other constructively and not risk confrontation. He commented that while there are fissures in the Shia-Kurd marriage, they must think very carefully about the consequences before divorcing. ¶4. (C) In the coming days, Salih said that he plans to meet with PM Maliki, Dawa leaders, ISCI,s Humam Hamudi, and Sistani. Salih added that Masoud Barzani plans to speak with VP Tariq al-Hashimi and House Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani. -------------- -------------- Accusing Maliki of Political Opportunism -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Salih questioned the timing of PM Maliki,s actions, claiming that Maliki is trying to provoke a Kurdish military reaction. Salih reported that one of his Ministry of Defense sources told him that two battalions are earmarked for Kirkuk. The Ambassador reported that President Jalal Talabani said &the Kurdish situation has never been so good.8 Salih explained this political maneuver is Maliki's way of unifying Arab Sunnis and Shia and further isolating the Kurds. Salih believes that Maliki cannot be seen as backing down from this confrontation because the prestige of his government is at stake. He added that Maliki,s leadership style has IIP and ISCI concerned. The Ambassador indicated that VP Hashimi did not side with the Kurds on the Diyala operation, and that ISCI VP Adel Abdul Medhi is only partly with the Kurds, warning that the Southern Shia believe the Kurds have overreached. ¶6. (C) Salih compared Maliki to General Abdul Karim Kassim who in 1961 neutralized political parties by using the military. The constant betrayal of various political groups was ultimately Kassim,s demise. Salih predicted that if Maliki continues to renege on agreements, he will fail. In any case, the Kurds end up suffering. BAGHDAD 00002968 002 OF 002 -------------- Waning Trust in GOI -------------- ¶7. (C) Salih added that the real battle is in Baghdad and not in Khanaqin. Salih said that Kurdish trust in the GOI is waning, citing government structure and misuse of the military. Salih claimed that Maliki is attempting to undermine the Kurds in the Iraqi Army, including the courtmartial of Major General Jamal (PUK),who was most recently the chief of MoD Intelligence. Salih called on the Ambassador to dissuade PM Maliki from taking any unilateral actions. Salih warned that if Maliki again reneges on the latest Khanaqin agreement that we should expect an October surprise worse than we could possibly imagine. -------------- Other Business -------------- ¶8. (C) Regarding Kirkuk and the provincial election law, Salih reported that there is no resolution to the power-sharing agreement being applied to Kirkuk's Provincial Council. He does not consider it useful to refer this to the Executive Council. That approach would bring in VP Abdul-Mehdi, whom the Kurds perceive as a friend, but Salih noted that Abdul-Mehdi is receiving criticism for not siding with PM Maliki on a number of issues. ¶9. (C) Salih flatly added that no government business is getting done these days. The Ambassador inquired about why the Parsons-Brinckerhoff Operations and Maintenance and General Electric contracts have not been expedited. Salih said he would look into it. Salih reported that the detentions group is back together. He remarked that Minister of Human Rights Wijdan has been very supportive. The Ambassador asked that DPM Salih remain engaged on that issue. ¶10. (C) Salih informed the Ambassador that former President of American University Beirut John Waterbury will visit UAI in October. Waterbury has offered his services to aid UAI,s development. ¶11. (C) Salih informed the Ambassador that Ayad Allawi's uncle died. He was the father of the former Minister of Communications Ali Allawi. Salih planned to pay his respects later that evening. CROCKER