IRAN-IRAQ BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME IN FEBRUARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000295 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS IR IZ KU SUBJECT: IRAN-IRAQ BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME IN FEBRUARY REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3481 B. 07 BAGHDAD 3159 BAGHDAD 00000295 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ACTING POL-MIL COUNSELOR KAREN H. SASAHARA, REASONS 1.4( B) AND (D) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: At a January 28 meeting with Acting PolMil Counselor, Iraqi MFA Under Secretary Mohammad Hamoud discussed GOI preparations for a further round of bilateral talks with Iran regarding their shared border. He indicated talks would take place on February 19, since negotiations planned for January had been cancelled at the request of Iran, citing the Ashura holiday. While repeatedly referring to the Iranians as "difficult" to deal with, Hamoud revealed that in September of last year Iranian FM Mottaki had told him that Iran agreed that the course of the Shatt al Arab (SAA) should be returned to the state it was in when the Iran-Iraq border had been demarcated under the 1975 Algiers Accord. ¶2. (S/NF) Redirecting the watercourse and demarcating the border as agreed under the Algiers Accord would fulfill the key Iraqi objective of keeping its offshore oil terminals in Iraqi waters and as far from the border as possible. Iraq,s delegation will utilize a survey of the SAA completed by Basrah University last year as a basis for discussion with the Iranians. In addition to the course of the river and demarcation of the border, Iraq,s other goals for the negotiation will include agreement on removal of wrecks obstructing navigation and remediation of mines, both of which are largely leftover from the Iran-Iraq war. Hamoud explained that the GOI was not planning to approach Kuwait regarding disputes about their maritime border around Umm Qasr in the near future, as they did not want to jeopardize otherwise improving relations. END SUMMARY. -------------- NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN FEBRUARY -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Acting PolMil Counselor, joined by the NAVCENT LNO to MNF-I and an MNF-I legal officer, met with Iraqi MFA Under Secretary Mohammad Hamoud January 28 to discuss GOI SIPDIS preparations for a further round of bilateral talks with Iran regarding their shared border. Hamoud, head of delegation for Iraq, related that negotiations planned for January had been cancelled at the request of Iran, citing the Ashura holiday. These talks had now been rescheduled for February ¶19. The Iraqi delegation will include intelligence, military, and port officials, among others. Iraq,s goals for the negotiation were a resolution of the riverine border running through the Shatt al-Arab (SAA),agreement on removal of the many wrecks obstructing navigation, and remediation of mines emplaced during the Iran-Iraq war. Hamoud, explained that removal of the wrecks will also require legal notice to the owners. -------------- ALGIERS ACCORD AS A BASIS FOR TALKS -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) President Talabani,s public repudiation (rhetorical, not legal) of the 1975 Algiers Accord (hereinafter "the Accord"),which delineated the Iran-Iraq border, had drawn a strong Iranian reaction and made his job more difficult, confided Hamoud. However, while Iraq would avoid acknowledging the Accord, the GOI would agree to use its delineation of the border as this was seen to be in Iraq,s interest. The border as established under the Accord would provide a greater buffer between Iraq,s offshore oil facilities and the Iranian border than might be the case if the line were redrawn today, since the course of the SAA had shifted westward, especially near its mouth. Hamoud displayed a chart drawn up based on a 2007 survey of the SAA conducted by Basrah University, graphically detailing this shift which was as much as 1.7 kilometers from its course in ¶1975. -------------- IRAN AMENABLE TO SHIFTING COURSE OF SAA -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) While repeatedly referring to the Iranians as "difficult" to deal with, Hamoud revealed that in September of last year Iranian FM Mottaki had told him that Iran agreed that the course of the SAA should be returned to the course BAGHDAD 00000295 002.2 OF 002 it followed when the Iran-Iraq border had been demarcated under the Accord. The border would then be defined by the thalweg as formalized in the Accord. Iraq had considerable leverage because in some locations the course of the river now completely flowed through Iraqi territory, allowing Iraq to close the river to Iranian navigation in those locations if it so desired. The costs of redirecting the SAA would be split evenly between the parties, according to Hamoud. While Iran preferred to activate the permanent joint committee referred to in the Accord, Iraq would seek a less formal mechanism to work out implementation of any final agreement. Hamoud foresaw that negotiations could take as long as one year. When asked about implementation of the agreement between border officials reached in August (reftel),Hamoud replied that while the Iranians "say yes" to such coordination, they don,t seem willing to put it into practice. -------------- --- KUWAIT BORDER IN DISPUTE, BUT A LOWER PRIORITY -------------- --- ¶6. (S/NF) Hamoud explained that the GOI was not planning to approach Kuwait regarding disputes about their maritime border around Umm Qasr in the near future, as they did not want to jeopardize otherwise improving relations. Iraq did not recognize the maritime border with Kuwait established by UNSCR 833, which follows the midline of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway, and instead claimed the entire waterway. However, the GOI saw the issues on the Kuwaiti border as less important than those with Iran, and Hamoud was optimistic that a resolution could be worked out with Kuwait at an appropriate time. ¶7. (S/NF) COMMENT: Our discussion with Hamoud confirms a maturation of the GOI position regarding the status of the Algiers Accord since the first round of these bilateral talks (reftel). While the Algiers Accord "brand" remains anathema due to its association with Saddam, the GOI now agrees to its delineation of the border, removing a major point of contention with Iran. President Talabani,s public "repudiation" of the Algiers Accord in December appears to have been walked back, at least in substance, making a successful round of talks with Iran more likely. END COMMENT. BUTENIS