AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SUNNI WAQF CHIEF AHMED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002202 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SUNNI WAQF CHIEF AHMED ABDEL GHAFFUR AL-SAMARAIE Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In their first formal meeting, Sunni Waqf Chief Ahmed Abdel Ghaffur al-Samaraie detailed for the Ambassador a number of reconciliation projects he is directing to bring Sunni political voices back into the Iraqi political process. He said he has worked to strengthen the Sahwa groups and urged Embassy pressure on the GOI to hire Sons of Iraq (SOI) into the Iraqi police; he has organized conferences of Sunni and Shia clerics and tribal leaders; and he has maintained close relations with religious and political leaders in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Moreover, he has used his pulpit and the media resources attached to it to warn Iraqis away from Iranian political positions, from religious extremists such as Hareth al-Dhari and from terrorists such as the Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Samaraie said he supports a Strategic Framework Agreement and a SOFA, without which he fears Iran "would swallow us." Ambassador Crocker thanked al-Samaraie for his courageous efforts to bridge sectarian divides and noted that much of the progress in achieving political stability and a stronger economy was due to his work. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador was joined by Poloff Chris Hegadorn, FSEC Justin Siberell, Special Assistant Ali Khedery and Poloff (notetaker). Al-Samaraie was accompanied by his son Ammar and his personal secretary, Ahmad Makki. Reconciliation, Sahwa, SOFA, the Iranians -------------- ¶3. (C) In a July 9 meeting with Ambassador Crocker, Sunni Waqf Chief Ahmed Abdel Ghaffur al-Samaraie began by noting that he had just hosted a delegation of 80 Shia religious leaders from Karbala and that, in turn, he expected to be invited to Karbala later this summer. Al-Samaraie said he supports the kind of "non-sectarian religion" that puts all Iraqis under one tent. Turning to politics, al-Samaraie said that his work aims to pull all political blocs -- Sunni or Shia -- away from Iran. Even Shia colleagues, he said, had complained to him about Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. Al-Samaraie has worked to encourage greater Sunni participation, including through the Anbar-focused Sahwa movement. Al-Samaraie viewed the Sons of Iraq program as "good for Iraq" and contributing measurably to the country's stability. Thus it was incumbent upon the GOI to provide continued budgetary support for the SOI program -- acceptance of the SOIs into Iraqi security forces would be an important symbol of reconciliation. ¶4. (C) Al-Samaraie said he and Prime Minister Maliki had met four months ago at a public gathering and had appeared together on a live television broadcast. In those remarks al-Samaraie said he had told Maliki that he was carrying a message from the Sons of Iraq and it was that "they want to be part of you" and that he had told Maliki that the government needed to bring the Sons of Iraq into the security forces and the police. Following his speech, the Prime Minister had told al-Samaraie that he agreed on the idea of integrating the Sons of Iraq into the ISF. Subsequently, al-Samaraie said, he had spoken to the Minister of Interior, who said also that he agreed to the idea and would cooperate to bring about that result. Al-Samaraie said, however, that the government is dragging its feet in integrating the largely Sunni SOI into the Iraqi police while providing strong support to similar groups raised from among Shia groups in Southern Iraq. Al-Samaraie said that he recognized that finding jobs takes time, but he wanted to urge the GOI to do so, because bringing the Sahwa into the government helps destroy the extremists. ¶5. (C) Turning to the Strategic Framework Agreement (SF) and the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) being discussed now, al-Samaraie said that the Iranians had taken out some portions of the draft and had criticized selected portions of what remained. He said the U.S. needed to improve its media effort to correct the Iranian misinformation. He said that the Iraqi media also needed revitalization to show to the Iraqi people the danger of the Iranian presence, especially what it is doing in the South. On the U.S. - Iraqi relations, al-Samaraie said that without the SOFA agreement, Iranians "would swallow us." Religious Extremism, Al Qaeda, Media -------------- ¶6. (C) Al-Samaraie expressed strongly negative opinions towards religious parties. Al-Samaraie said that the biggest mistake made in Iraq was to allow religious parties to take over the government. That decision led to the rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). When Al Qaeda appeared, he said, Iraqi religious leaders did not speak out against them, but rather BAGHDAD 00002202 002 OF 003 clapped as AQI leaders spoke of "struggle." As a result, many religious leader saw