Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD229
2008-01-27 09:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT-WASIT: WASIT SHAYIKHS DISCUSS SAHWA AL IRAQ

Tags:  PGOV IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO2073
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0229 0270924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270924Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5413
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000229 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT-WASIT: WASIT SHAYIKHS DISCUSS SAHWA AL IRAQ

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT-WASIT: WASIT SHAYIKHS DISCUSS SAHWA AL IRAQ

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Wasit reporting cable.


2. (C) On 18 January, ten Shi'a shaykhs from Wasit told PRT
and CDR 214 FB that they intend to establish a branch of
Sahwa al Iraq (SAI) in Wasit Governorate. The group was led
by Shaykh Raheem Bader Abood Al Hatem and included Shaykh
Alwan Abd al Rytha al Bandar al Amara, who claimed to be the
first cousin of Prince Rabi'yah. (Note. Prince Rabi'yah,
directly related to the Jordanian and Saudi royal families,
is the leader of the several million strong Rabi'yah
Confederation -- a mix of Shia and Sunni tribes. End note.)
The shaykhs opened the meeting with a proposal to provide
security for Wasit utilizing a force of 5,000 to 6,000
tribesmen overseen by over 150 shaykhs. Beyond describing
the force as a "second line" behind the ISF, details were
thin on exactly how these tribal forces would combat
nefarious militia and Iranian influence. More of a priority
to the group than an actual plan to coordinate with ISF was
emphasizing their logistical needs, including buildings,
weapons permits, agricultural projects, and two IP bodyguards
for each of the participating shaykhs.


3. (C) When pressed on an SAI political agenda for Wasit,
Shaykh Raheem said he submitted a registration application to
the National Government under the official name of
"Supporters of Wasit." He said the movement had 20,000
supporters but needed funding. Shaykh Raheem said he was in
direct contact with Shaykh Abu Resha and stated three goals
of the movement, (1) Security, (2) Democracy and (3) Justice.
He did not have a platform or political strategy beyond
saying that SAI would "put the right people" in the "right
places." He said that Wasit Governor Abd al Latif Turfa had
refused three requests to meet with him and two of the
shaykhs complained that the head of office for the Wasit
Directorate of Tribal Affairs, LTC Falih Hassan Nasir, had
threatened them with arrest if they did not recover the SAI
application forms distributed to Wasit shaykhs. PRT Team
Leader and CDR 214 FB noted that the USG was watching SAI
with interest and encouraged the shaykhs to concentrate on
political goals and supporting capable, viable leaders
willing to assume leadership positions in the Wasit
government.


4. (C) On 23 January, Poloffs asked Wasit Iraqi Police (IP)
Chief MG Abd Al Haninn about the possibility of the Sahwa
al-Iraq (SAI) expanding into the south. Hanin said that the
Prime Minister,s Office and Ministry of the Interior had
forbidden official support to any awakening movements south
of Baghdad. Hanin said he personally believed that, if
properly organized, the tribes could impact provincial
politics. He then backtracked, saying "I,m supposed to
stand with my tribe, but in truth the national spirit of the
western tribes is stronger than the national spirit in the
south." Hanin explained that tribes currently approaching
the PRT are not true patriots because they immediately ask
for money.


5. (C) Comment. Tribal confidence in providing a robust
tribal security force for the Province apparently does not
translate into confidence that they can provide security for
themselves in their own homes. However, in our judgment,
this lack of capability to deliver on the security aspect of
the SAI movement does not mean that its potential as a
political movement should be ignored. Although there are
significant obstacles, and we assess the odds of political
success on the Provincial level as fair to low, we will
continue to maintain a dialogue with the SAI shaykhs and
encourage their interest in working towards better
integrating the tribes in the political process. We have not
signaled any intention to respond positively to their request
for funding, since Maliki and the national leadership have
clearly laid down a red line regarding tribal awakenings in
the south. End comment.
CROCKER

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