MAYSAN GOVERNOR PLAYS IT COOL WHILE SHEIKHS RUN HOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002518 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PTER MOPS PINS SUBJECT: MAYSAN GOVERNOR PLAYS IT COOL WHILE SHEIKHS RUN HOT Classified By: Acting Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Maysan Governor Adil al-Maliki said all the right things in an August 9 meeting with PRT Team Leader (TL) at the Governor's offices in downtown Amarah. The Governor expressed satisfaction with security gains in the province as a result of Operation Tidings of Peace and the presence of coalition forces (CF),described the minimal role the provincial government was playing in planning and executing projects stemming from the GOI's $100 million funding allocation to Maysan province, and discussed his desire to cooperate with the GOI, Iraq Security Forces (ISF),CF, and the PRT to improve the lot of the Maysani populace. Coincidentally, in a meeting across town attended by 2-7 Battalion Commander, tribal leaders of the Maysan Awakening Tribal Council were decrying Governor al-Maliki as a corrupt, poor performer and the major reason for a lack of progress in the province in recent years. End summary. ¶2. (C) In the first strictly civilian meeting between the PRT and the Governor since operations began in June, Governor al-Maliki, who prior to military operations had stated on numerous occasions that Maysan was stable and secure, described security as greatly improved as a result of military operations. He stated that the citizenry and provincial government were pleased that conflict between Maysanis and the ISF and CF had been minimal. He offered his opinion that the next crucial steps would be to attract investment, create employment opportunities, and improve essential service delivery. ¶3. (C) The Governor promised to send a letter of invitation for the PRT to locate within Maysan, and espoused coordination as the key to development in the province. He stated a strong desire for provincial government agreement on all projects, and hoped projects would be delivered expeditiously. He repeated his stance that he will not seek reelection, citing friction between the tribes and the government, an apparent desire for change by Maysanis, and his belief that not running in eventual provincial elections would be "the peaceful way" despite his personal desire to finish what he has started. -------------- $100 Million Managed From Baghdad -------------- ¶4. (C) Al-Maliki said that the planning process for spending the $100 million from the GOI was not coordinated well, with Dr. Tariq Najem Abdullah from the PM's office (acting director of the GOI committee overseeing the Maysan reconstruction aid) working directly with Ministry Directors General in the province without consulting with the provincial government. According to the Governor, the focus of Dr. Tariq's committee is on quick projects that can be completed within 5-6 months and the proposed projects are currently tendered for bid. The Governor expects the projects will be announced soon and said he will approve the projects despite the fact that they do not fit his strategy for the province. He explained that only Dr. Tariq has authority to disburse the funding. -------------- Tribal Leaders Want Governor Gone -------------- ¶5. (C) On the same day across town, U.S. 2-7 Battalion Commander and Iraqi Army 38th Brigade Commander attended a meeting of the Maysan Awakening Tribal Council. Most of the approximately 20 sheikhs on the council were there, as well as a few religious leaders. The sheikhs focused solely on the poor performance of the Governor. They expressed unanimous dissatisfaction with his performance as governor, blamed him for the lack of progress over the last few years, and pointed a collective finger at him for the emerging gasoline shortage in Amarah. They claimed that the Governor is selling much of the gas on the black market around town for much higher prices, which is causing extremely long lines at the 28 gas stations around town. The sheikhs stated that the governor is closely aligned with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and is responsible for allowing the militia back into Amarah. There was a pervading sense that violence would likely escalate in town (hinted at by three attacks against the IA within the past week with no casualties),with the potential for a large-scale attack. ¶6. (C) Comment: Governor al-Maliki appeared to go to great lengths to avoid any statements that might be perceived as controversial in his meeting with TL and was careful not to make any comments against the ISF or CF. He clearly believes that cooperation with the U.S. is in his best current interests. The tribal leaders, now feeling empowered by recent meetings with the Prime Minister, want to see real BAGHDAD 00002518 002 OF 002 change and they believe that the governor is standing in their way. Their frustration is compounded by the fact that there is no formal information flow among the governor, city council, the ISF, and the sheikhs. While the sheikhs may not be at the point where they will consider taking matters into their own hands, they agreed that the Governor should have been arrested at the start of this operation. The growing friction between the tribes and the Governor has the potential to lead to serious, potentially violent, consequences. End Comment. CROCKER