MUTHANNA SHEIKHS ASK FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002595 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: MUTHANNA SHEIKHS ASK FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 2447 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2307 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1475 Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Two Muthanna sheikhs asked for U.S. assistance to combat Iranian interference in separate August 12 and 13 meetings with Senior Advisor Gordon Gray. While Sheikh Hakim Khashan presented a detailed political strategy and said he had formed alliances throughout central and southern Iraq, Sheikh Najim Abed Sayih seemed unwilling to take concrete political steps without a guarantee of broader U.S. support. The two sheikhs are political opponents, and their rivalry underscores the potential of personality feuds to undermine the electoral chances of tribally-based parties in the south. End summary. ¶2. (C) Sheikh and Muthanna Provincial Council member Khashan described his alliance with Dhi Qar Sheikh Ali Munshid's The Council of Southern Sheikhs and Sheikh Abu Risha as a force "stretching from the north to the south" that enjoyed the support of sheikhs from all of Iraq's southern governorates (ref A). He invited U.S. officials to a political conference being held by Abu Risha in Ramadi on August 20, and said tribal delegations from all over Iraq would be in attendance. Although seemingly optimistic, Khasan repeatedly asked for U.S. assistance to balance the influence of Iran and the institutional advantages of the religious parties; "How can we hope to compete?" he said, "It is like a war in which one side has planes and tanks and the other only has pistols." As examples, he pointed to the recently-formed tribal support council, which he called a Da'wa plan to gain tribal votes, and accused Iran of giving 20,000 USD to the office of every religious party, calling it "just the first of many payments." ¶3. (C) Khasan passed U.S. officials documents during the August 12 meeting that seemed designed to bolster his reputation and besmirch that of his political opponents, especially Provincial Council Chair Muhammed al-Zayadi, including a mission statement and internal by-laws for his party (The Assembly of the Mid-Euphrates),signatures of support from over two dozen Muthanna sheikhs, and Zayadi's (allegedly forged) educational transcripts. Khasan also criticized Sheikh Sayih at length as a "small sheikh" and former Ba'athist who lacked real power. He urged U.S. officials to stop meeting with Sayih, saying that such meetings damaged the reputation of tribal leaders as a whole and "makes my work more difficult." ¶4. (C) Sayih sounded many of the same themes as Hakim in his August 13 meeting but reserved most of his ire for the tribal support council, stressing the need to create a truly independent tribal council to combat the power of the religious parties. He repeatedly asked for U.S. assistance but was vague on specifics, eventually clarifying that he wanted legal sanction to organize an armed militia along the lines of the Anbar Awakening. He never mentioned his political party (ref C),instead focusing on the biased nature of the tribal support councils; collusion between Iran and the religious parties; and the responsibility of the U.S. to provide support to its ideological allies (i.e., the tribes). Sayih claimed to be America's sole ally in Muthanna and said banners denouncing him had been placed in the provincial capital of Samarra following a July 30 conference he organized that was attended by U.S. officials (ref A). Asked if the fragmentation among the Shi'a tribes would limit their electoral chances, Sayih responded that the U.S. needed to select a Shi'a sheikh to lead the tribes and hinted that he would be a suitable candidate. ¶5. (C) Comment: Although Sayih and Hakim professed to share similar nationalist, anti-Iranian ideologies, they are also bitter political opponents, and their rivalry underscores the potential of personality feuds to undermine the electoral chances of tribally-based parties in the south. Hakim, with previous electoral experience, a developed platform, and established alliances with other sheikhs, is likely the more credible candidate. The sheikhs' complaints over the political motivations behind the creation of tribal support councils echo the views of other southern tribal leaders (ref B) and are likely justified. End Comment. CROCKER