BAQUBAH SUNNI LEADERSHIP FEAR ARREST IN UPCOMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002330

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BAQUBAH SUNNI LEADERSHIP FEAR ARREST IN UPCOMING
IRAQ OPERATIONS

Classified By: ePRT Diyala South Team Leader Michael Thurston for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Sunni political figures in the Diyala
Provincial capital of Baqubah have expressed strong
reservations about upcoming Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) led
operations in Baqubah. In conversations with Diyala ePRT
they expressed their belief that the operations are a pretext
for the arrest of leading Sunni political figures ahead of
anticipated provincial elections. Many Sunni leaders are
convinced that the national government is determined to
maintain Diyala Province as Shia led in spite of its Sunni
majority. End Summary.


2. (C) The Iraqi government has announced plans for offensive
operations in Diyala Province. Planning and preparations for
Operation &Benevolent Diyala8 are well underway and could
begin in early August. In the Diyala River Valley and
surrounding areas, operations will target the remnants of
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists, while in the south they
will be targeting Shia extremists such as Jaish al Mahdi
(JAM)factions which refuse to comply with directions to
disarm and Iranian supported Special Groups criminals.


3. (C) Baqubah is about 75 percent Sunni and 9 of 14 council
members are Sunni. Both the council chair and Qa,im Maqam
are Sunni. Most council members expressed concerns to the
ePRT that the government will target them and other Sunni
leadership under the cover of going after AQI. They also
discussed this openly in council meetings. They believe the
July 15 arrest of council chairmen Ra,ad in his office by
the National Police, with a warrant reportedly signed by the
Governor (a Shia) and charging him with harboring suicide
bombers and assisting AQI, is the beginning. Details of the
arrest were provided by the Qa,im Maqam. The ePRT
governance officer arrived shortly after the arrest and was
met by upset Sunni council members. On July 20 the Qa,im
Maqam reported that he had been informed that the council
chair Ra,ad would soon be released. However, he is
concerned that even if he is released his arrest will have a
chilling effect on other Sunnis and serve to taint Ra,ad,s
reputation. CF (Coalition Forces) are typically informed of
this type of high profile arrest ahead of time; however, in
this instance, CF received no prior notification. Iraqi
press releases incorrectly said that CF participated in the
arrest.


4. (C) Coalitions Forces in Diyala were initially concerned
that the Iraqi forces, which will include the Shia-dominated
National Police, might also confront Sons of Iraq (SOI)
groups which can be found throughout the city and have been
instrumental in maintaining security and significantly
reducing the threat of AQI in Baqubah. If the ISF confronts
the SOIs in hostile actions, neighborhood security may be
jeopardized. Sunnis in the city have no confidence in the
ability or willingness of the Shia-dominated Iraqi Police to
provide unbiased security, according to Sunni councilmen and
other leading Sunnis who regularly talk to ePRT members.
(Note: To prevent this confrontation, Maj Gen Barrons, MNC-I
DCG-ISF, MG Hertling CG MND-N, BG Boozer DCG MND-N met with
LTG Ali (IGFC) and 12 tribal sheik and SOI leaders on 24
July. After much discussion an accommodation was made that
CF leaders believe will prevent ISF-SOI confrontations. End
Note.)


5. (C) Comment. CF officers in Diyala have discussed what
events in the province might cause Sunnis to give up on
peaceful involvement with the political process in Diyala.
They identified as the most dangerous threat to sustainable
security an election outcome that would leave Diyala,s
Sunnis feeling they have been disenfranchised. The majority
of Sunnis are convinced that in a free and fair election they
will take over the leadership of the Province. There are
scenarios in which the Shia and Kurdish minorities could
support one another to overcome a Sunni majority and keep
control of the Province. The removal of key Sunni leadership
by ISF during Operation Benevolent Diyala could be such an
&unhinging event.8 Undoubtedly there are AQI members and
sympathizers among Sunni political leadership, but the
perception among Sunnis will be that the Government, no
matter the legitimacy of the charges, is trying to gain an
unfair advantage ahead of provincial elections. They will
follow closely the actions taken against Shia leadership in
Diyala who are seen as JAM or JAM Special Groups extremists
as part of Operation Benevolent Diyala, to see whether ISF
are as tough on Shia criminals and terrorists as on Sunni
ones. End Comment.
CROCKER