DE-BAATH AMENDMENTS AND COMMISSIONERS PENDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002134

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT: DE-BAATH AMENDMENTS AND COMMISSIONERS PENDING
SUMMONING OF POLITICAL WILL, AND RETURN OF TAWAFUQ FRONT TO
GOVERNMENT

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Member of Parliament Rashid Azzawi, (Sunni/Arab,
Tawafuq, Iraqi Islamic Party) explained to Poloffs on July 6
the state of play regarding the law on Accountability and
Justice which passed last February but has been neither
implemented nor amended until now. Azzawi confirmed that the
Presidency Council recently agreed to a list of amendments to
the law, but asserted that Shia fears of a "return of the
Baath Party" had stymied further action. Azzawi believes
strong pressure will be required to prompt the PM to take
steps to amend the law or name the seven new commissioners
called for in the law. Azzawi said he is working with senior
Shia leaders in the government (ones eligible for firing
under the new law) to help convince the PM to move forward.
End summary.

PASSING THE LAW--ONLY THE FIRST HURDLE
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2. (C) In a July 6 meeting with Poloffs, Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP, Tawafuq) CoR member Rashid Azzawi acknowledged that
getting the law on Accountability and Justice LAJ (as a
replacement for the 2003 De-Ba'athification Law) passed in
February 2008 had been a victory, but noted that the GOI had
been under extreme pressure, especially from the U.S., to
pass it. Since then, Azzawi said, there had been no pressure
and no action to implement the law by passing the amendments
proposed by Vice President Hashimi and appointing the
seven-member High Commission for Accountability and Justice
to oversee implementation of the LAJ.

NO RESPONSE FROM GOI, WILL PRESS AHEAD ON OWN
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3. (C) Azzawi maintained that GOI leaders did not
understand the "danger" of leaving the LAJ unamended, adding
that he had explained this to the Minister of Defense, the
Minister of State for National Security Affairs Sherwan
Wa'ili, and the head of Baghdad security MG Abud Kanbar --
all of whom could be fired under the terms of the new law.
Azzawi said he had been pressing them to help convince Maliki
to move forward on amending the law, but that Sadrists and
ISCI were blocking progress. There were four main amendments
to the LAJ that VP Hashimi was pushing for, along with a few
other less consequential amendments. Azzawi confirmed that
an ad hoc legal advisory team (including himself and two of
VP Hashimi's lawyers) had recently agreed to a list of
proposed amendments, and that VP Adel Abdel Mahdi's office
had given "verbal approval," as has President Talabani's
office. The Presidency Council would submit the proposed
amendments to the Council of Ministers and the PM's office
once support from the Shia parties was clear. In the
meantime, Azzawi estimated that the Hewar bloc, Tawafuq,
Iraqiyya, and possibly Fadhilah, were supportive of the
amendments ("97 yes votes").

WITH NO COMMISSION, LAJ IS INK ON PAPER
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4. (C) Azzawi deplored the fact that the Council of
Ministers (CoM) had made no move to nominate and appoint
members to the High Commission for Accountability and
Justice, noting that he had written PM Maliki four times
about this, Azzawi stressed that implementation and
regulation of the LAJ is impossible without a working
Commission. Azzawi was critical of Ahmad Chalabi's role in
passing the LAJ, and said he should not be entrusted with its
implementation. Nonetheless, he confirmed that the CoR
de-Ba'athification committee was currently inactive.

READY FOR COMPROMISE
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5. (C) Azzawi acknowledged that there was genuine fear in
Shi'ite leadership circles, in particular the United Iraqi
Alliance (UIA),that an amended LAJ would facilitate the
Ba'ath Party's return to power. He maintained that they need
reassurances (reinforced by the U.S.) that this would not
happen. Azzawi believes U.S. pressure on the GOI to establish
the Accountability and Justice Commission would advance the
whole National Reconciliation process. He warned that if
former Ba'athists are driven to desperation they will be a
source of instability and all other reintegration efforts
will fail (Note: On July 7, a senior advisor to VP Hashimi
told POLOFF that the issue would be addressed more forcefully
by Hashimi once Tawafuq had returned to government. Hashimi,

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he admitted, had names in mind as nominees for the
Commission, but the time was not right to reveal them now.
Also, PM Maliki had too many other things on his plate to
concern himself about this issue, he concluded. End note).
CROCKER