HELSINKI II ROLL-OUT IN BAGHDAD: MUCH ADO ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002112 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: HELSINKI II ROLL-OUT IN BAGHDAD: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) On July 5, organizers and participants in the "Helsinki II process" for Iraq presented their results in a brief public ceremony. Their agreement, negotiated and signed by senior members of numerous political blocs, consists of 17 principles and 15 implementing mechanisms. The principles are largely those of normal political behavior and the Iraqi Constitution (opposition to terrorism, commitment to the Constitution and to peaceful and democratic means, and so forth). ¶2. (U) Saturday's ceremony was the culmination of two sets of meetings held earlier this year in Helsinki ("Helsinki II Seminar on Divided Societies"). The program was organized by the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies of the University of Massachusetts at Boston, the Institute for Global Leadership at Tufts University, and the Crisis Management Initiative and funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ¶3. (U) According to the organizers, the next steps are up to the Iraqis themselves. Professor Padraig O'Malley, the principal organizer, portrayed the ceremony as a "handing over" to the Iraqis of the agreement. ¶4. (C) The exercise was not without controversy. Prime Minister Maliki initially tried to put a halt to the process, even, reportedly, pressuring the Al Rashid Hotel, where the ceremony took place, not to allow it to proceed. (Comment: The Prime Minister viewed the conference as bordering on foreign meddling in internal Iraqi affairs and also worried that it would turn into a forum for opponents of his government to criticize GOI performance with outside participants lending legitimacy. End Comment.) In the end, however, Maliki relented under pressure from the conference organizers, and his National Security Advisor, Mowaffak al-Rabaie, spoke at the ceremony. ¶5. (C) The organizers had involved veterans of the internal conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa, notably Martin McGuinness, Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, and Cyril Ramaphosa of the African National Congress. On the evening of July 5, McGuinness, O'Malley and some of the other organizers called on Ambassador Crocker. After some discussion regarding the Helsinki II process, O'Malley brought up the Prime Minister's obstructionism. The Ambassador placed his behavior in the context of the emergence of Iraqi sovereignty. Maliki might have seen the process as international outsiders involving themselves in Iraq's most important internal affairs. The Ambassador noted the recent GOI policy of forbidding participation in any conferences outside Iraq without specific approval. ¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador said that he had just attended another reconciliation event that had underlined this point. The event, commemorating the fifth anniversary of Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim's assassination, was attended by the Prime Minister, the President and many Sunni leaders, as well. Two themes had emerged, making the event very different from last year's. The first was reconciliation; the second was sovereignty. The leaders had emphasized that they must all stand together as Iraqis, and that Iraqis -- not others -- must decide upon their own future. ¶7. (C) Comment: Despite the fanfare and senior attendance, little practical impact can be expected from the event or the document itself. The ceremony was marked by squabbling among several of the signers, odd as all potentially controversial or ground-breaking language had been negotiated out of the text in Helsinki. Organizers of the event can be forgiven for feeling slighted by the tone and commentary of Rubaie, who questioned the applicability of others' experiences to Iraq. "Reconciliation has been achieved in Iraq, and Prime Minister Maliki is its author," was Rubaie's basic message. End Comment. CROCKER