GOI REVERTING TO HARD LINE ON KHANAQIN STANDOFF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002859 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: GOI REVERTING TO HARD LINE ON KHANAQIN STANDOFF REF: BAGHDAD 02820 Classified By: PolMinCouns Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Shia-led GOI position on Kurdish security forces in the Khanaqin district of Diyala governorate appears to be hardening since an August 31 agreement to allow Kurdish security forces to remain in Khanaqin city. Shia leaders close to Prime Minister Maliki have stressed that the Peshmerga has no right to remain in Diyala province, that the PM regards this as a rule of law issue, and that the Peshmerga must pull back into the Kurdistan Region (KRG). Meanwhile, there are reports that the GOI has ordered to move three tank companies to positions southwest of Khanaqin, but the Kurdish and GOI leadership are remaining in contact with each other. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Ali al-Adib, leader of Maliki's Dawa bloc in the Council of Representatives (COR),told us September 4 that the Peshmerga must pull back not only to the Green Line as Maliki had previously demanded, but to the Kurdistan Region itself. Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, a leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) bloc in the COR that has generally been less hardline on the Kurds, on the same day told us there is no constitutional or legal justification for the Kurds to maintain security forces outside the KRG. He added that perceived Kurdish over-reach has created deep resentment even in the Shia south. (Note: Our contacts in southern Iraq report similar anti-Kurdish sentiment.) Furthermore, Sami al-Askari, a CoR member who is close to PM Maliki, told us September 5 that this issue is about applying the constitution. Diyala is not part of the KRG and KRG security should not be in Diyala. The PM, al-Askari added, is driving this issue because he sees it as a rule of law issue. Al-Askari stressed that while the Kurds must give way, armed force is not the way to solve this problem. Finally, there are reports that the Defense Ministry has ordered three tank companies to the Khanaqin area, a move likely to put Peshmerga units on edge and could cause KRG to order additional Peshmerga forces into the district. In all these meetings, PolMinCouns stressed that the authorities in Baghdad needed to maintain constant communication with the Kurdish leadership and to avoid armed confrontation. All our interlocutors agreed, although none would relinquish on the issue of principle. ¶3. (C) On September 5, PolMinCouns spoke with PM Maliki's political advisor Sadiq al-Rikabi, who gave no ground on the GOI's constitutional and legal authority to enter Khanaqin. Rikabi noted that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih had earlier September 5 afternoon asked to postpone tomorrow's emergency meeting of the Political Council for National Security (PCNS),saying the Kurds prefer a bilateral meeting to work this out. PolMinCouns stressed to Rikabi that the GOI and Kurdish leadership must resolve this issue through negotiation and must avoid confrontation between the IA and Peshmerga. Rikabi agreed an armed confrontation would be harmful to everyone involved. ¶4. (C) In recent conversations, the Kurds have displayed less of a sense of urgency regarding Khanaqin. On September 4, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told us that no additional meetings have occurred between the Shia and Kurds on Khanaqin since an agreement was reached on August 31, and that he considered the situation diffused. Zebari reiterated that the GOI agreed not to enter Khanaqin and the additional "new" Peshmerga will withdraw from the area. Top KDP official Rosh Shaways on September 5 told PolOffs he was not particularly concerned about the present situation in Khanaqin either and expected the KRG-GOI agreement to hold. Kurdish leaders continue to present Khanaqin as a possible harbinger of a future conflict with the GOI but unlikely to devolve into large-scale violence in the short term. ¶5. (S) Comment: We are skeptical of the Iraqi Army's ability to deploy sophisticated forces up to Khanaqin quickly. That said, we do not sense from any of the PM's civilian advisors any hint that the PM will back away from his demand that the Kurds deploy Kurdish security (as opposed to Khanaqin police) out of the town. They keep emphasizing that sooner or later the Iraqi Army has the right to deploy throughout Diyala province, disputed governorate borders or not. We expect Maliki to keep driving on this point. Our Kurdish contacts' relative calm on September 4 and morning September 5 suggests that they may not have understood that Maliki isn't quitting. On the positive side, they are in regular contact with each other, both on the ground at Khanaqin and at the national level in Baghdad. If this confrontation gets even more serious, we can anticipate that each side will look increasingly to us for support. The Kurds will want confirmation that they can protect Kurdish populations near the Green Line by maintaining KRG security forces in those areas, and the Prime BAGHDAD 00002859 002 OF 002 Minister (and Sunni Arabs) will want confirmation that Kurdish security forces should stay inside the KRG. For now, the Embassy continues to counsel calm on both sides, support the August 31 compromise on Khanaqin, and remind the parties that a process for resolving such disputed territories is ongoing and far preferable to a military solution. End Comment. BUTENIS