AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002087

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S MEETING WITH IRAQI
CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY PARTY LEADER SHARIF ALI BIN
AL-HUSSEIN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Party leader
Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein told the Ambassador he has been
approached by Sunni Sahwa leaders for advice on dealing with
the U.S. and the upcoming provincial elections. Sahwa
leaders, he said, worried that the U.S. does not trust them
and is not treating them as equals in the political process.
He said Sahwa leaders are frustrated that their efforts thus
far have produced few political gains and that unless they
gain some political influence through the provincial
elections, they will simply give up. That said, Sharif Ali
expects the Sahwa and former Baathists to do relatively well
in Anbar and in Baghdad competing against Tawafuq parties
such as the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),few of whose
leadership is from Baghdad. He said that the Sahwa tribal
groups will work together and that tribal chiefs, who prefer
to play power-brokers from behind the scenes rather than
actually govern, will designate the candidates who are to be
supported at the polls. He predicted the Sahwa will sweep
the countryside in the elections if they are able to
organize.


2. (C) Ambassador Crocker said that the electoral process
offers the Sahwa the best way to achieve Sunni integration
into the political system. The U.S. has a high regard for
the Sahwa and we have made gains together; but now we are in
a new phase of cooperation. This election is a complex
process that involves the passage of a provincial elections
law and then the development of platforms and policies and
communications strategies appropriate to the open list system
that is expected to come into play. As for Sahwa concerns
concerning the U.S. position on elections, the Ambassador
jokingly noted that IIP has also been complaining that the
U.S. favors the Sahwa over them, so we must have it just
about right. End Summary.

Approached by the Sahwa
--------------


3. (C) In a July 5 call on Ambassador Crocker, which he noted
was his first meeting with a USG official in more than three
years, Iraqi Hashemite family member and leader of the Iraqi
Constitutional Monarchy Party Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein
raised the issue of the Sahwa (Sunni Awakening). The Sahwa,
he said, had been a force for significant progress in the
past year. The Sahwa groups had contributed to improvements
in security and in the economy and the Sahwa groups were
poised to help strengthen the fragile gains that had been
achieved. Now, Sharif Ali said, to sustain and to expand
those gains, the Sahwa need to be brought into the political
process. That said, the governing coalition seems
uncomfortable with the Sahwa movement even as it needs to act
positively to bring that movement into the political process.


4. (C) Sharif Ali said that Sahwa leaders have come to him to
voice their concerns about the composition of the Independent
High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and their fear that the
electoral process would not be transparent. Sharif Ali said
that he had not meant to become involved in the elections,
but the Sahwa leaders have made clear that they are not
satisfied with the political status quo and that if their
contributions do not lead to political power, they will
simply give up. Moreover, Sharif Ali continued, the Sahwa
leaders told him they do not feel that the U.S. is
sympathetic to their concerns, that the U.S. does not trust
them, and that it does not treat them as equals in the
political process. In short, Sharif Ali said, the Sahwa feel
they are outside the fold, exposed, and that "if we lose the
elections, the next day there will be warrants for our arrest
and we will be called terrorists." And, Sharif Ali said,
Sahwa leaders had asked him how best to deal with the
upcoming elections and how to deal with the U.S.

U.S. Treatment of Sunni Groups: About Right
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Crocker said that the best way to achieve
integration into the political system is through elections.
Elections ensure that those who govern are held accountable.
People are aware that although the GOI income has grown as a
result of higher oil prices, their lives have not improved.
So leaders will be held accountable at the polls; all parties
have to be aware of the growing importance of public opinion.
But first there has to be an election law and like
everything else, it is a complex process to achieve one. For
instance, one peculiarity of the Iraqi political process is
that if a group dislikes the way a law is developing, it just
walks out of the assembly, effectively vetoing the bill by
removing the quorum necessary to consider it. Nevertheless,
UNAMI will urge on all parties the importance of a legitimate

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election. Any attempt at manipulation by the IHEC will be
counterproductive and will produce an outcry of public
opinion.


