BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD PART 3: KEEPING MOMENTUM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000266 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS PTER IZ SUBJECT: BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD PART 3: KEEPING MOMENTUM REF: A. BAGHDAD 264 - BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD PART 1: MAKING PROGRESS ¶B. BAGHDAD 265 - BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD PART 2: IT'S NOT OVER ¶C. 07 BAGHDAD 3531 - SURGE IMPROVES SECURITY ¶D. 07 BAGHDAD 3540 - EXPLOITING SURGE THROUGH SERVICES ¶E. 07 BAGHDAD 3545 - BUILDING GOI CAPACITY TO DELIVER SERVICES ¶F. 07 BAGHDAD 3885 - DISPLACED PERSONS RETURNING HOME ¶G. BAGHDAD 197 - IOM REPORTS ON IRAQI IDPS Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Many Baghdad residents have warned Mission officers that the enemies of Iraq may regain the initiative in Baghdad if the Government of Iraq (GoI) fails to develop and implement coherent policies for a number of key issues. These issues include the future of Concerned Local Citizen groups; the assassinations of mid-level GoI officials; high unemployment; Muqtadr Al-Sadr's "freeze" order which halted Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) attacks; the equity, effectiveness, and security of service delivery; and the possibility that displaced persons may return to Baghdad in large numbers. Despite a raft of efforts and initiatives to support GoI policy formation and implementation in these areas, the Coalition is pressing against the limits of its ability to shape political outcomes. Unless the Shia-led Iraqi Security Forces can build a critical mass of public trust, they will struggle to succeed as Coalition Forces draw down. Coalition efforts will continue and expand, but ultimately Baghdad's largest sect must decide the fate of Iraq's capital -- Sunnis can prolong the battle for Baghdad, but only the Shia can end it. This cable is the third in a three-part series on the status of the battle for Baghdad (reftels A and B). END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) This political section cable draws on information, analysis and anecdotes from post's local contacts, the Baghdad PRT, the Baghdad EPRTs, as well as MNF-I spot reports, surveys and polling. -------------- -------------- GOI MISMANAGEMENT OF CLCs COULD REVERSE SECURITY GAINS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The future of the approximately 27,000 (mainly Sunni) men who have joined Concerned Local Citizen groups figures high among anxieties expressed by Baghdadis. Sunni Sheikhs and local leaders worry that the GoI will not permit a sufficient number of CLCs to enter the ISF or other government employment; they also worry that if large numbers of CLCs do enter the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),the GoI will treat them as second class citizens, by paying them a lower wage than their Shia counterparts and refusing to allow them to serve in their own Sunni or mixed communities. Some Sunni residents have also begun to accuse the GoI of tacitly supporting the recent assassinations of CLC leaders, merely by failing to prevent them. For their part, Shia leaders -- at the local and national level -- worry that the CLCs contain, at worst, unreformed insurgents and AQI members and, at best, former insurgents and terrorists susceptible to recidivism if the GoI does not address their needs, most notably for employment. ¶4. (C) Residents of all sects fear that the CLCs possess the power, if they turn against the GoI, to escalate the violence in Baghdad and reverse recent security gains. Locals in the Diyala neighborhood of 9 Nissan (aka New Baghdad) district and the Salman Pak area in Mada'in qada have already expressed concern about the loyalty of CLCs in their area, and tensions have flared between CLCs and the ISF in the contentious neighborhoods of Ameriya and Doura. -------------- --- ASSASSINATIONS OF MID-LEVEL OFFICIALS HAMPER GOI -------------- --- ¶5. (S) A slow, grinding campaign of terror against mid-level officials and technocrats in Baghdad continues to hamper the effectiveness of the GoI by providing key managers a powerful reason to avoid implementing measures to improve efficiency or reduce corruption. Baghdad's mid-ranking officials -- at the national, provincial, and local level -- continue to suffer from assassinations and threats at a rising rate, even as the number of all other violent attacks trends downward, according to MNF-I intel analysts. Since April 2006, MNF-I reports that over 900 assassination "events" have targeted GoI officials -- including assassinations, kidnappings, attempted assassinations, and credible threats of assassination. The majority of those targeted since April 2006 -- 63 percent -- are mid-level officials and technocrats. Militants target officials in the middle ranks BAGHDAD 00000266 002 OF 004 far more often than they do higher-level officials, who were victims in only 8 percent of the 900 reported events. And Baghdad officials have suffered more attacks than have officials in the rest of Iraq's provinces put together, enduring 58 percent of all reported attacks against GoI officials nationwide since April 2006. -------------- -------------- AN END TO THE SADR 'FREEZE' COULD CAUSE MAJOR SETBACK -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) When asked what missteps Shia groups might take that could "re-radicalize" Sunni groups, Sunnis in Baghdad often refer to a renewed campaign of marauding attacks orchestrated by JAM. The JAM freeze, by all local accounts, has made a major contribution to stability in Baghdad. When asked what events might trigger the end of the freeze, locals mentioned the explosion by AQI of a large vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Sadr City, and they point to the potential for conflicts between JAM and Badr to spiral out of control in Karbala, Najaf, or other southern cities. They also referred to the perception common among Sadrists that CF continue to kill and detain legitimate JAM members. JAM and the Sadrists -- through their spokesmen and through Shia imams in mosques in JAM-controlled areas of Baghdad -- continually express concern that the Coalition has gone too far in its support of CLCs. As one resident of Sadr City told poloff, "Some feel the U.S. is supporting mainly Sunni awakenings." (NOTE: MNF-I intel analysts report that JAM Special Groups have begun targeting CLC leaders, paralleling the efforts of AQI. END NOTE.) ¶7. (C) Baghdadis from all sects fear the end of the freeze. Many look to the GoI to find a way to encourage Muqtadr Al-Sadr to continue and prolong his ceasefire, but feel that Prime Minister Maliki has not made any concerted public effort to do so. Fairly or unfairly, many locals believe that Maliki is passively awaiting Sadr's decision, despite the grave consequences for Iraq's capital -- and the country as a whole -- if Sadr ends his freeze. -------------- - UNEMPLOYMENT STILL PROVIDES A POOL OF RECRUITS FOR MILITANTS -------------- - ¶8. (C) Many of Baghdad's denizens express anxiety about how high unemployment rates contribute to sectarian violence. In recent meetings and surveys, they have emphasized three main economic problems -- over-reliance on fuels, high unemployment rates, and rising inflation -- but mainly worry that if legitimate enterprises do not find employment for restless young men, than the extremists will fill the gap. They also report that much of the increase in economic activity stems from the re-opening of shops that had closed down due to the violence. According to post's local contacts, few new shops are opening. People are also clamoring for more manufacturing and large-scale businesses -- and expecting the government to provide these. ¶9. (C) At the same time, inflation has reportedly affected rent, food, and fuel prices. Price increases suggest a resurgence of economic activity, but some Baghdadis believe excessive transportation costs have also contributed; the security situation still makes it expensive and risky to transport goods through some areas. Locals also claim that Baghdad's limited economic recovery has been patchy so far, with some areas remaining stagnant, particularly Sunni and mixed neighborhoods such as the Jihad neighborhood of west Rashid district; Zafaraniya and Diyala neighborhoods of eastern Karada district; and the Ameriya and Ghazaliya neighborhoods of Mansour district. Even residents in areas with historically wealthy and educated populations, such as Palestine Street, complain of a lack of jobs and low pay. -------------- -------------- GOI FAILURE TO DELIVER AND SECURE ESSENTIAL SERVICES ALIENATES ALL CONSTITUENTS, BUT ESPECIALLY SUNNIS -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The GoI's continuing inability to provide essential services to all of Baghdad's neighborhoods undermines its popular support and allows its illegitimate rivals -- local militants -- to sustain some popular legitimacy and to accrue much-needed revenue (reftels C - E). When asked what matters most to Baghdadis, a resident from 9 Nissan district told poloff, "All the time we're thinking about