SCENESETTER FOR WASHINGTON VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002312

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2028
TAGS: PINS PGOV PTER PNAT MOPS MCAP MARR IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR WASHINGTON VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER
OF INTERIOR JAWAD AL-BOLANI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (S) Iraqi Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani is a hard
working, honest broker achieving real but fragile success in
his efforts to rid the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) of
corruption and sectarianism. He arrives in Washington
against a backdrop of increasing good news about security in
Iraq and about his Ministry of the Interior. One year ago,
critics took aim at the corruption and sectarianism within
the Ministry even calling for the National Police to be
disbanded. A year on, steps by Minister Bolani are making
tangible progress in the MOI and Police, though all agree
they have far to travel as they refocus from essentially
paramilitary duties to law enforcement. Undoubtedly, the
Ministry still faces problems of corruption, sectarianism and
a need for greater professionalism as well. Bolani's visit
affords an opportunity to lay groundwork for the evolution of
U.S. partnership with MOI toward "peacetime" lines. Bolani
openly supports a continued U.S. security presence and spoke
publicly and forcefully on behalf of signing a Status of
Forces Agreement with the U.S. The visit also provides us an
opportunity to encourage him to make his voice heard on this
issue both within the government and publicly. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Backdrop: Bolani is a religious Shi'a, political
independent, making him able to work across ethnic and
sectarian lines, but also leaving him vulnerable to pressure
from Shi'a parties, including Shi'a deputies within his own
ministry. His reform efforts within MOI reveal the growing
confidence of the GOI as it finds new ways to assert its
sovereignty. Like many members of the GOI, Bolani recognizes
the need for continued support from Coalition Forces but also
supports the notion of a timetable for the withdrawal of
combat troops. During a July 19, meeting, Bolani told
POL-MIL Minister Counselor that he spoke in favor of the SOFA
at a session of Parliament and was later thanked by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs for his eloquent defense of the
agreement. Bolani is well aware that his ministry, and law
enforcement training measures, in particular, will likely
need sustained USG funding for at least several more years.

Accomplishments:

THE IRAQI NATIONAL POLICE
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3. (SBU) One year ago, the Congressionally-funded Jones
Report strongly criticized the Ministry of Interior for its
corruption and sectarianism, reserving special emphasis for
the problems within the National Police (the MoI's
Gendarmerie-like element, not to be confused with the larger
Iraqi Police Services) and calling for it to be disbanded. A
year later and under the leadership of Minister Bolani, some
important changes have taken place. Within the Iraqi
National Police, each of the nine brigade commanders in place
when the Jones Report was published has been replaced, as
have 27 battalion commanders. The effort to professionalize
the National Police now also includes professional training
and leader development. By October 2007, all members of the
National Police Brigade completed brigade level training.
Over 1500 National Police received training at the
Carabinieri Training Camp (the first graduates of that
program - the National Emergency Response Unit - acquitted
themselves extremely well during the initial phases of the
Operation Charge of the Knights, to clear Basra of JAM
forces). The Ministry is currently assessing courses of
action to double the number of graduates of this program -
run by the Italian Carabinieri.

MINISTERIAL REFORMS
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4. (SBU) When Coalition Forces liberated Iraq, the MOI
employed approximately 60,000 personnel. The total now
stands at 441,807, and is projected to exceed 474,000 by
December 2008, largely through the assimilation of over
80,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel. It is also
expected to assume administrative oversight for the Sons of
Iraq, 19,000 of whom have already been hired (see para 6 for
details). This enormous growth brings with it administrative
challenges requiring additional support personnel, supplies,
infrastructure, institutional-training capacity and
leadership development programs. This year, the MOI
developed its own strategic plan and is now using the plan to

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evaluate itself; the only ministry in Iraq currently able to
do so. There are a total of 91 advisors in the MOI. 76 are
from the U.S. and, of those, 74 are military and two are
civilians.


5. (C) Thus far, the Police have functioned more in a
counterinsurgency role than in a traditional civil rule of
law role. As Iraq transitions from a Counterinsurgency model
of policing to a Rule of Law model and from a
confession-based justice system to an evidentiary-based
system, the development of criminology and forensics
capabilities will be paramount. Likewise, the need for a
reliable internal affairs capacity and 'police ethic' will
continue to ferret out irreconcilables and criminals. These
efforts will continue to require a long-term commitment of
U.S. cooperation in helping Iraq to develop such capacities.

SONS OF IRAQ (SOI)
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6. (C) The Sons of Iraq are the locally-recruited, primarily
Sunni security forces, formerly known as Concerned Local
Citizens, who number approximately 80,000 and are paid by
Coalition Forces. PM Maliki and MNF-I recently agreed that
the SOI should transition to complete Iraqi control. To
date, approximately 19,000 have been taken into the MOI and
Bolani is willing to accept more - as long as he has the
ability to place the new assets in locales where the police
are currently understaffed and they are needed most. (The
question of the GOI taking over the SOI program is
politically charged, as many Sunni are anxious that the
Government intends to disband the program rather than
transition members into the security forces and vocational
programs, as intended.)

