BASRAH SECURITY COMMANDERS: SITUATION IMPROVED,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002243 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018 TAGS: MOPS PTER PGOV MCAP IR IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH SECURITY COMMANDERS: SITUATION IMPROVED, CHALLENGES REMAIN Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate July 16 meetings with Senior Advisor for Southern Affairs Gordon Gray and incoming and outgoing REO Directors, Basrah's Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police leadership proudly noted the security improvements following the March 2008 'Charge of the Knights' operation but warned of dangers ahead, including continuing militia activity and Iranian influence. Both stressed the necessity of securing the Iran-Iraq border and expressed confidence in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to provide security during the upcoming provincial elections. End summary. Security Improved -------------- ¶2. (C) Both officers said the security situation in Basrah had improved significantly since last spring. Iraqi Police Chief Major General Adel Kamal was sharply critical of the previous Iraqi Security Forces leadership in Basrah (Basrah Operations Commander Mohan and Iraqi Police Chief Jalil) for allowing the city to deteriorate into a state of anarchy. "People were using drugs, were not healthy, they were killing and trying to use religion as a cover... people used to be killed in public, women, children, and doctors." He said that since March the police had arrested 598 wanted suspects and seized "hundreds of IEDs and tons of explosives and tons of drugs." Recounting his role in Charge of the Knights, Basrah Operations Commander Lieutenant General Mohammed acknowledged that "first week wasn't on our side" and that Iraqi Security Forces encountered heavy resistance including numerous IED and mortar attacks. However, he said that the situation changed after the first week and proudly noted his own role in leading Iraqi Security Forces into some of Basrah's most dangerous neighborhoods, including the Jaysh al-Mahdi stronghold of Hyaniyyah. Police Infiltration -------------- ¶3. (C) Kamal said previous Iraqi Police recruitment was "not done properly," leading to widespread militia infiltration and forcing him to completely reorganize the police force. He estimated the size of his current force at 23,000, including four emergency response units. Under his leadership, Kamal said "the police now act within the law, and they always respect human rights." He credited the reorganization with changing the public's perception of the Iraqi Police, saying that "there used to be a gap between the police and army, but this has changed. Now we patrol together." Mohammed was less sanguine and said "the police remain infiltrated." He too criticized the previous leadership, claiming that political parties had each been allowed to bring a certain number of members into the police force and that the problem was nationwide: "I talked to my counterpart from Anbar at a conference, and he says Al Qaeda has infiltrated the ranks of his police." Iranian Threat -------------- ¶4. (C) "Iran considers Basrah its bridge into Iraq," said Mohammed, "and until now the Iraqi Army is not capable of combating this threat." The biggest danger, he said, is "we lack a sense of nationalism. Many people in Basrah are working for Iran." He said Iranian-backed cells were gathering information and planning a new round of operations. "The Quds force is very dangerous," warned Mohammed, pointing to the professional nature of its training and equipment and its ability to operate under the cover of various guises, including religious and social movements. Mohammed rejected the possibility of there being any positive aspects to the Iran-Iraq relationship, saying "It will be negative for us and positive for them." Recent Assassination -------------- ¶5. (C) Kamal thanked the REO for its condolences on the June 28 assassination of Iraqi Police intelligence head Jaber Musaed in Baghdad, explaining that the officer was the 13th name on a list of targets that had been circulated by militants. He called the militants' ability to track the officer to the house of his Baghdadi relatives testament to their continued threat. Sighing, he added, "You know us Eastern men are different. We have to see our families regularly. What can we do?" He doubted the suspects would be caught because the assassination occurred in Baghdad. "Al Qaeda, Jaysh al-Mahdi, the militias - in my mind, they are BAGHDAD 00002243 002 OF 002 all the same, and we can show them no mercy," he said. Striking a similar theme, Mohammed said "We are not afraid of death, but there is a list of 40 names circulating that includes myself, and my family could be targeted by a VBIED." He speculated that the militias had infiltrated the "closest levels" of Iraq Security Forces leadership in Basrah. Need to Secure Border -------------- ¶6. (C) On a security front, Kamal said the main challenge was the Iran-Iraqi border: "Historically, our relations with Iran our not positive. The best solution to reduce tensions is to secure the border." Acknowledging that the border is long and difficult, he said "It's our own fault for leaving the border open; we shouldn't keep criticizing Iran and trying to shift the blame." Despite this seeming generosity, Kamal later said the police had dismantled three networks of drug smugglers and pointed to Iran as the source of Iraq's drug problem, saying "Iran is responsible for everything." He also asked the U.S. to increase the frequency of air patrols over areas associated with smuggling. Mohammed likewise emphasized the importance of securing the entire Wasit - Maysan - Basrah border, which he said could be accomplished only with increased intelligence, manpower, and physical barriers. Elections outlook -------------- ¶7. (C) Mohammed said he was "positive" that the IA would remain a neutral force in the elections, and said security responsibility for the 34 voter registration centers was currently divided between the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. He acknowledged the possibility of elections-related unrest, saying "our culture still condones assassinations and violence." Kamal echoed his comments, saying that the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army were in close coordination with Iraqi High Electoral Commission and were already planning on how to secure Basrah's 386 polling centers during the actual elections. Need for development -------------- ¶8. (C) According to Kamal, the main challenge facing Basrah was now the need for development, specifically service delivery and job creation. "I told the governor and the Provincial Council Chair directly, we need services and jobs" he added. "Go into town, and you see young people without jobs, water, or electricity, being offered 200 dollars to blow up a HUMVEE." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Kamal and Mohammed's comments emphasize the fact that, despite a considerable improvement in security, very real challenges remain. Their shared criticism of their predecessors was striking, as Mohan and especially Jalil were regarded by many observers as dedicated officers cognizant of the militia threat but hamstrung by provincial and central authorities. The officers were candid about the continuing deficiencies of their respective forces and seemed visibly uncomfortable when discussing the possible impact of a reduction in Coalition troop levels in Basrah. In the words of Mohammed, "we need more troops, not less." End comment. CROCKER