AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AL-IRAQIYYA LEADER AYAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002228

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH AL-IRAQIYYA LEADER AYAD
ALLAWI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a July 13 lunch hosted by Ambassador
Crocker, al-Iraqiyya bloc leader and former Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi told Ambassador Crocker that he was not against
an SFA/SOFA with the United States in principle, but that he
and other parliamentary bloc leaders wanted more clarity from
the Maliki government on the parameters of such an agreement,
more specifically, the nature of the threats the agreement
was meant to confront. That said, Allawi passed on the
suggestion that he make a statement that he supported in
principle a long-term security agreement between Iraq and the
U.S. Ducking also the question as to whether al-Iraqiyya has
joined the National Salvation Front, a new coalition of blocs
being organized by former PM Ibrahim al-Jaffari, he declared
that Iraqiyya, Hiwaar, Fadhilah, elements of Dawa, and some
Sadrists all share the same goals in the parliament, that of
ensuring that a long-term arrangement with the U.S. will
prevent Iran from developing undue influence in Iraq.
Outside of the parliament, he said, al-Iraqiyya was forming
cooperative relations with groups that included the Sahwa,
some unions, associations, and even members of the Tawafuq
bloc to contest the upcoming provincial elections. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador was joined by S/I David Satterfield, NSC
Senior Director Brett McGurk, and PolCouns Matt Tueller.
Ayad Allawi was accompanied by his cousin, former Minister of
Communications Mohammed Allawi.

In Principle We Are Not Against...
--------------


3. (C) In a July 13 lunch that he hosted, Ambassador Crocker
asked Iraqiyya bloc leader and former Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi whether al-Iraqiyya has joined the National Salvation
Front, a coalition of parliamentary groups being organized by
former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaffari to oppose the Maliki
government. Allawi responded that Iraqiyya was engaged in
doing two things simultaneously: it was forming a
coordinating group of like-minded parties within the
parliament to ensure the unity of Iraq and it was forming
partnerships outside of parliament to contest the upcoming
provincial elections. In Parliament, Allawi said, Fadhilah,
Hiwaar and some Sadrists all share the same views with
al-Iraqiyya on how to keep the country unified, but that it
was "nothing called 'jabha' or 'Salvation Front' -- nothing
of that nature." As to al-Iraqiyya's alliances outside of
the Parliament, Allawi said that his party was looking to
develop partnerships to contest the provincial elections.
Those possible partnerships would include: the Sahwa, unions,
social associations, professors, and some members of the
Tawafuq coalition -- a pan Arab group.


4. (C) Clarifying his position on SFA/SOFA, Allawi said that
Iraq has been mismanaged. He said that to ensure the unity
of the country, it was important to identify the threat to
that unity, which was definitely Iran and pro-Iranian forces
in Iraq. Thus he personally saw the purpose of such an
agreement as a means of preventing Iran from taking over.
Yet, he said, the Maliki government has failed to clarify the
nature of the threat for which such an agreement is
necessary. The Foreign Minister's briefing to Parliament had
been no more than coffee shop generalities. What is wanted,
he said, are the details of the agreement, which the
government should provide at least to bloc leaders if not to
the entire parliament. Allawi said he did not think in
principle that people would oppose the agreements, only that
they needed to know why such agreements are needed.


5. (C) Ambassador Crocker and NSC Senior Director McGurk
noted that Allawi professed to support the agreement in
principle, his reservations having to do with the
government's failure to clarify the details of the
agreements. Yet the media has been reporting that Allawi is
against the agreement. For that very reason, it would be
helpful if Allawi were to say that he supported the agreement
in principle or at least that the agreement was a good thing
for Iraq and that he hoped it would be a success. Allawi
ducked the suggestion. He said that his words had been "In
principle we are not against" the agreement because such
agreements were normal occurrences in bilateral relations.
That said, he could not say he supported it because he did
not know the details, that he has heard only contradictory
statements from the government: first that there needs to be
a timeline for withdrawal, then that the agreements are being
considered. The government needs to provide clarity, he said.



6. (C) PolCouns Tueller reminded Allawi that the Sadrists do
say explicitly that they are against the agreement and that
Allawi is being grouped with those that are against an

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agreement with the U.S. Allawi, trying to deflect the
assertion, said that Ibrahim Jaffari, Fadhilah, Hiwaar and
the Sadrists had all wanted to hold a press conference in his
home to announce the formation of a coalition, but that he
had refused because he wanted to hear first from the
government. Allawi continued that he trusted neither the
Dawa party nor the Sadrists, though a few were reasonable,
and that he did not like the JAM at all.


