VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI ON: THE PROVINCIAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002152 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS IZ SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI ON: THE PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS LAW, SFA/SOFA NEGOTIATIONS REF: BAGHDAD 01987 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a July 8 meeting with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, Ambassador Crocker, joined by NSC Senior Director Brett McGurk and DASD Mark Kimmitt, discussed progress on the Provincial Elections Law and on the Strategic Framework Agreement and accompanying protocol/MOU. On the Provincial Elections Law, Hashimi, just returned from a one-day trip to Kirkuk, reported only that he was in listening mode. Ambassador urged Hashimi to meet with Talabani and Barzani to hammer out a general agreement not only to defer the Kirkuk elections, but to do so without any preconditions, and, preferably, on a timetable. On Iraq's long-term relationship with the U.S., the Ambassador underscored the need to conclude both a Strategic Framework Agreement and a short-term temporary authorization for our combat troops while we look at the long-term arrangement. Asked for his thoughts on timeliness in the SFA/SOFA, Hashimi said that Iraqis are sensitive on the subject of the U.S. presence: they know that the American people are "desperate" to get out; they are not getting much information on negotiations; and they do not want to be misled only to discover that the U.S. troops will stay forever. At the end of the day, he said, Iraqi leaders must give their people something that indicates change will occur. The Ambassador urged Hashimi to support posting of Iraqi ambassadors to Arab capitals as an important step in normalizing Iraq's relations with its neighbors. Hashimi said that the delay in the naming of Tawafuq ministers to the government involved games in which he was uninterested in participating. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador was accompanied at the 50-minute meeting by NSC Senior Director Brett McGurk, and DASD Mark Kimmitt. Hashimi was joined by Political Advisers Khalil al-Azzawi and Saif Abdul Rahman. Provincial Elections Law -------------- ¶3. (S) Vice President Hashimi briefly discussed his July 6 trip to Kirkuk during which he met with leaders of the Kurdish, Turkomen and Arab blocs and during which, he said, he was "trying to be a father to everybody." He said that in Kirkuk, he was mostly in listening mode and could report no progress on agreement on the Provincial Elections Law. The Ambassador suggested that Hashimi meet with Talabani and Barzani to hammer out an agreement. The Ambassador said that given Kirkuk's complexities, what is needed is a general agreement to just defer in Kirkuk. In addition, the parties need to be in agreement not to impose conditions on that deferment. Hashimi asked whether the mention of a period of time was needed; the Ambassador said we favor mention of a special time. As to the Ambassador's suggestion that he meet with Talabani and Barzani to work out an agreement, Hashimi said that he had asked his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Political Committee to develop an item-by-item report on the Tawafuq position, one that he could take to Talabani and Barzani. Hashimi also commented that Talabani was a fairly flexible person. But he stopped short of saying he would actually call the meeting suggested by the Ambassador. Strategic Framework Agreement, Protocol/MOU -------------- ¶4. (S) The Ambassador said that President Talabani has said he intends to raise in the Executive Council the long-term relationship with the United States and the legal basis for the post-2008 U.S. military presence. We need to conclude the Strategic Framework Agreement in the near term and then work on a temporary operating protocol which would provide the legal basis for our military operations after the expiration of UNSCR 1790 on 31 December 2008. We believe we can accomplish what is needed in the near term with a one-page addition to the Strategic Framework Agreement. This would provide a "bridge" to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which, as it covers many complex issues, may take a longer time. SOFAs, the Ambassador reminded, require, on average, two years to conclude. What we need now is a decision on how Iraq wants to proceed. President Talabani believes that the Executive Council is a good forum for reaching that decision. In sum, Ambassador Crocker said, we hope Hashimi and his colleagues will take on that issue and advise the Prime Minister. ¶5. (S) Hashimi, who said that he has been studying the issue, asked whether the one-page addition to the SFA, which he referred to as an MOU, had been amended. The Ambassador said that the original MOU text had contained a paragraph that implicitly referred to CPA 17. At a June 26 meeting of the Deputies, it had been decided that such a reference would not BAGHDAD 00002152 002 OF 003 work with the Council of Representatives (CoR),so we requested that Dr. Hamoud remove it. There is now no