6. (C) Ambassador Crocker noted that this year's local
elections will be a rehearsal for the 2009 national
elections. Independent groups will want to obtain
experience. And we are pleased to learn that they are coming
to Sharif Ali for advice -- that they realize there is
something to be learned: how to develop platforms, policies
and to communicate these to the people. Continuing,
Ambassador Crocker noted that several "awakenings" had taken
place: a security awakening against Al Qaeda and a political
awakening among increasing numbers of Iraqis who believe that
politics is important. When the election law is passed and
open lists become the way elections are held, there will be
greater representation for more points of view. It will be
interesting to see how the Sahwa will organize itself.


7. (C) Responding to Sharif Ali's question as to whether it
would be a good idea for him to assist the Sahwa electoral
effort, Ambassador Crocker said that it was for Sharif Ali
himself to judge. Certainly helping the Sahwa to become
involved in the political process is desirable, but we will
not want it said that the U.S. has asked Sharif Ali to
instruct the Sahwa on the political process. As for the
Sahwa complaint that the U.S. is not providing a sympathetic
ear to its concerns, Ambassador Crocker noted that the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) is accusing the U.S. of siding with the
Sahwa. Thus, if each side is accusing us of siding with the
other, we must have it about right. He said that the USG has
a high regard for the Sunni Sahwa and we have achieved gains
together. But now we are in a new place and with new
challenges. The Sahwa know how to calm a place and win
against Al Qaeda. But you cannot win an election with guns.
Thus, Ambassador Crocker said, Sharif Ali's experience and
willingness to counsel the Sahwa electoral effort could be a
real assistance to the political process.

Sahwa and Baathists To Win in Anbar, Salahadeen, Baghdad
-------------- ---


8. (C) Sharif Ali said that Anbar Sahwa groups will pretty
much come together and cooperate on local elections: there
would be no Sahwa 1, 2 and 3. Anbar groups will also
coordinate with Salahadeen Province and Baghdad groups to
maximize electoral gains. Sharif Ali said tribal groupings
will be important in the local elections. Tribal groups are
led by sheikhs who have no interest in actually governing,
but who prefer to be power brokers. The sheikhs will likely
designate experienced professionals as their candidates.
Sharif Ali predicted a clean sweep of the rural areas by the
Sahwa, provided they know how to run a campaign. Ambassador
Crocker noted that it will be an extra difficult challenge
for the Sahwa if those with recognition and status do not run
and nominees with little local name recognition do --
especially given the requirements of the open ballot system.


9. (C) Sharif Ali also forecast that the Sahwa and Baathists
will do well in Baghdad and its suburbs. The IIP leadership,
he noted, does not come from Baghdad and so that battleground
would be fairly open. Former Baathists (such as Saleh Mutlaq
of Hewar) will do well in Baghdad. IIP would have an
advantage over the Sahwa in other urban areas such as Mosul.
Sharif Ali said he did not believe that secular parties --
such as Ayad Allawi's Iraqiya -- will do well in provincial
elections. Allawi has "not organized Iraqiya or provided the
necessary leadership." Sharif Ali said that the Sunni Sahwa
are realistic about their influence and essentially are
competing to see who will be the partners of the Shia
majority. If they win 20% of the seats in key areas, it will
be a satisfactory outcome.


10. (C) Note and Comment: Sharif Ali's family is in London
where Sharif Ali attended university and became a successful
investment fund manager before resigning to pursue politics
in 1991. He told the Ambassador that he has been present in
Baghdad more or less continually for the past several years,
though he has not met with a U.S. official for more than
three years. Sharif Ali's party garnered only 0.16% of the
vote in the January 2005 elections, did not qualify for any
seats in the national assembly and has not been active in
Iraqi politics since then. It is not clear why Sharif Ali
has chosen to seek out USG connections now: whether he is
considering actively counseling the Sahwa, and through them,
gaining a voice in Sunni politics or whether he simply wants
to raise his political profile by engaging with the USG.
Sharif Ali said that he would remain in Baghdad until the
beginning of August, when he would travel to London for a
break with his family and then return to Baghdad for Ramadan
and the elections. End Note and Comment.

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CROCKER