DAWA TANZIM LEADER ON BASRAH AND FEDERALISM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002233

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: DAWA TANZIM LEADER ON BASRAH AND FEDERALISM,
ELECTIONS LAW, INA/NDF/FADHILA COALITION, SFA/SOFA

Classified By: Pol Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Dawa Tanzim COR members
Dr. Abdulhadi al-Hassani and Qassim al-Sahlani July 16 at
the Dawa Tanzim party's COR office, Hassani spoke about his
recent trip to Basrah, expressing dismay at the lack of
reconstruction in Iraq's second city while intimating that
Basrah may be better off within a federal region. Regarding
the delay in passing the Elections Law, both Hassani and
Sahlani argued that postponing the provincial elections in
Kirkuk was not a viable option, and the Kurds would need to
compromise on the issue of Kirkuk. In their estimation, the
32/32/32/4 option, though not perfect, was the best solution
at the present time. (Comment: Kurdish and Arab bloc leaders
are negotiating language to allow a delay in Kirkuk
elections. A vote is expected on July 21. End Comment.)
The two
men were extremely dismissive of the newly-formed
INA/NDF/Fadhilah bloc, rumored to also include the Sadrists
and former
PM Ibrahim Jaafari's Reform Trend. Openly skeptical about how
long the different parties' leaders and parties would be
able to coexist, the two also questioned whether the bloc
sought to be a legitimate opposition bloc or merely an
obstructionist entity. Weighing in on the SFA/SOFA, the two
stated that though most pragmatic Iraqis recognized the need
for a comprehensive security agreement with the United
States, the Iraqi public would not tolerate any agreement
seen as
imposed upon them by the United States. End Summary.


2. (C) In a meeting held July 16, Dawa Tanzim representative
Dr. Abdulhadi al-Hassani discussed his recent trip to
Basrah, stating that though the security situation in Basrah
had improved, he was dismayed with the overall lack of
reconstruction and development in Iraq's second city.
Hassani, a native Basrawi, recounted that when Shaikh Zayed
embarked on Abu Dhabi's ambitious development plan in the
1960s, he used to counsel patience among his skeptical
citizens,
assuring them "that one day Abu Dhabi would be like Basrah."
Shaking his head in disappointment, Hassani stressed that
the GOI could do more to promote investment and economic
development in Basrah, and suggested that the current
government
is too focused on Baghdad. Though acknowledging that he
supports a strong central government, he indicated that
Basrah's
future may be better served within a federal region that
could also include Thi Qar and Maysan provinces.


3. (C) Turning to the Elections Law, Hassani said that most
Iraqis want the provincial elections to take place as soon
as possible, and asserted that the Kurds would need to
compromise on the issue of Kirkuk. Joining the meeting late,
party
leader Qassim al-Sahlani concurred with Hassani, and both men
stressed that the 32/32/32/4 option, though not perfect, is
the best solution for now. They also said that postponing the
elections in Kirkuk is not a viable option, alleging that
the Kurds have already moved hundreds of thousands of Kurds
to the province since 2003, and would probably use any delay
to continue their attempts to change the facts on the ground.


4. (C) Commenting on the newly-formed INA/NDF/Fadhilah
coalition, which may also include former PM Jaafari's Reform
Trend
and the Sadrists, both men questioned how long the disparate
actors within the coalition would be able to work together,
with Hassani stating that "they may be united in their voting
now, but they are not (united) as a group." Sahlani added
that it was unclear whether this group has been formed as a
legitmate opposition party, or merely as an obstructionist,
anti-Maliki bloc. Dismissing Allawi and Jaafari, both men
claimed that they no longer enjoyed the popular support they
once had, and Hassani sarcastically opined that if they were
really serious about leading Iraq, they might consider
spending more time in the country. As for the Sadrists,
Hassani said that during the violent periods of 2005-2006,
the
Sadrists filled the political and security vacuum, but added
that "Iraq has moved on, while the Sadrists have not."


5. (C) Before concluding the meeting, both men commented on
the SFA/SOFA, arguing that though most pragmatic Iraqis
realize the need for an agreement, ignorance, mistrust, and
misinformation have negatively shaped the public,s attitude
toward the SFA/SOFA. They also cautioned that any eventual
agreement will need to be seen by the Iraqi public as an
agreement concluded between friendly nations, not a diktat
imposed by the United States upon the Iraqi nation.
CROCKER