PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS LAW UPDATE; UNAMI STRIVES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002411 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS LAW UPDATE; UNAMI STRIVES FOR A DEAL REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 2305 ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 2280 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4(b) and ( d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) With the CoR ready to take up the provincial elections law again on Sunday, August 3, the U.S. and UN are working hard to facilitate a solution to the key remaining obstacle to a deal on a new Iraqi election law, the treatment of Kirkuk. An Iraqi "wise men's" group has been working since Wednesday, and the UNAMI team is convening a meeting August 1 evening with a group of political leaders that include some of the wise men, as well. We, along with the UK, will attend to show a united front from the international community. UNAMI will seek agreement on the basis of a modified text for Article 24 of the law. The atmosphere for a solution darkened considerably, however, when the Kirkuk provincial council threatened on Thursday, July 31, to seek to attach Kirkuk to the KRG. The Embassy has been in continual contact with various interlocutors, encouraging them to reach agreement and urging against provocative unilateral actions, such as that taken by the Kirkuk provincial council. End Summary. Trying to find a solution -------------- ¶2. (C) Two days before the Council of Representatives (CoR) is scheduled to take up the provincial elections law once again, we, the Iraqis and the United Nations are working intensely to find a solution acceptable to all sides on the remaining major obstacle to an agreement -- the treatment of Kirkuk (and, by implication, of Article 140). The Iraqis have created a high-level "wise-men's" group, which has been meeting since Wednesday. The group includes vice president Adil Abdul Mahdi, Rowsch Nouri Shaways (Kurd - KDP),Jalal Al-Din Al-Sagheer (ISCI),Abdul Karem Al-Samuraie (IIP),Ayad al-Samaraie (IIP) and Fouad Ma'assoum (Kurd - PUK). In addition, there have been multiple side meetings and phone calls between top Iraqi political leaders and senior political bloc figures. (Comment: As best as we can tell, while the Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party has been in regular contact with other Iraqi political blocs, harder line Sunni Arab groups are having fewer such conversations. They don't reach out to other blocs much and only a few figures, such as Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi, have reached out to them.) 
 ¶3. (C) UNAMI, meanwhile, has been working with all sides and has been adjusting its compromise language on Article 24 of the law, which concerns elections in Kirkuk. Ambassador Crocker, PolMinCouns and poloffs have been meeting non-stop with contacts, urging the Iraqis to focus on finding some compromise language with UNAMI. UNAMI will convene a meeting Friday evening of 8-9 Iraqi politicians, including several members of the "wise-men's" group, in an effort to gain agreement on its latest compromise text. The Embassy will attend the meeting as observers. ¶4. (C) The most important stumbling block, as before, is the demand by radical Sunni Arabs and Turcomen from Kirkuk for specific language guaranteeing that the Kurds will not have a majority of either provincial council seats or senior executive positions; that they will not be able to annex Kirkuk to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG); and that voters' rolls will not reflect the demographic changes in Kirkuk that have favored the Kurds since 2003. PolMinCouns spoke with wise-man and IIP number two Ayad al-Samaraie on July 31. Al-Samaraie, who has been trying to mediate between the Kurds and the radicals, suggested that the radicals might accept the less specific UN compromise language coupled with some sort of side agreement or letter from the U.S. and the U.N. providing the guarantees they seek. ¶5. (C) UNAMI's proposal must balance the desire of the Kurds to mention Article 140 and the fear of the Arabs that the CoR committee formed to address the Kirkuk issue will fail. UNAMI's language includes power sharing of the top jobs in the Kirkuk province (Governor, Deputy Governor, Chair of the Provincial Council),plus administrative jobs reaching down to the district and sub-district levels; addressing property rights issues (Note: We have heard from al-Samaraie that IIP is willing to take this out. End Note); references to Article 140, the Provincial Powers Law (Law 21) and the Regions Formation Law (Law 13). Finally, it includes a vague guarantee that if "the committee fails to deliver a formula" the CoR and GOI may seek the assistance of the UN to ensure provincial elections will occur in Kirkuk before December ¶2009. BAGHDAD 00002411 002 OF 002 Kirkuk Provincial Council complicates the problem further -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In the midst of the intense diplomatic activity aimed at finding a solution, the already very mistrustful atmosphere between Kurds and other parties was suddenly and sharply worsened by the action of the Kirkuk provincial council on July 31. In spite of Ambassador Crocker's strong and clear warning to President Talibani that such a step would be provocative and counter-productive, the Kirkuk PC took a vote threatening, if the election law was not passed on Sunday, to seek the annexation of Kirkuk to the KRG. The vote had an immediate negative effect in Baghdad. Ambassador warned President Talabani midday on July 31 that the move would dramatically complicate the negotiations to finalize a compromise election law text and he urged Talabani weigh in to stop any other Kirkuk local moves that would aggravate tempers further. Poloffs met with Sunni radical Saleh al-Muttlaq on Friday evening, shortly after word had arrived of the Kirkuk vote. The always mistrustful and hard-line al-Muttlaq charged that the vote proved that "your friends" could not be trusted, and that all the Arabs' and Turcomen's fears about Kurdish intentions had been proven correct. We assured al-Muttlaq and all our contacts of U.S. disapproval of the provocative and ill-advised unilateral acts, such as the Kirkuk vote. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Kirkuk provincial council vote was unhelpful but we still sense a fighting chance to get agreement between at least a core center of Iraqi political parties around a UNAMI compromise text concerning Kirkuk. That core center would include ISCI, the Prime Minister's Dawa party, the Kurdish PUK and KDP parties and the Iraqi Islamic Party. Ideally, at least some harder line figures, such as parliament speaker Mashadani or other elements of the Bloc 127 group that passed the original election law vetoed by the Presidency Council would sign up to the UNAMI text. We do not expect any sudden breakthroughs, and we anticipate some more posturing, bargaining and back-room dealing before the anticipated vote on the election law on August 3. CROCKER