their sons become involved in the movement. He said that when asked why they had become involved in Al Qaeda, an involvement that resulted in so much pain for Iraq, the young men had said it had been because their fathers had not warned them against Al Qaeda. Thus, al-Samaraie continued, religious leaders must act responsibly. Al-Samaraie added that he does not tolerate any sympathy for Al Qaeda among his preachers and he has spoken both inside and outside of Iraq against Al Qaeda. Once, in Turkey, he received a phone call from NSA Mouaffaq asking whether he need protection and the promise to provide it if necessary. (Note: Last year al-Samaraie was instrumental in ousting Hareth al-Dhari's anti-U.S. and politically negative "Association of Muslim Scholars" from Iraq and reasserting the traditional role of the Waqf in Iraq. End Note.) ¶7. (C) Al-Samaraie discussed the importance of media -- which he both loved and needed -- in his various efforts at reconciliation, support for the Sahwa and anti-Al Qaeda work. He said he had a media office and research center that produced anti-Al Qaeda materials that he distributed through his preachers and mosques. But by the same token that the al Hurriya and al Arabiya television networks were potentially positive tools, the Egypt-based television channel Al-Rafadain was poisonous. Al-Samaraie said he wanted the assistance of the U.S. to convince Egyptian President Mubarak to shut it down. ¶8. (C) Al-Samaraie said that his more than seven thousand preachers and mosques have created strong lines of communications with tribal leaders. Recently, five hundred such tribal leaders -- both Sunni and Shia -- had visited him to ask for election advice. Al-Samaraie said that he supports Ahmed Abu Reisha, though his influence was limited to Anbar. He said he also supported Jamal Karabouli of the Iraqi Red Crescent. Al-Samaraie commented that Iraq's experience with religious parties have almost made him wish the U.S. had imposed on Iraq a technocratic government rather then a democracy. Nevertheless, Al-Samaraie continued, he wanted to find ways to cooperate with the U.S. and asked what the issues were for which the U.S. needed support. Elections -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Crocker said that al-Samaraie's reputation had preceded him and that he had seen al-Samaraie on television. He thanked al-Samaraie for his contributions to the reconciliation effort and for helping bring stability back to Iraq. Progress has been made since last year and much of it has been due to al-Samaraie's efforts. Ambassador said that we support the Sahwa. But, at the same time, the U.S. must have a relationship in the long-term with the GOI and for that, we need to engage all parties. On jobs for the Sons of Iraq, Ambassador Crocker said that Maliki agrees that the Sons of Iraq play an important role in ensuring Iraqi security and stability, but that the government cannot absorb all Sahwa into the security forces. There must be some jobs for others. However, Maliki is looking into the possibility of integrating the Sons of Iraq into other sectors. On the SFA/SOFA, Ambassador Crocker said that an agreement has not yet been reached, but we will get there. We do not seek a long-term military presence in Iraq; moreover we have seen the effects of the upgrading of Iraqi forces in Basrah, Maysan and Mosul. As for Iranian attacks on the SOFA, they seem to actually help us as people do not believe Iran. Ambassador Crocker said that there is no doubt that al-Samaraie's continuing position against Al Qaeda has helped change the atmosphere against Sunnis inside and outside Iraq. ¶10. (C) Ambassador said that certain parties did not participate in the 2005 elections, but will have their opportunity to participate in the forthcoming provincial elections. Elections are important in Iraq and Coalition Forces and the UN are playing a role not to interfere in elections (as Iranians do). We want to guarantee that elections are fair and open. Ambassador Crocker noted that neighboring states like Kuwait can play a positive role. The UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, and Turkey are also important neighbors with which Iraq needs to develop relations because they also do not want to see a strong Iranian presence in Iraq. There seems to have been some progress on this of late. ¶11. (C) Al-Samaraie said he had recently spoken to Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Naif to tell him he should send an ambassador to Baghdad. Prince Naif had said that only security concerns were holding up such an appointment. Al-Samaraie said he believes the Arab states understand Iraq's situation. He said he would have loved to have been a part of PM Maliki's delegation to the UAE, but the GOI included only Shia in the delegation; he should have included BAGHDAD 00002202 003 OF 003 Sunnis as well because Sunnis have good relations with Arab states. Al-Samaraie said that he had warned Prince Naif that receiving Hareth al-Dhari would help the Iranians and be counterproductive. He believed Naif had listened. CROCKER