AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH COUNCIL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002211

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH COUNCIL OF
REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKER MASHADANI, JULY 14, 2008

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) Mashadani confirmed he intends to bring the
provincial elections law to an item-by-item vote on July 15.
He expects passage if he gets a quorum. Mashadani was gloomy
about Sunni parties' prospects in the elections, as they lack
money compared with Shia parties that are, he said, fueled by
patronage and Iranian money. For the continuing delays in
Tawafuq's return to government, Mashadani blamed bloc leaders
who failed to consult with their own members. He was
likewise downbeat about the prospects for passing a bilateral
security agreement this year. The often dramatic Mashadani,
who described himself as "boiling with rage" and providing
the "true message of the Sunni people," spent much of the
90-minute meeting complaining about Sunni parties' lack of
financing, the "imbalance" in governing structures and the
United States' failure to recognize the Sunnis as its true
allies in Iraq. End Summary.

Elections law: pressing for a vote
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2. (C) On July 14, Ambassador met with Council of
Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani in the
latter's residence. The Ambassador was accompanied by NSC
Senior Director Brett McGurk. Opening with the provincial
elections law, Mashadani confirmed that a five-hour
negotiating session on July 13 had failed to resolve the
Kirkuk issue, and that he would therefore bring the law to an
item-by-item vote on Tuesday, July 15, provided he can muster
a quorum. Implying that the Kurds might boycott the session,
Mashadani claimed the ability to find a quorum without them.
Ramming the law through without the Kurds, however, would not
be desirable, he said.


3. (C) Mashadani outlined four options for dealing with the
Kirkuk issue. First, just go ahead with the elections ("not
recommended," he remarked); second, delay elections in Kirkuk
without conditions ("we can't do this"); third, divide Kirkuk
into four electoral districts (also "not recommended");
finally, postpone elections in Kirkuk "within some framework
of controls." This was the option Mashadani favored and
thought would be adopted.


4. (C) As for the elements of the "framework of controls,"
Mashadani listed a determination by a special commission of
who is a Kirkuk resident, and a census of Kirkuk (as in the
past, Mashadani predicted this could be done in three or four
months). He also listed the 32-32-32-4 apportioning of seats
favored by Arabs and Turcomen. Asked whether all sides
accepted this "framework," Mashadani claimed "a certain
degree of acceptance by all sides," but acknowledged there
was not full agreement. He claimed, though, that the plan
"gives dignity to each side." Observing that Arabs are
afraid the Kurds want Kirkuk, he speculated that the city
might be joined to Sulaimaniya (NFI).


5. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of adopting
an elections law before the CoR recesses for the summer in
August. Referring to the (originally Turkish) 32-32-32-4
formula, the Ambassador said that the U.S. had been talking
to the Turks, asking them to urge more flexibility on the
Turcomen. Mashadani agreed on the need to have a law before
the break, saying he "wouldn't accept" failure.

But what then?
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6. (C) Mashadani then turned to his fears about the outcome
of the provincial elections themselves, a theme he returned
to repeatedly, and with some warmth, throughout the meeting.
He argued that Sunni parties were at a disadvantage compared
with Shia parties, which enjoyed both patronage flowing from
the ministries they controlled and financing from Iran.
Without explicitly asking for U.S. financing, Mashadani urged
the U.S. to "right the balance" by supporting its "true
allies," the ones who (through Awakening Councils) had
defeated Al Qaeda alongside the U.S.


7. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that foreign financing of
election campaigns was forbidden in Iraq. Mashadani agreed,
but claimed that the Iranians find other means to get money
to Shia parties. Concerning the control of ministries, the
Ambassador pointed out that it was the Sunnis (Tawafuq) who
had removed themselves from government. He insisted on the
importance of elections to Iraq's political development and
to the Sunnis themselves.

Tawafuq leaders ignoring back-benchers

BAGHDAD 00002211 002 OF 002


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8. (C) The mention of Tawafuq led to a discussion of the
continuing delays in its return to government. Mashadani
blamed bloc leaders who, he said, had negotiated the return
with PM Maliki, but had not consulted with their own members.
As a result, he said, Tawafuq was divided within itself
about the proposed slate of ministers. Mashadani predicted a
large exodus of Tawafuq members. The Ambassador remarked
that a return to government was in Tawafuq's own interest,
particularly in this pre-electoral period. Mashadani agreed,
saying that a solution must be found in the next few days.

Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
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9. (C) Mashadani deplored Sunni opposition to an SFA,
claiming he told his colleagues that they should be grateful
for the American presence, without which "they would be
nobody." "Would you give Baghdad to the Persians?" by
throwing the Americans out, he had asked them. Mashadani
blamed propaganda and remarks by the government (especially
"pro-Iranian" national security advisor Mowaffak Al-Rubaie)
for the fact that "95 percent of the street and 95 percent of
the news-sites" oppose an agreement with the U.S.


10. (C) The Ambassador said that he had spoken to PM Maliki
and to other members of the Executive Council. They hoped
for an agreement on tactics to increase support for an SFA.
Mashadani retorted "they are not capable of passing this
agreement." It would be impossible to pass an SFA this year,
he continued, "except on one condition." Mashadani thought
that an agreement among some elements of Tawafuq (like
himself),Saleh al-Mutlaq, Ayad Allawi and Fadhila might do
the trick, if such an accord could be reached. All these
groups and people, Mashadani argued, fear the departure of
U.S. forces because that would amount to "a coup d'etat for
Dawa and Iran."

Regional matters
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11. (C) Mashadani pointed to Iran's diplomatic presence in
Baghdad, and to the paucity of Arab embassies. He blamed
Arabs' fear of the Iranians for their reluctance to open
embassies in Baghdad. He urged the U.S. to press the Saudis
to open an Embassy. The Ambassador agreed on the necessity
of a greater Arab presence in Iraq, and said the Iranian
presence was not an excuse for the Arabs not to come.

Remarks to press
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12. (SBU) After the meeting, Mashadani addressed a small
number of journalists waiting in his home. For some reason,
he emphasized encouraging foreign investment (which had not
been discussed) in his account of the meeting just ended. In
his own remarks, Ambassador Crocker stressed the
opportunities opened for Iraqis by recent improvements in
security, as well as the importance of the upcoming elections.
CROCKER