NINEWA: MINORITY COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES SHARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002828 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: NINEWA: MINORITY COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES SHARE CONCERNS, AND PREJUDICES, WITH UNAMI Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader Alex Laskaris, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. ¶1. (C) Summary: Ninewa,s minority communities are divided between and among themselves over the article 140 process. Some claim that their communities will be better off under Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) rule; others prefer to remain part of Ninewa Province. Some cite the KRG as their primary threat, while others cite Al Qaeda. Internal unity among confessional or ethnic minority groups is still far over the horizon; getting Ninewa,s minority groups to recognize common interests and make common cause is an even more daunting challenge. At the same time, it is the Sunni Arab majority that is the source of the insurgency and which is most alienated from provincial power, either the formal structure through Mosul or the informal KRG mechanisms that dominate the political life of the province. End summary. ¶2. (C) On August 26-30, a UN human rights team led by Maria Soledad Pazzo (Argentine) visited PRT Ninewa to interview representatives from ethnic and confessional minority groups, as well as Arab and Kurdish groups regarding the human rights situation in Ninewa Province. (Note: PRT did not sit in the meetings with the UN.) ¶3. (C) On August 27, the UN team met with Yezidi and Shebak groups from Hamdaniya and Al-Sheikhan led by Hussein Aswad Mato of the Yezidi Cultural Center and Sindibad Shawkat of the Shebak Cultural Center respectively. According to Pazzo, both groups were highly politicized and appeared to be paid to support the KRG publicly. Neither raised any specific human rights concerns but noted their satisfaction with the security situation provided for them by the KRG. ¶4. (C) Also on August 27, the UN team met with Kurdish members of the Ninewa Provincial Council as well as some members of the Herki, Keki and Mizori groups. (Note: The Herkis are Kurds who supported Saddam Hussein and are now outcasts in the Bartalla area. The Keki and Mizori are Kurdish clans both suspected of instigating violence against Yezidis in Al-Sheikhan in February 2007.) The head of the delegation was Mahdi Herki, who is also a KDP Provincial Council member. Overall, Pazzo said the Kurds primarily blamed the difficult security situation in Mosul on Arab Muslim extremists. In addition, Pazzo said that Herki and the others attending the meeting blamed the Kurdish exodus from Mosul city on the repeated assassinations of Kurds at the hands of Muslim Arab extremists. None of the attendees, including the Herki Kurds, mentioned any Kurd-on-Kurd violence. ¶5. (C) Pazzo and her team met with Sunni Arab and Turkmen tribal leaders on August 28. There were Arabs representatives from the districts of Sinjar, Makhmoor, Mosul, and Tel Afar. They were led by Shaher Sultan of Qaraj sub-district, who complained mostly of unlawful Kurdish detention of Arabs. In addition, the Arab representatives from Sinjar said they were being discouraged from registering to vote by Peshmerga forces guarding Voter Registration Centers. According to Pazzo, the Peshmerga would tell Arabs trying to register that elections would not be held so there was no need to register. The Arabs said they all faced difficult economic conditions with regard to rising food prices. (Note: Voter registration in Iraq is a passive system; if one is listed on the Public Distribution System list (rations database),then one is registered to vote. The voter registration update period which ran from July 15 through August 28 allowed Iraqis to check the list and ensure their information was correct. End Note.) ¶6. (C) The Turkmen, led by Ahmed Younis Salih from the village of Rasheediya in Mosul district, said their main concerns were the lack of services and the economic deprivation they suffer. The Turkmen representatives said that the provision of services was only marginally better in Turkmen villages under Kurdish administration (such as those around Basheeqa) than those under the Ninewa provincial administration. The Turkmen also said that they could not enter Mosul for security reasons, which hurt the ability of their community to conduct trade. ¶7. (C) On August 29, the UN team again met with Yezidis and Shebak leaders as well as the Christian mayor of Tel Kaif, Bassam Bello of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Bello described Kurdish attempts to win support through either payouts or intimidation, according to Pazzo. Consequently, Assyrian Christians in Tel Kaif who do not want to join the KRG are subject to threats and harassment. BAGHDAD 00002828 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Qosay Abbas of the Shebak Democratic Assembly told a similar story for the Shebak in Hamdaniya. According to Pazzo, Abbas said that the KDP employs threats and intimidation against any Shebak groups that try to assert an independent, non-KRG aligned identity. Pazzo also said that Abbas took time to explain the intimidation and violence the Shebak IDPs now residing in Hamdaniya district had faced. According to Pazzo, Abbas emphasized that the Shebak IDP communities in Hamdaniya are suffering due to unemployment. ¶9. (C) The Yezidis in Sinjar led by Wa,ad Mandou Hamou of the Yezidi Movement also echoed much of what Bello and Abbas had said about the strong-arm tactics of the Kurdish political parties, according to Pazzo. Hamou, however, said that the economic situation for the Yezidi in Sinjar were as big, if not a bigger, concern. According to Pazzo, Hamou said that the ongoing drought has hit the Yezidi farmers especially hard, thereby pushing food prices up in an already depressed economy. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) It is important that the UN and other interlocutors meet regularly with these groups. Although these are set piece meetings, they serve the useful purpose of ensuring that a wide cross-section of views is heard. As with previous meetings, we will need to keep in contact with the participants to ensure that they suffer no retaliation for having met with the UN. ¶11. (C) Minority rights are critical to our work in Ninewa, and we have succeeded in assembling a broad range of interlocutors in all communities and of all persuasions. That said, the insurgent threat to the province is deeply rooted in the Sunni insurgency, which feeds off the profound alienation of Sunni residents from their provincial government. Having pursued aggressive minority outreach over the last two months, we will continue to build on the links that have been established and renewed. However, we are turning our attention to the Sunni community and will spend the coming weeks reaching out to its members. BUTENIS