the same things -- fuel, power, water -- easy things, silly things." Services including trash collection, sewers, water, and electricity are often markedly inferior in Sunni or mixed neighborhoods such as Adhamiya, southern Ghazaliya, Ameriya, Ghadier, Diyala, Qadria, and Zafaraniya; and in qadas such as Taji and Abu Ghraib. BAGHDAD 00000266 003 OF 004 ¶11. (C) Inside the Zafaraniyah neighborhood, locals report a startling contrast between the services provided to a block (Mulhalla 953) that is predominantly Sunni, and those provided to the adjacent block (Mulhalla 954),which is predominantly Shia. The Sunni block lacks a working sewer, potable water, water pressure, and daily trash pick up. In the adjacent Shia block, the sewer works, the pump works, the water is potable, and the Amanat collects trash every day. (NOTE: Both blocks receive about the same amount of electricity. END NOTE.) Many Sunni and Shia residents of Baghdad report that such blatant inequalities may, cumulatively over time, precipitate a violent backlash against the GoI. -------------- -------------- WAVE OF RETURNING IDPs COULD CRASH INTO SOME AREAS -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees have begun returning to Baghdad in small numbers, raising alarm among some locals and GoI officials that an increasing rate of return could disrupt many Baghdad neighborhoods which only recently stabilized (reftels F and G). According to local sources, mostly Shia have thus far returned, and they have returned mostly to Shia-dominated areas. Fewer Sunni have returned, and few returnees appear to have reclaimed their homes in mixed areas. Nonetheless, if the security situation continues to improve, the number of returnees may surge, and so might the rate of return. The GoI, however, lacks a comprehensive policy to prevent the conflicts that might erupt following a large and rapid influx of IDPs and refugees. GoI policy must clarify and communicate the role of the ISF in resolving local disputes, many of which will inevitably turn violent, and the legal alternatives available for people who find squatters in their homes -- and for those who "sold" their homes under duress. -------------- COALITION AS "ADVISOR" AND "PROD" IN BAGHDAD -------------- ¶13. (C) Coalition efforts are under way to persuade, prod, and advise GoI officials to address each of the trends and potential events described above that might impede forward momentum in Baghdad. With regard to protecting GoI mid-level officials, officers in MNF-I Strategic Operations, with input from the Embassy's political, economic, and political-military sections, are working to educate, support, and enhance GoI efforts to protect their own officials. Embassy, the Baghdad PRT, and MNF-I are engaging energetically with the GoI -- at various levels -- to help Iraqi officials improve service delivery, and to devise plans to address the employment of CLCs and the possible return of large numbers of IDPs and refugees. As to the Sadr freeze order, Embassy, PRTs, EPRTs and MNF-I continue to engage Sadrists at the local level, and at every opportunity, to persuade them to seek power through political engagement instead of violent intimidation. With full recognition that the Iraqi government and private sector will lead and sustain economic development in their own country, the PRT and EPRTs, in close cooperation with Mission elements including USAID, help to increase employment opportunities by providing short-term employment, micro-grants, training, and other forms of economic stimulus throughout Baghdad, while the Brinkley Task Force works to revive major State-Owned Enterprises and the senior consultants and advisors at ITAO work every day to build GoI capacity at the ministry level. Inter-agency anti-corruption efforts are also pressing forward. ¶14. (C) Training, monitoring, and collaboration with Iraqi Security Forces also continue apace. The number of violent attacks in Baghdad could not have decreased so substantially and so quickly without some successful efforts and sacrifices by Iraqi Security Forces. Many residents, however, perceive and experience -- and report -- that Iraqi Security Forces continue to behave in a blatantly sectarian manner. Some sectarian behavior remains explicit and clearly perceptible, but the Coalition often misses more nuanced gestures of discrimination and disrespect that take place, for instance, at checkpoints -- such as the extortion of small bribes, unprofessional inspections of vehicles, and veiled threats. Among the many problems cited by locals, popular perceptions of ISF