IRAQI NSC ON AUGUST 17 REVIEWS MOSUL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002729 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL PTER SY IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI NSC ON AUGUST 17 REVIEWS MOSUL RECONSTRUCTION AND MOD READINESS REF: BAGHDAD 02608 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/REL MCFI) Summary: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chaired the August 17 meeting of the National Security Council (I-NSC) that focused on reconstruction efforts in Mosul, MOD's logistics modernization, and protection of infrastructure. The Council also reviewed operations in Diyala, protection of judicial officers, and budget execution. There were sharp exchanges regarding reconstruction efforts in Mosul while the MOD's detailed briefing on its progress toward self-sufficiency in logistics elicited an expression of impatience and frustration from the PM. All applauded the dramatic improvement in the protection of vital infrastructure. End Summary. Secure Housing for Judiciary -------------- ¶2. (S/REL MCFI) The PM opened the Council meeting with a review of measures to be taken to protect judicial officials. Following up on last week's discussion of protecting judicial officials from assassination or intimidation (reftel),he called for squatters and others living in the Salhiya apartment complex in Baghdad to be removed to provide secure housing for judicial officials. After discussion, which noted the Council of Representatives' concern about eviction of residents, he directed the Ministries of Finance and of Interior to pay compensation to those forced out, adding that even squatters should be given compensation, albeit much reduced. Budget Execution Summary Report -------------- ¶3. (S/REL MCFI) Minister of Finance (MOF) Bayan Jabr presented a summary of budget figures, clarifying the budget situation from the previous week's flawed and truncated presentation (reftel). He noted that budget execution figures for the allocations to the governorates were not reliable. Deputy Prime Minister (D/PM) Barham Salih (whose portfolio includes financial and economic affairs) called for coordination with the Minister of Planning to ascertain how much of what had been allocated to the Ministries had actually been spent on projects. He noted the difference between capital funds and operating funds, underlining the success the GOI has had in capital budget execution. Diyala Operations -------------- ¶4. (S/REL MCFI) Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdul Qadr reported that the amnesty period, and the pause in conventional operations, in Diyala would end on August 18. He listed numerous successes to date, including tribal support for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) leading to the handing over of 50 terrorists and over 400 to 500 turning themselves in to the ISF. He noted again the support of the sheikhs in the operations. 34th Peshmerga Brigade -------------- 5.(S/REL MCFI) MOD added that a potential conflict with the 34th Peshmerga Brigade had been resolved. He stated that the brigade would pull out to the Kurdish Regional Government area no later than August 25 and later be incorporated into an as yet unformed Iraqi Army (IA) mountain division. The current sector of the 34th Peshmerga Brigade in Diyala would be taken over by the 4th Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division. Reconstruction in Mosul/Ninewa -------------- ¶6. (S/REL MCFI) D/PM Rafi Issawi (whose portfolio includes services) presented a short video depicting the desperate state of affairs in Mosul, particularly the northern half of the city. (Issawi had gone to Mosul a few days earlier to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation there.) He followed this video presentation by listing the problems facing the city and Ninewa Province. Placing the blame on the shoulders of the Governor, D/PM Issawi praised LTG Riyadh's successful efforts to improve security and to work with GOI ministries to enhance the delivery of necessary services. He added, however, that there were not enough Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police to secure Mosul,s neighborhoods. He reported that many Mosul residents had expressed gratitude for the efforts of the ISF, but had lamented the BAGHDAD 00002729 002 OF 003 lack of services and delays in reconstruction projects. DPM Issawi suggested that as priorities the GOI needed to refurbish the military base at Mosul, resolve challenges with facilities protection services and river police, and develop a new security plan once all forces were available. ¶7. (S/REL MCFI) A rather strained discussion followed, with the PM and others noting myriad needs (opening the Mosul airport, housing troops, repairing infrastructure, etc.) while implying that Mosul/Ninewa Reconstruction Coordinator Zuhair Chalabi was not responding to the needs. The PM stressed that extraordinary measures (bypassing bureaucratic requirements) must be taken to accelerate reconstruction and provision of services. Bristling, Zuhair Chalabi insisted that he had overseen numerous successful projects, employed thousands, re-opened market streets, and spread the reconstruction funds equitably. All this, he added, in the face of continued terrorist violence to include the assassination of Mosul's mayor. ¶8. (S/REL MCFI) While acknowledging Chalabi's efforts, National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr. Muwaffaq Rubaie complained that a significant percentage of