PRIVATE BANKING IN IRAQ "DOING WELL"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002311 SIPDIS STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK NEW YORK FOR TOZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2023 TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: PRIVATE BANKING IN IRAQ "DOING WELL" REF: A. BAGHDAD 2090 B. BAGHDAD 2156 C. BAGHDAD 278 Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Private banks are "doing well" in Iraq, according to a leading banker, but many challenges remain. Over the past three years the average capital of private banks has risen from approximately USD 6 million to over USD 40 million. Private banks in Iraq, particularly those that are foreign-owned, must contend with legal and regulatory obstacles and a central bank with severely degraded capacity. It is difficult and risky to move cash between banks, creating serious problems for Iraq's cash-based economy. End summary. ¶2. (C) Fouad Mustafa, chairman of the Iraqi Private Banking Association and president Credit Bank of Iraq, told econoff on July 6 that private banks are growing and "doing well" in Iraq. In the past three years, the average capital of private banks in Iraq has grown from approximately USD 6 million to over USD 40 million. And while the overall environment for private banking had improved in the past five years, many challenges remained, Mustafa said. ¶3. (U) The Credit Bank of Iraq is a privately-owned retail bank that opened in 1998. It currently has 12 branches, 9 of them in Baghdad and the rest in Irbil, Basra, and Hillah. Credit Bank plans to open a branch in Karbala later this year. The National Bank of Kuwait (NBK) owns 75 percent of Credit Bank, the International Finance Corporation has a 10-percent stake, and individual Iraqis own the remaining shares. ¶4. (C) The Credit Bank currently has about USD 500 million on its balance sheet and 10,000 customers. It adds new customers every month. All of its bank branches are connected electronically, allowing customers to deposit or withdraw funds from any branch. This is an innovation in Iraq; state-owned banks such as Rafidain and Rasheed, which hold 90 percent of deposits in the banking system, do not have this capability. The Credit Bank's automated clearing house connection should be online shortly; its real-time gross settlement connection with the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) is "not perfect" and is more "sometime" than "real time" due to technological problems at the CBI. ¶5. (C) The Credit Bank generally pays 10 percent interest on 
savings accounts and charges 18 percent for loans. Most of its loans are either for business expansion or for mortgages. Risk management is a challenge in Iraq; most loans are collateralized with real estate. Relationships played a big role in deciding who qualifies for a loan, Mustafa said. ¶6. (C) Mustafa said the Credit Bank enforced NBK's anti-money laundering (AML) policies on all transactions in Iraq and followed international know-your-customer (KYC) standards. As far as he knew, only the Credit Bank and HSBC-owned Dar As-Salaam bank had such AML policies. (Note: Al-Warka Bank, the largest private bank in Iraq, also enforces AML and KYC according to international best practices. End note.) -------------- Foreign-Owned Banks Face Legal Challenges -------------- ¶7. (C) "The Central Bank of Iraq's personnel are not up to international standards," said Mustafa, who was a CBI employee until 1998. The CBI had faced many challenges, including having its offices destroyed by fire, and its human capital and technological capabilities had been much degraded. CBI staff needed a lot of retraining, Mustafa noted (Ref A). ¶8. (C) Recent regulatory decisions by the CBI on the make-up of the boards of directors of private banks are of concern to foreign-owned private banks like the Credit Bank. The regulation that individual foreign shareholders be restricted to one seat per entity on the board of directors means that NBK could lose control the Credit Bank despite its majority holding. This would also be very problematic for other foreign banks, such as HSBC, which owns 80 percent of Iraq's Dar As-Salaam bank, Mustafa surmised. Other foreign banks would likely not bring their much-needed banking expertise and investment into Iraq until this problem is addressed, he added. (Note: This new CBI regulation is inconsistent with Iraqi investment law. Post is addressing these concerns with the CBI. End note.) ¶9. (C) Another Iraqi law affecting foreign banks is the BAGHDAD 00002311 002 OF 002 requirement that all meetings of boards of directors be conducted in Iraq. This is a challenge, said Mustafa, given Iraq's security situation and lack of adequate support services for such meetings. (Note: The CBI has recently stated that holding a board meeting via video conferencing is acceptable so long as Iraqi members of the board are in Iraq at the time. End note.) ¶10. (C) Laws regulating foreign ownership of property in Iraq also affects banks. An Iraqi Supreme Court decision allowing foreign investors to rent buildings in Iraq was not a practical solution for banks, said Mustafa. "You cannot rent a building and turn it easily into a bank. You need to own the land so you can build a bank with a proper vault and security systems," he noted. -------------- - Turkish, Iranian Banks Are Biggest Competitors -------------- - ¶11. (C) Mustafa said that most large foreign banks were taking a wait-and-see approach to investing in Iraq. Banks that had invested in Iraq two or three years ago had largely been inactive due to security concerns. In addition to the Dar As-Salaam Bank, Mustafa's largest foreign-owned competitors are Turkish-owned Ziraat Bank and Iranian-owned Bank Melli. Mustafa said Bank Melli had both commercial and retail operations and engaged in "sectarian marketing" in appealing to Iraq's Shi'ite community, he said (Ref B). -------------- Too Much Cash, Not Enough Security -------------- ¶12. (C) "Iraq is still a country that runs on cash," said Mustafa, pulling out a one-million Iraqi dinar (USD 840) stash from his briefcase that he keeps with him at all times. Though the Credit Bank supported the initiative of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to use electronic funds transfer at points of sale via mobile phones, Mustafa said, most merchants he dealt with felt most comfortable dealing with physical money. For them, "seeing is believing." ¶13. (C) So much cash presents real logistical problems for banks due to problems that the Central Bank has had receiving and distributing cash through the banking system since its January 28, 2008 fire (Ref C). The "home-made vault" in the building housing Mustafa's office "currently has USD 3.6 million and IQD 15 billion (USD 12.6 million) sitting in it." "This very dangerous situation makes me take Valium and blood pressure pills every day," Mustafa said. ¶14. (C) All banks in Iraq are also forced to rely on only one company to transport cash. This state-owned company with "a couple of 1980's-era armored cars" is inadequate to meet demand for cash movement between banks and the CBI. Mustafa noted that he would be willing to trade cash with other banks directly, but "since there is no Wells-Fargo and strict laws about private security companies, I can do nothing." Insurance coverage for cash losses due to theft during movements by the state-owned company are also woefully inadequate, he said. -------------- Letters of Credit: Unkept Promises -------------- ¶15. (C) Mustafa noted that underwriting letters of credit (L/Cs) for government purchases is a profitable business opportunity for private banks in a country undergoing massive government-funded reconstruction. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) had promised that private banks would be permitted to underwrite 10 percent of all government L/Cs for public sector purchases. However, said Mustafa, private banks in Iraq had actually only managed to get 2 or 3 percent overall. Regulations and laws that restrict public entities from opening accounts in private banks were major barriers that must be addressed through legislation that addresses on private banking. Mustafa added that Minister of Finance Jabr had told him that the MoF "was scared to spend government money through private banks due to concerns about their accountability and trustworthiness. CROCKER