SUNNI CHARGES GOI "DOING AL-QAEDA A BIG FAVOR"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002730 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2018 TAGS: PINS MOPS KISL IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI CHARGES GOI "DOING AL-QAEDA A BIG FAVOR" REF: BAGHDAD 2708 Classified by Political Minister-Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Dhia Mahdi (strictly protect),a senior aide to (Sunni Arab) Deputy Prime Minister al-Issawi, recently complained that the GOI had "(done) Al-Qaeda a big favor" through its recent security operations in Diyala province, which he alleged targeted Sunni political rivals rather than actual terrorists. The GOI's recent "misguided" operations in the province were likely to deepen local mistrust of the GOI, and would inevitably work in Al-Qaeda's favor, he warned. Mahdi also lamented that the GOI was mishandling the GOI's integration of the Sunni Awakening and Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces. Though his concerns were consistent with those of other Sunni contacts, Mahdi underscored that he believed PM Maliki has Iraq's best interests at heart but is being misled by his sectarian circle of advisors. End summary. -------------- Actions Playing into Insurgents' Hands -------------- ¶2. (C) Dhia Mahdi (strictly protect),a senior aide to recently appointed (Sunni) Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, told poloff on August 24 that operation "Benevolent Diyala," which climaxed with the murky August 17 raid by a Ministry of Defense special operations unit on the seat of the provincial government in Ba'qouba, was playing into the hands of the insurgency. ¶3. (C) Rather than thwarting Al-Qaeda, which has had a stronghold in the province, the recent GOI "anti-terrorist" operations in Diyala have actually targeted Sunni Awakening leaders and key figures in the provincial Islamic party (IIP),Mahdi alleged. Such operations were bound to alienate the Sunni population from the GOI and push them back into the arms of Al-Qaeda and other insurgent elements, Mahdi insisted. -------------- Shunning the Sahwa -------------- ¶4. (C) Mahdi recalled that Deputy Prime Minister Issawi had been besieged with complaints from Diyala Sunnis during a mid-August visit to the province. In particular, the Ministry of Interior was not implementing GOI orders to make payments to local Sahwa leaders who have been battling local Al-Qaeda, including compensation payments to Sahwa "martyrs" killed fighting the terrorists. This despite PM Maliki's explicit orders that such payments be made, Mahdi asserted. He blamed the failure to implement the payments on (Shi'a) sectarian elements in the Ministry of Interior who see both Al-Qaeda and the Sunni Sahwa as adversaries. In this context, meaningful integration of the Sahwa into the ISF would be a non-starter, he claimed. ¶5. (C) Mahdi assessed that PM Maliki has Iraq's best interests at heart. Instead, he blamed Mahdi's circle of advisors, who are pursuing personal and sectarian agendas and keeping the PM badly informed about realities in the field. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) The August 17 raid, which resulted in the death of the governor's aide and the arrest of a university president and senior provincial leaders, has provoked outrage and mistrust toward the GOI among Sunni Arab politicians at both the provincial and national levels. (For example, Vice President Hashimi's chief of staff recently gave us a bleak assessment of the Diyala operation and its implications - reftel.) The concerns outlined by Mahdi are representative of Iraq's Sunni political leadership. ¶7. (C) Most of our Sunni Arab interlocutors share a deep distrust of the GOI (a view also reflected in recent public opinion research),seeing a sectarian agenda behind its actions. (Of course, members of the Prime Minister's circle, such as Sadik Rikabi, are equally distrustful of the Sunni Arab leadership.) Still, some Sunni Arabs like Mahdi, and also Sheikh Ali Hatim, hereditary leader of Anbar's powerful Dulaimi tribal confederation, have a kinder view of PM Maliki the man. In this view, it is Maliki's Da'wa Party clique, beholden to Tehran, rather than Maliki the individual, that is the real enemy of the Sunni Arabs. BAGHDAD 00002730 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) The success of the Iraqi Security Forces in operations in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, and Amarah has set the stage for operations in Diyala and appears to underpin Maliki's confidence in his leadership. Mahdi is certainly not the only observer who sees Maliki's latest efforts as going beyond forceful security operations to settling of scores, and laying the groundwork for sectarian dissension. End comment. BUTENIS