reconstruction funds was reaching Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or its supporters. PM added that the Governor is a problem who refuses to work with those he suspects of terrorist links, confirmed or not. MOD chimed in that the problems throughout Ninewa are the result of poor administration, and stressed the absolute need to deliver services to the people or lose the people's support. Deputy Commanding General LTG John Cooper (UK) suggested that the level of destruction in Mosul required greater funding for reconstruction and that the Ministries of Finance and of Planning should dispatch staff to Mosul to facilitate funding and execution of projects. ¶9. (S/REL MCFI) Commanding General (CG) David Petraeus reminded the Council that Mosul/Ninewa continued to experience a high level of violence, undermining significant reconstruction efforts. He noted that AQI was still conducting car bomb and suicide attacks and murdering one or two policemen every day, which must be stopped. He observed that although the Coalition had deployed an additional Stryker Battalion to Mosul and the Iraqi Security Forces had added a brigade for 3rd IA and more Iraqi SOF, additional IA and Iraqi Police forces were required. He assessed that AQI finances itself from criminal activities in the Mosul to Bayji area, and will fight tenaciously to retain control over this region. ¶10. (S/REL MCFI) The PM expressed agreement, calling for more Iraqi forces to be deployed to Mosul/Ninewa as soon as operations in Diyala are completed in a few weeks. The National Operations Center and the Crisis Action Cell should meet in the next few days to plan for expanded, targeted operation in Mosul, he concluded. MOD Logistics Briefing -------------- ¶11. (S/REL MCFI) The MOD introduced senior staff officers to brief the Council on the administrative system of the Iraqi military. After a few minutes, the PM interrupted to ask for a simple evaluation of when the MOD would be self-sufficient, that is, independent of Coalition Forces' support. Recognizing that it would vary across the area of daily life support, provision of ammunition, emergency services, and so forth, he pressed the MOD to give him estimates of how much the Iraqi forces had achieved percentage-wise for each branch. Testing the patience of the PM and most Council members, the MOD officers continued to present details on logistics capability, for examples, noting the number of 36,000 liter versus 10,000 liter fuel tanker trucks available. ¶12. (S/REL MCFI) The PM interrupted again and asked the MOD to give a rough estimate of how much had been accomplished in each area. Wincing, the MOD estimated that Iraqi forces were 80% self-sufficient regarding ammunition, 60% for fuel, 40% for medical evacuation, and about 25% for food and water. MOD then added that while the MOF has provided funds for capital investments, funds were now needed for maintenance and operations as well as infrastructure improvements. After further, at times heated, discussion involving the PM, MOD, NSA, and D/PM Barham Salih, the MOD indicated he would provide the specifics of his forces' needs. Protection of Facilities -------------- ¶13. (S/REL MCFI) The Chief of Military Intelligence briefed BAGHDAD 00002729 003 OF 003 the Council on the success over the past year in improving the protection of vital infrastructure, much of which is highly vulnerable to attack. He reported that planned terrorist attacks on the dams at Mosul and Haditha had been thwarted, oil pipelines had not been successfully attacked in months, and power lines had also been safeguarded. Concerning oil pipelines, he noted that when we provide the protection we need, there is little threat to them. Further, AQI plots to poison the water supply in Baghdad had been frustrated. Many attacks were planned, of course, to reduce the people's confidence in the government or to extort protection money from operators of service providers - successful operations to protect the facilities had dramatically reduced the number of attacks and undercut the criminal and terrorists efforts to subvert state authority and fill their coffers. He noted that as reconstruction and development projects increase, ISF units will be needed to protect those implementing the projects to re-build the country. ¶14. (S/REL MCFI) General Petraeus congratulated GOI forces on their success, noting the reality of the threats. To illustrate the success, he called the Council's attention to the fact that, for the first time since 2003, the entire 400 KV network was up and functioning. As well, electricity production was up almost 15% from last year despite the drought that adversely affected hydroelectric production. Also, oil production is up. The pipeline from Kirkuk to Bayji's refineries is secure, as is the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and the Bayji-Baghdad pipeline would be working soon. Water production plants in Baghdad were functioning at markedly better levels than last year. And in contrast to last year, when Baghdad nearly ran out of chlorine, there currently is a supply of over 130 days in Baghdad. In sum, protection of infrastructure was a real success story of which the Iraqis could be proud. Some of this success could be tied to the Sunni insurgents turning on AQI and joining with the GOI to restore and rebuild Iraq. Now, he concluded, was the time to provide for the Sons of Iraq. The PM responded that taking care of them was D/PM Rafi Issawi's responsibility and he would certainly do so. BUTENIS