7. (C) Allawi said that Iraq needed the presence of the U.S.
armed forces. CNN had reported that only 10 percent of the
Iraqi armed forces were ready. Ambassador said that the
mathematical formula by which we evaluate operational
readiness, good as it is, may not be the best indicator of
the Iraqi situation. A better measurement of the readiness
of the Iraqi forces would be whether Iraqi battalions are in
the lead in their area of operations. Of the 153 battalions,
114 of them (75 percent) are in the lead. Allawi said that
the government should be providing clarifications such as the
one provided by the Ambassador and it has failed to do so.
Nevertheless, Iraq needed the presence of the U.S. armed
forces, because the Iraqi forces are not yet ready. Allawi
continued that even if we cannot set dates but must set
goals, as the U.S. builds Iraq's capability, it can draw
down forces. Ambassador Crocker said that we all agree that
even with the departure of the surge forces there is still a
role for the U.S. to play in Iraq. But if U.S. forces are to
remain beyond December 31, there must be a legal basis -- we
cannot do it on a handshake. Ambassador said that politics
are at play on both sides in this election year, but
political debates should not get in the way of long-term
security interests and we hope that those in Iraq who seek
common interests take that into account.

Provincial Elections, Regional Progress, Lebanon
-------------- ---


7. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that Allawi had cited a
united Iraq as being the basis for his participation in a new
parliamentary coalition and yet the Fadhilah bloc wants Basra
to be a separate region. Allawi said that he had been
approached by Basra Governor Mohammed al-Waili two days ago
about the issue. Allawi said that the al-Iraqiyya position
was that it is too early for that because the country is
still too open to Iranian interference. Once Iraq is
unified, Allawi said, separate regions can be discussed.


8. (C) In response to Ambassador Crocker and S/I
Satterfield's invitation to discuss al-Iraqiyya's plans for
the provincial elections, Allawi said that he would be
approaching the United Nations in New York and Amr Moussa of
the Arab League for their involvement. He said he did not
think there was fairness in the government's handling of
elections and that 120 legislators had just signed a paper
calling for fair elections. On al-Iraqiyya strategy, he said
that his bloc would try to form local partnership in each
province. Basra, Kirkuk, Anbar and Maysan, he said, were the
most important governorates for al-Iraqiyya and it was in
those areas where there had to be fair elections. Mosul,
Kirkuk and Diyala have unique structures and Iran would try
its best to influence those elections. The elections in
Basra would be more important than those in Baghdad, he said.
Allawi said he did not know what the Sadrists planned to do.
S/I Satterfield said that although there will be no list,
voters will know who the Sadrist candidates are. Tueller
added that some Sadrists will run as independents. Allawi
said that there are some good Sadrists, such as Shaykh Salah
al-Obeidi, who are interested in talking to the U.S.
Ambassador Crocker noted the irony of a movement that began
with the purpose of asserting Iraqi Arab identity is being
led by someone living in Iran and that it is involved in
sectarian violence.


9. (C) S/I Satterfield noted that we are pleased with Iraq's
progress in developing its relations with countries in the
region and invited Allawi's views on the subject. Allawi
said the recent visit of the Turkish Prime Minister and the
posting of ambassadors from Jordan, the UAE and Bahrain were
important and that the GOI should capitalize on the
opportunity and reciprocate to show Arabs that it is working
not only with Iran. But, Allawi said, the GOI's successes
are based not what it has done, but what the U.S. has done.
Arab countries are beginning to believe that Iraq is moving
away from Iran.


10. (C) On Lebanon, Allawi said he had hopes for the new
Sleiman government. He said he had been invited to attend
the wedding of Nabih Berri's daughter and had taken the
opportunity to hold meetings with Fouad Siniora and Michel
Sleiman. He said he also had a good meeting with the Amal
members of the Lebanese Parliament. The discussions were on
Iran's influence on Lebanon and Iraq. His Lebanese

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interlocutors believed that this chapter of Lebanese politics
was won by the Syrians and the Iranians and that Hizbollah
was gaining confidence by the day. Allawi said that Nabih
Berri was "a good guy," who Allawi had encouraged to open up
to and to trust Saad Hariri. Iran is not about to let go in
Lebanon. It wants more and unless there is a coherent Arab
strategy, it will be difficult to confront Iranian ambitions,
Allawi concluded.
CROCKER