partiality do more to undermine trust in the ISF than possibly any other factor. Unless they can build and maintain a critical mass of public trust, ISF will struggle to succeed as Coalition Forces draw down. Sectarian prejudice by the Iraqi Security Forces may well prove the biggest hurdle for the GoI as it seeks to win over the population it is charged to secure. -------------- -------------- BAGHDAD 00000266 004 OF 004 BAGHDAD'S SUNNIS LOST THE WAR, BUT CAN PROLONG THE BATTLE -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) As Coalition Forces draw down in 2008, the two largest sects in Baghdad will have an even freer hand in shaping the fate of Iraq's capital. The Sunni minority will not likely win back their pre-war stranglehold on Baghdad's institutions. While the Sunnis have lost the war, they can still prolong the battle for political and security control of Baghdad. If a large number of tribal and local leaders turn the CLC groups they lead against ISF and CF, or re-forge alliances with AQI or irreconcilable insurgent cells, they can substantially prolong the bloodshed in Baghdad. Sunni groups can also play a spoiler role in Baghdad's political institutions. This role could entail boycotting Baghdad's next provincial elections, and generally playing the victim instead of figuring out how to make the most of the new Sunni reality in Iraq, which is characterized by a level of political influence that more closely aligns to their population and resources. (NOTE: In a recent example of the intransigence that still characterizes the political approach of many Sunni leaders in Baghdad, a group of Sheikhs claiming to represent CLC leaders from around Baghdad province told poloff January 24 that Sunnis, not Shia, represent the majority of Iraq's population; they also said that they would not fully engage in the political process until the Council of Representatives re-writes the Constitution. END NOTE.) -------------- -------------- CONCLUSION: ONLY THE SHIA CAN END THE BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) While Sunnis can prolong the battle for Baghdad, only Baghdad's Shia majority has the power to end it. Three Shia political parties -- Dawa, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI),and the Sadrists -- lead the central government and Baghdad's major provincial and city institutions, including the Governor's office, the Provincial Council, and the Amanat. They also dominate the Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad. Despite their powerful position, these groups have not yet communicated to members of the Sunni minority in Baghdad -- through policies, services support, hiring practices, consultations, or rhetoric -- that they are welcome to play a substantial role in the public institutions of a Shia-dominated city, and that Sunnis can benefit more substantially from participation in the political process than from violent opposition to it. ¶17. (C) Barring a series of statements and actions that clearly convey this message, a best case scenario in 2008 would involve a political tussle between the Sadrists and ISCI to appeal to Sunni "swing" voters in Baghdad -- and to voters in other minority groups, such as the Fayli Kurds, Assyrians, and Yezidis -- for support in provincial elections. In this scenario, ISCI and the Sadrists would recognize that they can most effectively control Baghdad's provincial and municipal institutions by attracting the votes of minority groups. Ideally, a Shia party seeking to appeal to minority voters might even propose a plan to police and, ultimately, disband Shia militias. ¶18. (C) For the Shia parties to adopt such an approach, they must first overcome the paranoia and insecurity that have held back Baghdad's Shia leaders in the past. In the worst case scenario, Shia political parties will tighten their sect's grip on the levers of power in Baghdad, by means both legal and illegal, ensuring not necessarily that their sect remains predominant, but that their sect-based political parties do so. Most likely, the Shia political parties, and the officials who owe their allegiance to these parties, will not actively court or engage the Sunni population during ¶2008. They appear set to continue, however, to improve the coordination, professionalism and discipline of the Shia-dominated service ministries and security forces. These actions, of course, ultimately benefit Baghdad's Shia and Sunni populations, but may not prove sufficient to create the widespread local support required for the GoI to end the violent conflict plaguing Iraq's capital city. BUTENIS