CHALABI VIEWS ON THE PITFALLS OF DE-BA'ATH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000269

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CHALABI VIEWS ON THE PITFALLS OF DE-BA'ATH

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with PolCouns on January 24, Dr.
Ahmed Chalabi, the current Commissioner of the Higher
National De-Ba'athification Committee and the Chair of the
PM's Essential Services Committee, shared his views on the
passage of the Law of Accountability and Justice. While
noting some positive aspects of the new law, he cautioned
against its increased scope and its potential to undo what he
defended as positive reconciliation work that the HNDBC
accomplished under his leadership. Post continues to believe
that meaningful implementation of the law, which did not
codify necessary procedures, will rely heavily on the actions
the GoI takes before the law is put into effect. While
Chalabi's views can be seen as self-serving, he draws on a
strong base of knowledge of the de-Ba'athification process.
He also believes the ultimate impact of the law will depend
heavily on how the government and the new commission
implement the law. We will seek opportunities to engage the
PM and other senior officials to highlight the need for
proactive GOI efforts in shaping positive implementation of
the law. End Summary.

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Chalabi's views on Accountability and Justice
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2. (C) Dr. Chalabi noted that the Law of Accountability and
Justice (LAJ) was positive in two aspects. First, he stated
that the change of name from the Higher National
De-Ba'athification Commission (HNDBC) to the Higher National
Commission of Accountability and Justice (HNCAJ) was
beneficial to all parties. Second, he was enthusiastic about
the clause that gives pensions to those members of the
Shu'aba level, although he was quick to point out the HNDBC
tried to give pensions as often as they were able to those
who already applied for them.


3. (C) "Every other aspect of the law," Dr. Chalabi
commented, "is harsher to the Ba'athists." He quoted the
clause that expands the scope of the commission to "purge
organizations of the government sector, mixed sector, civil
society, and Iraqi society of the Ba'ath party system in any
form." (Article 3, second part) He noted the law provides
that rulings of the HNDBC remain valid if they do not
contradict the new law, which was particularly worrisome
(Article 20) with regard to the continuing validity of
previously granted exemptions. He cautioned that there was
significant potential for the new commission to begin a game
of "political football" by overturning previous decisions to
further political aims.


4. (C) As cause for his concern, he pointed to the 7000
employees of the Ministry of Interior who in his view will
face loss of their jobs due to their former membership in the
Ba'ath party (Article 6, sixth part). He also was critical
of the clause that rids Ba'athists of the rank firqa from
positions of Director General or higher (Article 6, second
part). For example, the HNDBC had previously issued numerous
exemptions (including eight of the top eleven current Iraqi
generals) to key officials of the rank firqa. He said it was
possible that those exemptions will be terminated once the
law goes into effect. In response to questioning about the
validity of this point of view, Chalabi opined that the new
chairperson had discretion to allow former exemptions to
stand, without consultation from another body such as the
Council of Ministers, but was not bound to do so. (Comment:
According to Post's interpretation of the law, the Council of
Ministers, through coordination with the HNCAJ, could step in
and allow the individuals to return to their jobs with
approval of the CoR (Article 12). Otherwise, an appropriate
entity, including the individual, his ministry, or the
provincial council, would have to contest the termination
within 30 days (Article 15). End Comment.)


5. (C) On the topic of the ratification of the LAJ, Chalabi
said that it would be a huge mistake for VP Hashimi to veto
the law; if returned to the CoR, the law might never emerge
again. He commented that it had been extremely difficult to
get the UIA to consider the law at all. He characterized
Sistani and his aides as "violently against it," and singled
out Sistani spokesman al-Najafi as particularly strong in his
opposition. Noting that only 111 representatives voted in
favor, he reiterated that it would be unwise for the
Presidency Council not to sign the law.


6. (C) Chalabi agreed that how the LAJ is implemented is
critical. Due to the vague outline of procedures within the
law, its implementation is heavily dependent on who becomes
chairman of the HNCAJ. He commented that the CoR would
appoint the chairman, and stressed the need for someone with
the right intentions who was strong and balanced to lead the

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commission. Post's interpretation of the LAJ is that the
Council of Ministers appoints seven commissioners, who are
confirmed by a simple majority of the CoR. The commissioners
then elect a chairman from among themselves, who is confirmed
by an absolute majority of the CoR (Article 2, fourth and
sixth parts).


7. (C) When asked how many former Ba'athists the LAJ and the
Unified Pension law would affect, Chalabi doubted that many
additional members at the rank of firqa would apply for
pension benefits, since they already had that opportunity
under the HNDBC. He estimated that about half (about 2000)
of those at the shu'aba level would apply for pensions; the
rest would not because, to do so, they must face the
associated difficulties of returning to Iraq.

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Comment: The time crunch in the implementation
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8. (C) Post assesses that much of the positive gain for
reconciliation represented by passage of the LAJ will be lost
if the GoI allows the law to be published without considering
a number of implementation issues and alleviating them by
issuing implementing regulations and ensuring the appointment
to the commission of well-regarded, non-partisan figures. If
the GoI does not exercise appropriate leadership, the
chairperson of the HNCAJ will have significant discretion in
establishing bylaws and implementing regulations.


9. (C) However, there is a timeline written into the law that
goes into effect upon its publication in the official
gazette. Naming a chairperson for the HNCAJ will require the
appointment of the seven commissioners and the subsequent
confirmation and approval of one of them as chair by an
absolute majority of the CoR. This chairperson has 30 days
from the LAJ's publication (not his appointment) to issue
bylaws to regulate its activities (Article 27). It is not
clear what will occur if either the CoR is unable to confirm
a chairman before that 30-day window lapses, or if the
chairman does not issue these bylaws.


10. (C) The law does not clearly spell out the process for a
former Ba'athist to apply for either a pension or
reinstatement into employment, something they must do within
the first 60 (or 90, if out of the country) days from the
date of publication in the official gazette (Article 7).
Likewise, the law does not clearly spell out what will happen
to those individuals who receive de-Ba'athification orders
after the 90-day window. Also, since there is a 30-day
deadline to file an appeal, it is not clear what will happen
to those who received de-Ba'athification orders prior to the
enactment of the law. The as yet unwritten implementing
regulations are therefore of great importance to the
prospects of the law facilitating the reinstatement of former
Ba'athists.
BUTENIS