BASRAH'S RELIGIOUS MINORITY LEADERS HOPE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002242 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018 TAGS: KIRF PGOV IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH'S RELIGIOUS MINORITY LEADERS HOPE FOR BETTER FUTURE Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor for Southern Affairs Gordon Gray and REO incoming and outgoing directors met on July 15 and 16 with Father Emad and Abdel Kareem al-Khazraji, the leaders of Basrah's minority Christian and Sunni communities. Both leaders expressed dismay over the widespread emigration from their communities since 2003 and hope that refugees would eventually return to Basrah. Emad and Khazraji acknowledged that the security situation had improved but said their communities continue to be marginalized as minorities under a political system that centers on patronage politics and party affiliation. Emad explained that without representation on the Provincial Council the Christians were unable to secure government financing and jobs. Both expressed hope for political change and asked for U.S. assistance in building schools, rehabilitating places of worship, and other projects. A scheduled meeting with Mandean leaders did not occur, but REO Basrah will follow up with this outreach effort to religious minorities. End Summary. Overview of the Basrah Archdiocese -------------- ¶2. (C) Father Emad Aziz al-Banna said that he is the representative of Chaldean Patriarch Cardinal Emmanuel Delly in southern Iraq and heads the archdiocese that consists of Maysan, Dhi Qar, Basrah, and Wasit. He said that he currently carries the title of 'monsignor' and that Cardinal Delly had postponed a planned trip to Basrah to invest Emad with the title of Archbishop due to security concerns. Emad estimated the size of the Christian population in Basrah as around 500 families, broken down as follows: 246 Chaldean families; 30 Assyrian Orthodox; 112 Assyrian Catholic; 100 Armenian Orthodox; 25 Ashurians; 34 Roman Catholic; and 15 Protestant. In Maysan, the Christian population consists of 14 Chaldean and 10 Roman Catholic families. Asked about the situation in Maysan, Emad said the Christian community had not been targeted even before the government operation and said he had traveled to Maysan recently to celebrate Mass. Overview of the Sunni Endowment -------------- ¶3. (C) Khazraji explained that the Sunni Endowment traditionally had an administrative role, including running the 160 Sunni mosques in Basrah as well as Sunni mosques in Dhi Qar and Maysan. The endowment also owns several orchards and farms, the profits of which are sent to the central endowment in Baghdad for distribution nationwide. Financially, the endowment is supported by the central government budget. However, Khazraji explained that circumstances since 2003, including the burnings of mosques and assassinations of local Sunnis, had compelled the Endowment to expand its role and establish relationships with the U.S., UK, and provincial government to advocate on behalf of the Sunni community. Christian and Sunni Emigration -------------- ¶4. (C) Khazraji bemoaned the large-scale emigration of Basrah's Sunni population, estimating that only 200,000 residents of the 700,000 - 800,000 strong population that existed prior to 2003. He said that some Sunnis were returning due to following the improved security situation but that most families were waiting for the outcome of provincial elections. Emad repeatedly expressed concern over the plight of Christian refugees who had fled Basrah to the north or neighboring countries. He estimated that 650 families had left Basrah since 2003. The improving security situation has halted the emigration, and Emad expressed hope that the Christians would decide to return to Basrah. Trouble with Provincial, Central Government -------------- ¶5. (C) Although Emad initially characterized the relationship between the Christian community and Basrah's power brokers as "excellent," he went on to catalogue a list of complaints and abuses. He claimed the Provincial Council was composed of "extremists and Iranians" and complained that Christians suffered from "marginalization, not discrimination." He explained that without representation on the Provincial Council the Christians were unable to secure government financing and jobs. ¶6. (C) Although he acknowledged that the 'Charge of the Knights' operation had improved the security situation and stabilized the city, Khazraji criticized the provincial and central government for failing to protect the Sunni community. He said provincial officials initially resisted BAGHDAD 00002242 002 OF 002 Charge of the Knights and insisted in dismissing previous Basrah Operations Commander Mohan and Iraqi Police Chief Jalil: "Mohan and Jalil opened a new chapter in our history by pursuing the terrorists...but the provincial government forced them from their positions." Khazraji conceded that current Iraqi Security Forces officials are "good, but they are not Jalil and Mohan." He said that party affiliation still played a central role in the appointment of government officials, and said of the new Basrah University president, "he is qualified, but he was picked because he was Da'wa." Khazraji also accused the central government of actively blocking an investigation into the murders of several Sunni residents. Need for Political Change -------------- ¶7. (C) Emad expressed hope that "technocrats and scientists" would come to power in the provincial elections. Asked if the Christians were running in the upcoming elections, Emad said "we need 40,000 votes to gain a seat, and our community is only 2,000 or 2,500 people. A quota system would be better." However, he revealed that the Chaldean Council in Kurdistan had made a deal with the ISCI secretary general to place a Christian candidate, agricultural engineer Salah Yousif, on the ISCI list. Meanwhile, Khazraji described the current political climate as "a cold war." He added that widespread discontent had led to the collapse of local political coalitions and called such change "good." "The people need skilled figures to be elected - not militias. Right now 100 percent of PC funds go into their pockets, so if we elect people that take only 50 percent, even that would be an improvement," said Khazraji. He deplored the influence of Iran on the elections, saying "even the traffic lights in the street are from Iran." Describing Iran's ties to ISCI, he said that participants on a recent pilgrimage organized under ISCI's auspices received snacking nuts and robes bearing 'Made in Iran' labels. Request for U.S. Assistance -------------- ¶8. (C) Khazraji asked for U.S. assistance for several projects, including securing job opportunities for Sunnis, building a hospital and school, and renovating four to five Sunni mosques. Khazraji said he had asked the Provincial Council Chair for assistance with the mosques but had been told that "the endowment should be responsible for such things." He explained that the endowment's budget limited spending on mosques to 50,000 USD annually, far short of the 300,000 USD needed to complete the repairs. Emad likewise requested U.S. support for several specific projects, including an interfaith kindergarten, a textile factory that would employ women, and a children's theater. He said that monthly rents in Basrah averaged 300 USD and outlined a plan to build subsidized apartments on church property as a means to entice Christian families into staying in Basrah. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Although their respective communities differ markedly in national size and influence, Emad and Khazraji offered nearly identical narratives of past persecution and hopes for a better future. Many Basrawis insist that their regional identity supersedes any sectarian tensions, and in fact outright attacks against the Sunni and Christian communities seem to have ceased following the reassertion of government control. However, in a political system dominated by patronage politics the groups will likely continue to struggle to gain adequate government support, and in the long-term unemployment and marginalization may prove equal to ethnic violence in driving religious minorities out of the province. End comment. CROCKER