SONS OF IRAQ (SOI) PROGRAM UPDATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002414 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 TAGS: PINS MOPS PGOV ECON IZ SUBJECT: SONS OF IRAQ (SOI) PROGRAM UPDATE REF: A. BAGHDAD 164 ¶B. BAGHDAD 4205 (2007) ¶C. BAGHDAD 1005 ¶D. BAGHDAD CLASSIFIED O/I JULY 28 ¶E. BAGHDAD 2330 Classified By: Political-Military Minister-Counselor Marcie Ries for re asons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is the second in a series of reports on the Sons of Iraq (SOI),formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens (CLC). For information regarding the origins, training, equipment, operations, and the initial prospects for integration of the former CLC, see Ref A. ¶2. (S) Summary. As of July 2008, the SOI program had grown to approximately 103,000 members, providing a significant Iraqi augmentation to security forces in critical areas of the campaign against the insurgency and Al Qaeda. Around 25% of the SOI have requested permanent positions in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),though the GOI to date has approached such integration conservatively. Some Iraqi government and military leaders remain suspicious of the program, as seen most recently during planning for ISF operations in Diyala. The remainder may seek civil employment, but generating the required number of job opportunities remains a challenge given the slow rate of job growth in Iraq presently. The future of the program is shifting towards Iraqi control and Iraqi responsibility for the SOI's future. End Summary. ISF integration -------------- ¶3. (S REL MCFI) As of July 30, 2008, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) has contracted for a total of 101,319 SOI personnel in the following provinces: Ninewa: 2,748 Kirkuk: 11,070 Salah ad Din: 7,205 Diyala: 8,154 Baghdad: 56,087 Anbar: 4,719 Babil: 9,334 Qadisiyah: 2,002 ¶4. (S REL MCFI) From February-May 2008, integration of SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was slow but steady. The GOI had what turned out to be well-founded suspicions that some of the SOI were insurgents, and established a vetting process to cull bad apples out of the ISF basket. Constant oversight by MNF-I Force Strategic Engagements Cell (FSEC) kept the files moving through the process at the GOI's Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR),Iraqi intelligence agencies, and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). IFCNR vetted the personnel files for errors, and intelligence agencies screened the files for disqualifying criteria, particularly security concerns. MoI issued hiring orders. Intelligence screening eliminated about 7% of applicants. The average time to process a group of applicants was about 100 days: 25 for IFCNR, 41 for intelligence, and 35 for MoI. A further constraint was the limited availability of basic training classes offered by Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. ¶5. (S REL MCFI) The process came to a halt in May after PM Maliki circulated a letter dated May 28 indicating the GOI had reached the limit it had agreed with CF for SOI-ISF integration. According to the PM's letter, the GOI had agreed to integrate 20 percent of SOI out of a maximum 57,000 total hired by CF under the SOI program. The May 28 letter stopped SOI integration when 12,000 SOI had been integrated into ISF (just over 20 percent of 57,000). Senior CF leaders have been pressing the PM on integration of SOI and transition of program control. The future of SOI - registration and transfer to Iraqi control -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) MNC-I Commander LTG Austin met with PM Maliki on July 3 to propose turning over responsibility for the program to the GOI by January 1, 2009. The PM agreed to take over the contracts for 60,000 SOI. To get SOI numbers down to 60,000, the PM agreed to hire a further 17,000 SOI into the Iraqi Police before the end of 2008. That step, combined with the ongoing transition of 26,000 SOI through CF-funded employment and training programs, will reduce the number of remaining SOI contracts to 60,000. MNC-I agreed not to hire new SOI nor to backfill the successfully transitioned SOI. Several GOI entities, including IFCNR, the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC),and the National Security Advisor's office were tasked by the PM to prepare SOI transition plans to be enacted once the GOI assumes all SOI contracts later this year. IFCNR BAGHDAD 00002414 002 OF 002 Chairman Mohamed Salman recently presented the plans to PM Maliki. ¶7. (S) In late July, MG Qanbar Abud, the BOC Commander, pressed IFCNR to establish a policy for SOI and then to get out of the way. Abud envisioned a basic policy that the GOI would assume the SOI payroll, and the BOC would register, vet, and assist in the SOI's future; the policy would be executed by BOC and CF commanders, not IFCNR. ¶8. (S) In July 30-31 meetings with IFCNR Chairman Salman, PM Advisor Dr. Bassima al Sa'adi, and Deputy National Security Advisor Safa al Shaykh, FSEC and MNC-I identified the emerging GOI direction: to create a SOI transition organization. This organization would handle the GOI assumption of SOI contracts as well as non-security transition. Suspicions in some quarters -------------- ¶9. (S REL MCFI) Throughout July, tension between SOI members and program supporters on the one hand, and some GOI officials and ISF commanders on the other, continued to run strong in some places. As the ISF prepared for a major new security operation now kicking off in Diyala, some Diyala leaders feared the operation would result in violent suppression of the SOI (Ref D). In mid-July, the GOI announced a requirement for all SOI to report to local police stations to be counted and registered as part of the GOI's plans to assume responsibility for all SOI contracts. The effort reportedly fed into fears among some SOI in Diyala Province that the GOI planned to arrest or disarm SOI in advance of expected ISF operations. In late July, ISF commanders assured Coalition officers that SOI will not be targeted in the Diyala operations. IFCNR Chairman Mohamed Salman told FSEC officers that the GOI's registration effort was suspended pending delivery of MNC-I's own SOI audit process. Civilian training - no guarantee of long-term employment -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) MNF-I has sought to generate civilian employment opportunities as a long-term solution for reintegrating SOI and preventing a return to insurgency. Options included public works programs and vocational-technical training (VOTECH). These solutions are temporary, however, and reflect the ongoing problems of unemployment and underemployment in Iraq (Ref B). Unless these are addressed, when the programs end the SOI will once again be "on the street." ¶11. (S) Among the programs providing training for former SOI members in transition: Civilian Service Corps (CSC),Joint Technical Education Reintegration Program (JTERP),and Community Based Workers Program (CBWP). CSC is a MNC-I initiative to provide skills training and employment. It is focused on construction tasks. CSC is training over 3,500 trainees on 17 contracts. MNC-I currently uses Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for this program. JTERP is an Iraqi-led program with MNC-I support. JTERP provides education and skills training for released detainees as well as former SOI members. Attendees are not guaranteed employment upon completion of the program. JTERP is training 255 former SoI in Pilot Programs in Salah ad Din, Babil, and Baghdad provinces. Further expansion is planned in August and September in Salah ad Din, Anbar, and Diyala provinces. CBWP is Iraqi-led and funded, but it also receives support from MNC-I's CSC program. The intended effect is to transfer SOI from security tasks to public works programs. Concurrently, MNC-I intends to continue using CERP funds for public works programs of its own. Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) Comment: The road to GOI control of the SOI will have some bumps. While MNC-I will provide its SOI roster to the GOI, we expect the GOI will insist on its own registration, to verify the MNC-I list and ferret out persons of interest. The GOI will apply Iraqi law to SOI members, arresting some for suspected criminal activity which may have occurred either before or during their SOI service. Fearing arrest, some SOI members will flee rather than register their names with the Iraqi Police. Meanwhile, other members would rather quit than work for the GOI. In the end, the key issue for SOI transition is going to be whether or not SOI find gainful employment. The GOI will need to recognize that if they do not want to take more into the security services, they will have to generate other alternatives. CROCKER