Challenges:


7. (S/NF) Despite the gains and the cautious optimism for
continued success at the MOI, ministerial capacity - force
management, budget execution, and national-to-tactical
logistics and sustainment remain challenges as does continued
unacceptable levels of corruption, sectarianism and the need
for greater professionalism. Operations earlier this year
in Basra and Baghdad posed a serious challenge to the nascent
law enforcement apparatus in Iraq. Police personnel manning
unfortified stations and checkpoints were confronted with
large, aggressive insurgent forces beyond their capability to
handle. Some understandably withdrew from their positions,
others fled against orders to the contrary, and still others
failed to report for duty. Many police units, however, stood
their ground, especially when back-up support arrived. Other
police officers had their families threatened if they
reported for duty.


8. (S/NF) In coordination with internal security efforts in
Basra and Sadr City, led by PM Maliki, Iraqi police forces
performed very effectively in operations that were ultimately
successful. Subsequent investigations by the MoI have led to
actions being taken against some offending personnel. Some
were transferred, others ordered to take remedial training,
and still others were fired. Vulnerable key police stations
and check points are also being hardened as a consequence of
these operations.


9. (S/NF) As the MOI stands up its own internal court system
to investigate and prosecute corrupt officers, Bolani needs
to ensure complete transparency and openness in the court's
operations. Likewise, he needs to push for a more
professional police force, consolidating the gains of the
last twelve months while strengthening a professional police
ethic through more frequent police training and leadership
development programs. Finally, Bolani also needs to clarify
the relationship, from a law enforcement perspective, between
the central government and the provinces, particularly as it
relates to command and control. Compounding this issue is
the requirement to transition from military-led, intelligence
based counterinsurgency efforts to civil, warrant-based
apprehensions. The keys to overcoming these challenges are
found in better pay for officers; better equipment (including
weapons, ammunition, fuel for vehicles and supplies); and
developing police confidence through the implementation of an
effective Internal Affairs Division as well as an effective
Inspector General's Office.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK/SOFA
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10. (S/NF) In a July 19 meeting with POL-MIL Minister
Counselor, Bolani assured Ambassador Ries that he believes an
agreement is in both Iraq's and America's interest. Bolani,
like most members of the GOI, are keen to ensure that any
agreement not limit Iraqi sovereignty or be seen as doing so.
However, as one of the responsible parties for security in
Iraq, he is not keen to be left "home alone." He is
supportive of an agreement and particularly continues to
welcome USG assistance in the law enforcement arena.

NEIGHBORS PROCESS
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11. (C) Minister Bolani was involved in the Neighbors Process
Ministerial meeting and in talks with his counterparts in
Turkey and Syria. The visit affords an opportunity for a
much wider conversation with him about counter-terrorism
challenges facing Iraq, including, development of border
security, cooperation with Turkey, as well as his estimate of
Syria's willingness to help, and others.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
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12. (S/NF) Jawad Karim al-Bolani is an independent Shi'a
politician. His independence suggests he can work across
ethnic and sectarian lines. Bolani publicly said his
Ministry's priorities include combating sectarianism, rooting
out corruption, and addressing human rights violations. He
also emphasized the need to control Iraq's borders and
strengthen the public's trust in the police.


13. (S/NF) Bolani appears genuine in his attempt to improve
the efficiency and accountability of the MOI. He often
reassigns corrupt or poor performing leaders to positions
with less authority. In November 2007, he said publicly that
the MOI needed to exclude people with sectarian or political
affiliations, and in September 2007 he dismissed 195 MOI
employees allegedly affiliated with the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).
In March 2007, Bolani dismissed 500 police officers in Ad
Diwaniyah province who refused to perform assigned tasks, and
he has suggested that proficient officers be promoted,
offering individual awards to raise morale.


14. (S/NF) The Minister is respected in the government and
the MoI for his independence and his brave decision making
processes. He has also developed a team of senior MoI leaders
who more confident of their own abilities and share his
passion of building Iraqi's police forces into a respected
and effective arm of the Government of Iraq. His subordinate
leaders are committed to manning, training, equipping, and
policing the force. Moreover, the minister effectively gained
$1.7 billion in supplemental funding recently this year from
the GoI, he looks more broadly than just his own ministry,
and is probably the most traveled minister in the government.


15. (S/NF) Bolani was born on 1 November 1960 in Baghdad. His
family hails from the Ad Diwaniyah area. Bolani earned a
B.S. in mechanical engineering from Baghdad's Institute of
Technology in 1984. He was a member of the Ba'th Party and
served in the Iraqi Air Force from 1984 until 1999, when he
reached the rank of colonel. He left the military to become
part owner in a glass and furniture business, where he worked
during 1999-2003. He served as chairman of the Transitional
National Assembly's Water Committee in 2005. He does not
speak English.
CROCKER