TALABANI ON SOFA, IRAQI FOREIGN RELATIONS, KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002153 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ SUBJECT: TALABANI ON SOFA, IRAQI FOREIGN RELATIONS, KEY LEGISLATION Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met on July 7 with President Jalal Talabani and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih. Talabani called for a specific USG-GOI plan for countering Iranian opposition to the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),but praised recent statements by diverse Iraqi leaders in support of the pacts. The President summarized his recent trip to the U.S. and Greece. On the hydrocarbon and election laws, Talabani acknowledged U.S. frustration with seemingly hardline recent Kurdish positions, but claimed the Kurds will compromise on both as negotiations continue. Finally, Talabani and Salih suggested isolating National Council for Dialogue (NCD) leader Khalaf Ulayan due to Ulayan,s obstruction of negotiations for Tawafuq's return. End summary. SFA/SOFA: Iran Hostile But Iraqis Will Come Around -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Talabani suggested the U.S. and GOI work out a specific plan for overcoming opposition to the SFA and SOFA -- driven largely by Iranian pressure -- in the Political Council for National Security (PCNS) and Council of Representatives (COR). Salih assessed that many in the GOI wonder why they would risk provoking Tehran for a document they fear will not outlive the current U.S. administration, and Talabani added that many Iraqi politicians merely are parroting Tehran's position on the agreements. Talabani wondered what had changed since Qods Force commander Qasim Soleimani told him in late March that Tehran did not object to the SOFA, and said he had asked ISCI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (who he said is in Iran right now) to investigate this seeming contradiction. He commented also that Tehran increasingly fears a Democratic U.S. president because of pro-Israel statements by the Democratic candidate. ¶3. (C) Talabani praised statements in support of the SOFA by Defense Minister Mufriji, Interior Minister Bulani, and even Tawafuq head Adnan Dulaymi, and added that Ayatollah Sistani is playing a helpful role by condemning Iranian interference in what should be an Iraqi matter. The Ambassador added praise for Talabani's own statement of support, arguing that most Iraqis are irritated at Iranian involvement in the SFA/SOFA issue. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed the necessity of Iraqi decisions on an agreed negotiating approach. We were close to finalizing a Strategic Framework. We should conclude that and then concentrate on a short bridging protocol to provide our forces with the necessary authorities and immunities after December 31 until a SOFA could be concluded. The Ambassador urged Talabani to convene the Executive Council to assist PM Maliki in coming to a decision. Talabani said he agreed with our approach, would convene the Presidency Council first and then the executive Council. Talabani's Personal Diplomacy in Mideast, Europe -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Talabani enumerated his recent diplomatic maneuvers to bring world leaders to Iraq. He invited leaders from Greece, Hungary, and Pakistan to Iraq at last week's Socialist International Conference in Athens, in both his and Prime Minister Maliki's name, and said UAE Foreign Minister Abdallah bin Zayid on his recent visit to Baghdad invited Talabani, Maliki, and COR Speaker Mashhadani to Abu Dhabi. Talabani also expressed high hopes for the planned visits of Jordanian King Abdallah and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, stressing the value in particular of strengthening ties to Jordan and publicizing the recent bilateral oil agreement. Kurds Will Compromise on Kirkuk Election, Hydrocarbons -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador pressed Talabani for a moderate Kurdish stance on the Kirkuk election impasse. Many Kurdish leaders, the Ambassador noted, insist on delaying the provincial election pending difficult preconditions like the total implementation of Article 140; Talabani laughed and said the USG should not listen to such voices, seemingly indicating they represent a mere negotiating ploy. Barham Salih commended Mashhadani,s efforts to resolve the deadlock, prompting Talabani to observe with amusement that Mashhadani is becoming a wise man. ¶7. (C) Talabani acknowledged that U.S. policymakers are unhappy at the latest Kurdish proposal on the hydrocarbon legislation, but said the USG must make its exact position clearer. The President said he could encourage KRG President Barzani to moderate, and that the U.S. position strongly influences how Barzani views the issue, but that all parties BAGHDAD 00002153 002 OF 002 are looking (so far in vain) to the U.S. to endorse a particular compromise on an oil law. Isolate Ulayan to Bring Tawafuq Back -------------- ¶8. (C) Salih said negotiations for Tawafuq's return had taken a turn for the worse the night before -- Khalaf Ulayan demanded the Ministry of Higher Education for his NCD, which both Prime Minister Maliki and Vice President Hashemi oppose. Talabani welcomed in principle the idea of Ulayan leaving Tawafuq, calling such a departure consistent with his longtime belief in forming a core of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish moderates to isolate extremists like Ulayan. Separately, Talabani praised the nomination as Minister of Justice of Dara Noor al-Din, a Kurd, and said both Maliki and Hashemi think highly of him. CROCKER