reference -- direct or indirect -- to CPA 17. ¶6. (S) Hashimi asked what the situation would be should we fail to reach agreement on a SOFA by December 31. What would be the legal cover for the presence of troops and what would define the Code of Conduct? The Ambassador noted that Hashimi had raised the very reason for the MOU. For U.S. forces to be present after that date, there must be a legal basis. In most countries, there is a SOFA in place. Here, we are proposing that there be a bridge between the end of UNSCR 1790 and the SOFA -- a protocol that covers operational authorities, detentions and jurisdiction. Completing a Strategic Framework Agreement and an MOU would get us there. ¶7. (S) Finally, Hashimi asked whether UNSCR 1790 is referenced in the protocol and wanted to know how Iraqi funds would be protected. Ambassador Crocker said there is no reference to UNSCR 1790 in the protocol. NSC Senior Director McGurk noted that the bridging mechanism being prepared will consist of both a protocol and an MOU. The protocol will deal with key issues: operational authorities, detention, and jurisdiction (required for U.S. troops to be present on Iraqi soil). The MOU will deal with technical issues such as entry and exit. On ensuring that Iraqi funds are protected, McGurk said that the decision was Iraq's: it could seek a UNSC resolution and we would support such a resolution, though there would have to be some commitment on Iraq's part to work towards settling outstanding claims. McGurk said that a team that could advise on this issue will be arriving from Washington in the near future. ¶8. (S) NSC Senior Director McGurk said that we are now hearing talk about withdrawal timelines in connection with the agreements being considered. We are willing to discuss common goals and dates, but not in the context of a date-driven withdrawal. Thus we are interested in the Vice President's frank thoughts on the issue. ¶9. (S) Hashimi replied that Iraqis are sensitive on the subject. Although few details have been divulged to the public, Iraqis generally understand that the American public wants to get U.S. troops out. At the end of the day Iraq needs U.S. help in training and logistics, but the Iraqi leadership still needs a bottom line and a time. Iraqis need to see a light at the end of the corridor -- they do not want to be misled and to discover later that U.S. troops will stay forever. We need to give something to the people, he said, explaining that the Iraqi people are like people anywhere, and they need to see a change, and a sign that foreign forces are leaving their country. DASD Kimmitt noted that if we are too explicit, the calendar may drive the operations rather than events on the ground. Hashimi acknowledged the caveat, but insisted that where possible, Iraqi leaders needed to be able to say there will be change, if not a timeline. The Ambassador said that the requirement of Iraqi leaders underscored the need to get on with the work of completing the Strategic Framework Agreement and the protocol. DASD Kimmitt added that the longer the delay in reaching an agreement, the more opponents will take control of the issue. Other Issues: Tawafuq Return, King Abdullah, Iraqi Ambassadors -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) The Ambassador asked how the appointment of Tawafuq nominees to the Council of Ministers, the Tawafuq Coalition's return to government, was progressing. The Ambassador noted that the recent news that one of the Tawafuq Coalition's leaders had withdrawn the name of one of his nominees seems to have delayed the submission of names. Hashimi replied that the original list of names had been previously agreed to by representatives of the three coalition leaders. Thus it remained only for the Prime Minister, who has the list, to submit the names to the CoR. The delays, he said, were all part of a game in which he had no interest playing. ¶11. (S) Hashimi asked whether Ambassador knew the reason for the postponement of (Jordanian) King Abdullah's visit to Iraq. The Ambassador said he believed the postponement was due to a tight schedule which had the King scheduled for an evening event in London the same day he was to be in Iraq. Ambassador said he understood the visit would be rescheduled at an early date. Noting the Prime Minister's successful visit to the UAE and the announcement that Jordanian and UAE ambassadors would be posted to Baghdad, Ambassador Crocker said that the time was right for Iraq to accelerate the normalization of its relations with the international community. He urged Hashimi to push for the early posting of Iraqi ambassadors to as many capitals as possible, especially Arab capitals. Given the time required to move ambassadors BAGHDAD 00002152 003 OF 003 through the CoR confirmation process, the Ambassador said, the GOI could speed up the process by moving sitting ambassadors from their current posts to Arab posts, a move that would not require CoR approval. Hashimi acknowledged the suggestion and said he thought something along these lines was already occurring, referring to the pending transfer of the current Iraqi ambassador to Japan to Saudi Arabia. CROCKER