AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002087 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY PARTY LEADER SHARIF ALI BIN AL-HUSSEIN Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Party leader Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein told the Ambassador he has been approached by Sunni Sahwa leaders for advice on dealing with the U.S. and the upcoming provincial elections. Sahwa leaders, he said, worried that the U.S. does not trust them and is not treating them as equals in the political process. He said Sahwa leaders are frustrated that their efforts thus far have produced few political gains and that unless they gain some political influence through the provincial elections, they will simply give up. That said, Sharif Ali expects the Sahwa and former Baathists to do relatively well in Anbar and in Baghdad competing against Tawafuq parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),few of whose leadership is from Baghdad. He said that the Sahwa tribal groups will work together and that tribal chiefs, who prefer to play power-brokers from behind the scenes rather than actually govern, will designate the candidates who are to be supported at the polls. He predicted the Sahwa will sweep the countryside in the elections if they are able to organize. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Crocker said that the electoral process offers the Sahwa the best way to achieve Sunni integration into the political system. The U.S. has a high regard for the Sahwa and we have made gains together; but now we are in a new phase of cooperation. This election is a complex process that involves the passage of a provincial elections law and then the development of platforms and policies and communications strategies appropriate to the open list system that is expected to come into play. As for Sahwa concerns concerning the U.S. position on elections, the Ambassador jokingly noted that IIP has also been complaining that the U.S. favors the Sahwa over them, so we must have it just about right. End Summary. Approached by the Sahwa -------------- ¶3. (C) In a July 5 call on Ambassador Crocker, which he noted was his first meeting with a USG official in more than three years, Iraqi Hashemite family member and leader of the Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Party Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein raised the issue of the Sahwa (Sunni Awakening). The Sahwa, he said, had been a force for significant progress in the past year. The Sahwa groups had contributed to improvements in security and in the economy and the Sahwa groups were poised to help strengthen the fragile gains that had been achieved. Now, Sharif Ali said, to sustain and to expand those gains, the Sahwa need to be brought into the political process. That said, the governing coalition seems uncomfortable with the Sahwa movement even as it needs to act positively to bring that movement into the political process. ¶4. (C) Sharif Ali said that Sahwa leaders have come to him to voice their concerns about the composition of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and their fear that the electoral process would not be transparent. Sharif Ali said that he had not meant to become involved in the elections, but the Sahwa leaders have made clear that they are not satisfied with the political status quo and that if their contributions do not lead to political power, they will simply give up. Moreover, Sharif Ali continued, the Sahwa leaders told him they do not feel that the U.S. is sympathetic to their concerns, that the U.S. does not trust them, and that it does not treat them as equals in the political process. In short, Sharif Ali said, the Sahwa feel they are outside the fold, exposed, and that "if we lose the elections, the next day there will be warrants for our arrest and we will be called terrorists." And, Sharif Ali said, Sahwa leaders had asked him how best to deal with the upcoming elections and how to deal with the U.S. U.S. Treatment of Sunni Groups: About Right -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Crocker said that the best way to achieve integration into the political system is through elections. Elections ensure that those who govern are held accountable. People are aware that although the GOI income has grown as a result of higher oil prices, their lives have not improved. So leaders will be held accountable at the polls; all parties have to be aware of the growing importance of public opinion. But first there has to be an election law and like everything else, it is a complex process to achieve one. For instance, one peculiarity of the Iraqi political process is that if a group dislikes the way a law is developing, it just walks out of the assembly, effectively vetoing the bill by removing the quorum necessary to consider it. Nevertheless, UNAMI will urge on all parties the importance of a legitimate BAGHDAD 00002087 002 OF 003 election. Any attempt at manipulation by the IHEC will be counterproductive and will produce an outcry of public opinion. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that this year's local elections will be a rehearsal for the 2009 national elections. Independent groups will want to obtain experience. And we are pleased to learn that they are coming to Sharif Ali for advice -- that they realize there is something to be learned: how to develop platforms, policies and to communicate these to the people. Continuing, Ambassador Crocker noted that several "awakenings" had taken place: a security awakening against Al Qaeda and a political awakening among increasing numbers of Iraqis who believe that politics is important. When the election law is passed and open lists become the way elections are held, there will be greater representation for more points of view. It will be interesting to see how the Sahwa will organize itself. ¶7. (C) Responding to Sharif Ali's question as to whether it would be a good idea for him to assist the Sahwa electoral effort, Ambassador Crocker said that it was for Sharif Ali himself to judge. Certainly helping the Sahwa to become involved in the political process is desirable, but we will not want it said that the U.S. has asked Sharif Ali to instruct the Sahwa on the political process. As for the Sahwa complaint that the U.S. is not providing a sympathetic ear to its concerns, Ambassador Crocker noted that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is accusing the U.S. of siding with the Sahwa. Thus, if each side is accusing us of siding with the other, we must have it about right. He said that the USG has a high regard for the Sunni Sahwa and we have achieved gains together. But now we are in a new place and with new challenges. The Sahwa know how to calm a place and win against Al Qaeda. But you cannot win an election with guns. Thus, Ambassador Crocker said, Sharif Ali's experience and willingness to counsel the Sahwa electoral effort could be a real assistance to the political process. Sahwa and Baathists To Win in Anbar, Salahadeen, Baghdad -------------- --- ¶8. (C) Sharif Ali said that Anbar Sahwa groups will pretty much come together and cooperate on local elections: there would be no Sahwa 1, 2 and 3. Anbar groups will also coordinate with Salahadeen Province and Baghdad groups to maximize electoral gains. Sharif Ali said tribal groupings will be important in the local elections. Tribal groups are led by sheikhs who have no interest in actually governing, but who prefer to be power brokers. The sheikhs will likely designate experienced professionals as their candidates. Sharif Ali predicted a clean sweep of the rural areas by the Sahwa, provided they know how to run a campaign. Ambassador Crocker noted that it will be an extra difficult challenge for the Sahwa if those with recognition and status do not run and nominees with little local name recognition do -- especially given the requirements of the open ballot system. ¶9. (C) Sharif Ali also forecast that the Sahwa and Baathists will do well in Baghdad and its suburbs. The IIP leadership, he noted, does not come from Baghdad and so that battleground would be fairly open. Former Baathists (such as Saleh Mutlaq of Hewar) will do well in Baghdad. IIP would have an advantage over the Sahwa in other urban areas such as Mosul. Sharif Ali said he did not believe that secular parties -- such as Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya -- will do well in provincial elections. Allawi has "not organized Iraqiya or provided the necessary leadership." Sharif Ali said that the Sunni Sahwa are realistic about their influence and essentially are competing to see who will be the partners of the Shia majority. If they win 20% of the seats in key areas, it will be a satisfactory outcome. ¶10. (C) Note and Comment: Sharif Ali's family is in London where Sharif Ali attended university and became a successful investment fund manager before resigning to pursue politics in 1991. He told the Ambassador that he has been present in Baghdad more or less continually for the past several years, though he has not met with a U.S. official for more than three years. Sharif Ali's party garnered only 0.16% of the vote in the January 2005 elections, did not qualify for any seats in the national assembly and has not been active in Iraqi politics since then. It is not clear why Sharif Ali has chosen to seek out USG connections now: whether he is considering actively counseling the Sahwa, and through them, gaining a voice in Sunni politics or whether he simply wants to raise his political profile by engaging with the USG. Sharif Ali said that he would remain in Baghdad until the beginning of August, when he would travel to London for a break with his family and then return to Baghdad for Ramadan and the elections. End Note and Comment. BAGHDAD 00002087 003 OF 003 CROCKER